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THE OCTOBER 1992 SUPREME COURT TERM AND
ANTITRUST: MORE OBJECTIVITY THAN EVER
STEPHEN CALKINS*
Time and again the Rehnquist Court has favored antitrust certainty.
When faced with a choice between achieving individualized justice and
adhering to relatively clear, generalized rules, it has usually chosen the
latter. The certainty of objective evidence has been preferred to the
more customized resort to subjective evidence.'
This pattern continued during the 1992-93 term. Perceived objectivity
through generalized rules triumphed in the term's four antitrust cases,
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,2
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,3 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,4
and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.5
This article will discuss each case in turn. It will be seen that especially
in terms of the litigation process at the Court and the quality of the
decisions, it was an unsatisfying antitrust year.
I. PROFESSIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTORS
At issue in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. was the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A brief comment on these
cases was published in MATTHEw BENDER'S ANTITRUST REPORT, August 1993. The author
thanks Jonathan B. Baker, Molly S. Boast, Geoffrey Calkins, James D. Hurwitz, Abbott P.
Lipsky,Jr.,James R. Loftis, and Veronica G. Kayne for helpful comments on a draft; Patrick
J. Coyne, Alan H. Silberman, andJonathan L. Stark for sharing briefs and transcripts; Faye
R. Morrison and Patricia A. Peters for research assistance; and many friends and colleagues
for invaluable discussions. Responsibility for what follows lies exclusively with the author.
' See Stephen Calkins, The 1990-91 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: Toward Greater
Certainty, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (1991).
113 S. Ct. 1920 (May 3, 1993).
' 113 S. Ct. 884 (Jan. 25, 1993).
4 113 S. Ct. 2891 (June 28, 1993).
' 113 S. Ct. 2578 (June 21, 1993).
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protection of certain petitioning for government action.6 Before Profes-
sionalRealEstate (PRE), plaintiffs had to satisfy a subjective test to establish
that litigation was sham (and therefore unprotected from the antitrust
laws). In PRE, the Court supplemented that subjective test with an objec-
tive test-and required plaintiffs to satisfy both. Unfortunately, the
Court's opinion, by Justice Thomas,7 failed to achieve the clarity it sought.
A. THE LITIGATION
The litigation in PRE featured a shootout between subjective and
objective standards. Even with the Solicitor General joining petitioners
in preferring subjectivity, it was not a fair fight. Perhaps it was because
the odds were so against them that petitioners kept changing strategy
right up until oral argument.
Petitioners were in trouble from the beginning. The suit concerned
videodiscs, an ill-fated home-entertainment technology. When a resort
hotel operator started renting videodiscs to patrons for in-room viewing
without payment of royalties, eight movie studios filed a single, appar-
ently reasonable lawsuit alleging copyright infringement.' The movie
studios lost in a controversial copyright decision," and then had to con-
front the antitrust counterclaim that had been filed with the answer to
their original lawsuit.
The district court granted summary judgment on the counterclaim. 10
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects a" 'legitimate effort to influence
government action,'" it explained." That the suit in question was a
legitimate effort was clear because the original plaintiffs 2 had sought
and expected a favorable outcome, the merits had been difficult to re-
6 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its sham exception are discussed in Calkins, Toward
Certainty, supra note 1, at 615-18; and Stephen Calkins, Developments in Antitrust and the
First Amendment: The Disaggregation of Noerr, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 327 (1988).
7 All nine Justices voted to affirm the court of appeals. Justice Souter concurred and
filed an opinion. Justice Stevens, with Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment and
filed an opinion.
' The studios presumably were concerned about lost potential royalties, but they also
may have worried about a possible threat to their competitive system for delivering movies
to hotel rooms through a wired cable system. 113 S. Ct. at 1923.
9 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 228 U.S.P.Q.
743 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court noted scholarly criticism
of the decision, 113 S. Ct. at 1930.
0 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,971 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
"Id. at 63,243 (quoting Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff, 690 F.2d
1240, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982)).
12 References to "plaintiffs" and "defendants" hereinafter will refer to parties in the
original suit; the parties in the antitrust counterclaim will be referred to as "counter-
plaintiffs" and "counter-defendants."
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solve, and "there was probable cause for bringing the action." The Ninth
Circuit affirmed.14 It interpreted Ninth Circuit precedents as erecting a
"two-part test": to prove "sham" litigation, counter-plaintiffs must prove
"(1) that the suit is baseless-a legal question ... and (2) that the suit
was brought as part of an anticompetitive plan external to the underlying
litigation-a question of fact."' 5 Since the counter-plaintiff did not "chal-
lenge the district court's finding that the infringement action was brought
with probable cause, i.e., that the suit was not baseless,"' 6 there was
no need for discovery on subjective intent before granting summary
judgment.
The Petition for Certiorari's "question presented" was whether the
court should have considered evidence "that the lawsuit in question was
not pursued with a genuine desire to obtain a favorable judgment."'7 By
the Brief on the Merits, petitioners had changed the question to whether
the court should have refused to consider evidence that the lawsuit
"was pursued with indifference to its outcome."' 8 By the middle of oral
argument, petitioners had switched to a "but-for" test asking whether
the suit would have been brought but for a predatory motive."
The Solicitor General joined petitioners in favoring a subjective intent
based test but disagreed as to the test and the outcome. He argued that
the test should turn on whether "litigation was brought to inflict harm
through the process alone, without regard to the outcome."20 He called
for rejecting the Ninth Circuit's test but affirming on other grounds.
Respondents argued that lawsuits should be sham only if they flunk
both an objective and a subjective test. Respondents' objective test would
have limited the sham exception to "objectively unreasonable" lawsuits.2'
"Objective misconduct" such as "serious misrepresentations" would sat-
isfy this.22 Absent such misconduct, however, a lawsuit "can be a sham
's 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 63,243.
'4 944 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1991).
' 944 F.2d at 1532. The Ninth Circuit recognized two types of sham activity: certain
baseless suits, and" 'misrepresentations ... in the adjudicatory process.' "944 F.2d at 1529
(quoting California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)).
It did not discuss misrepresentations, which were not in issue.
'6 944 F.2d at 1530.
'7 Petition for Certiorari at i.
IS Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at i.
Transcript at 10.
2o Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 16.
:I Brief for the Respondents at 41.
2 Brief for the Respondents at 41. Other misconduct that would satisfy this objective
test would include "flagrant abuses in the litigation process; a pattern of baseless or unsuc-
1994]
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only if it lacked a reasonable basis. ' 23 At oral argument, respondents'
lawyer was emphatic on the importance of a two-part, objective-subjective
test but was vague about each part.24 Once he said that "[blaselessness
is one way to satisfy that [objective] standard. 25 Later he seemed to use
"baselessness" and lack of probable cause as interchangeable phrasings
of the test.26
The petitioners fared badly in oral argument. The Court was clearly
disconcerted by the midstream switch of standards.27 Beyond that, how-
ever, the Court appeared anxious about the implications of any subjective
standard. Chief Justice Rehnquist worried aloud about the consequences
for summary judgment: "But you seldom get a summary judgment in
a case like this if you can go through a corporation's files on a question
of intent. The Ninth Circuit" approach is "at least much more easily
administrable I think, than the one you're urging."2" Later, after the
petitioners' lawyer advocated the measuring of a plaintiff's conflicted
motivations, the Chief Justice observed, "One thing is clear, isn't it, that
we'll never have summary judgment in one of these cases?, 2 9
B. THE COURT'S OPINION
From such an array of protean tests it would be a challenge to construct
an opinion of shining clarity and wisdom. It is disappointing, nonetheless,
cessful suits directed against petitioners; or misconduct amounting to a 'denial of access'
to the judicial forum." Id. (relying on California Motor Transport).
23 Brief for the Respondents at 41. This test was alternatively phrased to require that
"the underlying claim was not reasonably justified." Id.
24 The Justices twice had to ask how respondents' standard differed from the Govern-
ment's. Transcript at 40, 47-48.
2- Transcript at 32.
26 Transcript at 40-41:
In our world, there are two steps. First, the court makes an objective determination
of whether-in this case of whether there was probable cause to support the
lawsuit. If the court finds probable cause, that's the end of the case. If the court
finds no, the suit was baseless, then there's an inquiry into subjective intent. And
if the requisite subjective intent is found, the intent only to inflict harm through
the process, as opposed to the result, then Noerr immunity doesn't apply and the
litigation can be the basis for antitrust liability.
27 justice Scalia hypothesized, "So, we'd say, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, after
awarding damages, whether you award it or not, you should then ask yourself.., whether
this suit would have been brought but for the fact that it is harming a competitor."
Transcript at 11. There followed a lengthy colloquy about similarities and relationships
among the "genuine interest" test, the indifference test, and the but-for test.
28 Transcript at 9 (questioner identified by lawyer's response).
29 Transcript at 13 (Chief Justice identified by lawyer's response to line of questions).
Counsel responded that he could "imagine a number of situations in which summary
judgment could be granted," to which the Chief Justice rejoined, "Somebody is going to
have to be pretty careless." Id. at 13. Again counsel tried, arguing that successful litigants
in nonbaseless litigation could be entitled to strong presumptions. The Chief Justice was
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that the Court perpetuated the culture of capriciousness that infected
this case. Neither the Court's reasoning nor its result is satisfying.3" The
Court's analysis consisted of (1) a review of its previous decisions that
was rife with mischaracterizations and non sequiturs, and (2) unpersua-
sive resort to a dictionary.
Previously, sham litigation was defined in one of two ways: (1) "private
action that is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government
action, '"s' or (2) "situations in which persons use the governmental pro-
cess-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive
weapon.32 As a result of PRE, inquiry into "the litigant's subjective
motivation," which requires proof that the plaintiff sought to harm com-
petition with the "governmental process," is just the second step.3 The
new first step was phrased more than a half-dozen ways: only "objectively
baseless" litigation can be sham;1 "an objectively reasonable effort tolitigate cannot be sham; 3 5 a sham lawsuit "must be objectively baseless
in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success
on the merits; '"3 6 a lawsuit is immunized if "an objective litigant could
not buying: "But that still isn't going to do a whit for you on summary judgment." Id.
at 14.
30 The Court even started unfortunately. Citing cases, it wrote that the "array of defini-
tions adopted by lower courts demonstrates" that the Court was "prescient" when it "once
observed that 'sham' might become 'no more than a label courts could apply to activity
they deem unworthy of antitrust immunity.'" 113 S. Ct. at 1925 (quoting Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 508 n.10). Any such prescience would
deserve only limited credit, however, because only 3 of the 10 cited cases were decided
after Allied Tube. The Allied Tube Court had not made a prediction at all; rather, it had
complained about the lower court ("the Ninth Circuit's approach renders 'sham' no more
than a label courts could apply ....").
s' Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500 n.4 (1988); cf. Lawrence A. Sullivan, Developments in the
Noerr Doctrine, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 361, 362 (1987) ("A petition is not a sham, in this
purpose-centered sense, unless petitioner is really not looking for government action at
all.").
32 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1354 (1991).
Omni muddled things by also quoting Allied Tube's "not genuinely aimed at procuring
favorable government action" language, appending the words "at all." Ill S. Ct. at 1354.
See Calkins, Toward Certainty, supra note 1, at 615-16.
s 113 S. Ct. at 1928:
Under this second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus on
whether the baseless lawsuit conceals "an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor" through the "use [of] the governmental
process-as opposed to the outcome of that process as an anticompetitive weapon."
(citing first Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961) (emphasis added) and then Omni (emphasis in original). This second step differs
from the Ninth Circuit's, which had required "that the suit was brought as part of an
anticompetitive plan external to the underlying litigation." 944 F.2d at 1532.
s4 113 S. Ct. at 1923.
" Id. at 1926.3 1 Id. at 1928.
19941
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable out-
come;, 37 "sham litigation must constitute the pursuit of claims so baseless
that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect to secure favorable
relief;0 8 a lawsuit cannot be sham if there was "probable cause to institute
legal proceedings," which "requires no more than a 'reasonabl[e] belie[f]
that there is a chance that [a] claim may be held valid upon adjudica-
tion' ;, 3 9 it is sufficient that "[any reasonable copyright owner ... could
have believed that it had some chance of winning an infringement suit; 40
it is sufficient that "a similarly situated reasonable litigant could have
perceived some likelihood of success;",4 ' and it is sufficient that a "court
could reasonably conclude" that the suit "was an objectively plausible
effort to enforce rights. 42 And this listing of alternative versions of the
test ignores the Court's puzzling reference to Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.43
The Court asserted that its "original formulation of antitrust petition-
ing immunity required that unprotected activity lack objective reason-
ableness. 44 Yet this claim was supported merely by pointing to Noerr's
holding that an anticompetitive animus does not make otherwise valid
petitioning illegal. 45 A holding that persons may ask the government to
harm their rivals says nothing about whether petitioning is immune even
when not genuinely motivated by an interest in seeking the petitioned-
for redress.46
Most of the Court's justification for its alternatively phrased objective
test consisted of an unpersuasive review of post-Noerr precedent. The
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1929.
" Id. (citation omitted).
40 Id. at 1930.
41 Id. at 1931.
42 Id.
13 Without explaining the importance of the point, the Court wrote, "Even though it
did not survive PRE's motion for summary judgment, Columbia's copyright action was
arguably 'warranted by existing law' or at the very least was based on an objectively 'good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.' FED. RULE CIV.
PROC. 11." Id. at 1930-31.
41 113 S. Ct. at 1926.
" Id. at 1926-27 (citingNoerr, 365 U.S. at 138-39, 143). Similarly, United Mine Workers
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965), which was quoted as saying that petitioning is
protected "regardless of intent or purpose," was rejecting an assertion that a conspiracy
intended to violate a statute was unprotected, 381 U.S. at 669-70.
46 This limitation was recognized in Noerr itself:
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified. But this
certainly is not the case here. No one denies that the railroads were making a
[Vol. 62
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Court claimed that California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited 7
drew a line "separating objectively reasonable claims from 'a pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims,' ,4 whereas California Motor Transport actually
drew quite a different line.49 The PRE Court wrote that its "recognition
of a sham in that case [California Motor Transport] signifies that the institu-
tion of legal proceedings 'without probable cause' will give rise to a sham
if such activity effectively 'bar[s] ... competitors from meaningful access
to adjudicatory tribunals and so ... usurp[s] th[e] decisionmaking
process.' "50 But this assertion took words out of context and, by doing
so, misread precedent. The essence of California Motor Transport is not
that actions were instituted " 'without probable cause,' " but rather that
they were instituted " 'with or without probable cause.' ""' That Court was
untroubled by the plaintiffs having prevailed in a majority of the ac-
tions.52 Although California Motor Transport did refer to "baseless" filings,
and some have read the opinion as supporting a "baselessness" test,53
that Court's holding turned squarely on plaintiffs' intent.54
genuine effort to influence legislation and law enforcement practices.
365 U.S. at 144.
47 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
41 113 S. Ct. at 1927 (quoting 404 U.S. at 513).
4 404 U.S. at 513 ("One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may go
unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder
to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused.").
'0 113 S. Ct. at 1927 (quoting 404 U.S. at 512) (brackets by PRE Court).
-" 404 U.S. at 512 (emphasis added). The charge in California Motor Transport was that
one group of truckers reflexively challenged virtually every request by a competitor for
additional operating rights. The discussion from which PRE plucked snippets is as follows:
Petitioners rely on our statement in Pennington that "Noerr shields from the Sher-
man Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or
purpose." 381 U.S., at 670. In the present case, however, the allegations are not
that the conspirators sought "to influence public officials," but that they sought
to bar their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and so
to usurp that decisionmaking process. It is alleged that petitioners "instituted the
proceedings and actions ... with or without probable cause, and regardless of
the merits of the cases." The nature of the views pressed does not, of course,
determine whether First Amendment rights may be invoked; but they may bear
upon a purpose to deprive the competitors of meaningful access to the agencies
and the courts. As stated in the opinion concurring in the judgment, such a
purpose or intent, if shown, would be "to discourage and ultimately to prevent
the respondents from invoking" the processes of the administrative agencies and
courts and thus fall within the exception to Noerr.
52 Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 1967 Trade Cas. (CCH)
72,298, at 84,744 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (21 of 40 proceedings "resulted in action favorable
to [counter-ldefendants").
5 E.g., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 999 (3d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS].
Accord Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CAL. L. REV.
1177, 1232 (1992) (California Motor Transport inconsistent with probable cause test); James
D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr,
74 GEO. L.J. 65, 95 (1985) (California Motor Transport rejects objective standard). The
1994]
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The PRE Court wrote that ever since Noerr and California Motor Trans-
port it had "consistently assumed that the sham exception contains an
indispensable objective component., 55 Any such assumption, however,
is not manifested in the written opinions, the excerpts quoted by the
Court notwithstanding. 6 The Court highlighted cases holding that an
anticompetitive purpose is not sufficient to make petitioning sham, but
such cases do not lend support. 7 The Court quoted at length Omni
Outdoor Advertising's explanation that anticompetitive intentions do not
make a sham;5 8 but such language does not show that Omni "held that
challenges to allegedly sham petitioning activity must be resolved ac-
cording to objective criteria. 59 Instead, Omni was a source of what had
been relatively settled law on the sham doctrine. ° When the Court con-
centrality of intent is made especially clear in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in
California Motor Transport, on which the majority twice relied, 404 U.S. at 512, 515. Justice
Stewart reviewed the complaint and reasoned that "the respondents are entitled to prove
that the real intent of the conspirators was not to invoke the processes of the administrative
agencies and courts, but to discourage and ultimately to prevent the respondents from
invoking those processes. Such an intent would make the conspiracy 'an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman
Act would be justified.' "Id. at 518 (emphasis in original) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144).
PRE noted some of California Motor Transport's references to purpose, but responded
merely by observing as follows: "That a sham depends on the existence of anticompetitive
intent, however, does not transform the sham inquiry into a purely subjective investigation."
113 S. Ct. at 1926 n.4.
15 113 S. Ct. at 1927.
56 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,380 (1973), referred to proceedings
where "the purpose to suppress competition is evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying the
hallmark of insubstantial claims" (italicized words omitted by PRE Court), and it was merely
describing the holding in California Motor Transport. In his concurring opinion in Vendo
Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 645 (1977),Justice Blackmun was not "describing
a successful lawsuit as a 'genuine attemp[t] to use the.., adjudicative process legitimately,' "
as suggested, 113 S. Ct. at 1927; rather, Justice Blackmun wrote that the District Court
"believed that it was enough that Vendo's activities ... were not genuine attempts," etc.,
whereas he concluded that a single state court proceeding leading to a "considered af-
firmance" by the Illinois Supreme Court of a $7 million judgment could not be said to be
"using the state-court proceeding as an anticompetitive device in and of itself." 433 U.S.
at 645. The only case providing solid support for PRE is Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc.
v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743-44 (1983), the NLRB case reasoning by analogy to Noerr's
sham exception and declining to permit the NLRB to enjoin the prosecution of nonbaseless
state court lawsuits.
"' See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Confusion about purposes permeated the
oral argument. One question suggested that "if there was no intent to harm competition,
that's the end of the case." Another, that if "there is intent to harm competition, it doesn't
make any difference how well based the case was or even if it was won." Transcript at 6-
7. One Justice asked, "[w]hen does anybody bring suit against a competitor without hoping
to harm the competitor?" Transcript at 11. Another questioner suggested twice that anyone
filing a copyright suit desires to harm the defendant's business. Transcript at 38.
113 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Ill S. Ct. at 1354).
59 113 S. Ct. at 1928.
o See supra note 32; see also Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1355 (sham exception should not apply
to "a genuine attempt to influence governmental action").
[Vol. 62
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cluded its review of previous cases by declaring that "fidelity to precedent
compels us to reject a purely subjective definition of 'sham,' ,,61 the Court
was engaging in a certain amount of overstatement.
6 2
In addition to its review of precedent, the Court found support for
its new two-part test in a dictionary. The Court claimed that "the apparent
confusion" about the sham exception "may stem from our use of the
word 'genuine' to denote the opposite of 'sham.' ,,63 The Court then
explained that " 'genuine' has both objective and subjective connota-
tions." It can mean " 'actually having the reputed or apparent qualities
or character,' " or it can mean " 'sincerely and honestly felt or
experienced.' ,,64 The Court found in these two meanings support for
adding an objective test: "To be sham, therefore, litigation must fail to
be 'genuine' in both senses of the word."6
With all due respect, that conclusion does not follow. In the referenced
cases the word "genuine" (or "genuinely") is followed by "aimed," "at-
tempt(s)," and "effort." No definition of "genuine" can transform an
inquiry about whether litigation was a "genuine attempt to influence
governmental action" into the Court's new, varying, subjective-and-objec-
tive test; but that test is now law.
C. THE MEANING OF PROFESSIONAL REAL ESTATE6 6
Clarity is impossible when a court offers such a smorgasbord of stan-
dards. Three Justices recoiled from the seeming casualness of the Court's
61 113 S. Ct. at 1928.
62 See also Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, The Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions for
Anticompetitive Litigation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 757, 797 (1992) (Allied Tube rejected objective
tests); Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust Exemptions for Private Requests for
Governmental Action: A Critical Analysis of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 17 U. CAL. DAVIS
L. REv. 549, 571 (1984) ("courts have held that the defendants' intent is the principal
criterion in determining whether attempts to obtain governmental relief are a sham"); cf
Hurwitz, supra note 54, at 102 ("The weight both of prevailing authority and sound policy
... supports a requirement of baselessness, except where petitioning is supported by unethical
conduct, undertaken in complete disregard of the merits, or part of an overarching unlawful scheme.")
(emphasis added); Milton Handler & Richard A. De Sevo, The Noerr Doctrine and Its Sham
Exception, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. I, 55 (1984) (calling for the sham exception to be narrowed
and limited by a "dual standard" to include only (1) frivolous petitioning where (2) plaintiff
knew it lacked legal or factual basis). But cf, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note
53, at 999 n.207 (lower court cases adopting baselessness requirement).
63 113 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1355; Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500 n.4;
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144; and Vendo Co., 433 U.S. at 645 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
result)).
64 113 S. Ct. at 1928-29 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
948 (1986)).
65 113 S. Ct. at 1929 (footnote omitted).
66 For other discussions of the case, which raise some points related to the material that
follows, see Maxwell M. Blecher, A Plaintiffs Survival Guide in the Post-Columbia Pictures
19941
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drafting.Justice Souter, concurring, asserted that the Court had held "that
a person cannot incur antitrust liability merely by bringing a lawsuit as long
as the suit is not 'objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant
could realistically expect success on the merits.' ,,67 But he worried that
lower courts might not find this test among the cloud of proffered stan-
dards.Justice Stevens,joined by Justice O'Connor, found a different hold-
ing in PRE, namely, " 'that an objectively reasonable effort to litigate can-
not be sham regardless of subjective intent.' ,6 He quoted four different
phrasings of the Court's new test and wondered whether the Court meant
to suggest that counter-plaintiffs had to satisfy one, some, or all of them.
Nor do PRE's facts clarify its holding. The case involved a single lawsuit
that was "obviously legitimate," according even to Justice Stevens, the
Justice apparently most sympathetic to the defendants' position.69 Yet
nothing in the Court's discussion prevents application of its test to two,
three, or many lawsuits. The PRE dispute focused sharply on litigation
rather than petitioning more generally; yet it is not clear that the Court's
discussion does not apply to other forms of petitioning as well. Also
uncertain is the fate of the line of authority declining to protect unethical
petitioning conduct such as fraud and misrepresentation.7° It is not even
clear that the Court has eliminated exclusive reliance on subjective moti-
vation in the "sham" exception or for Noerr immunity more generally.
1. Possible Continued Subjectivity in Identifying Shams
However the Court's "baselessness" test is phrased, it could incorporate
an element of subjectivity. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, found that
the suit was not "baseless" because the district court found "probable
cause"; but the district court emphasized that "[i]t was clear from the
manner in which the case was presented that the plaintiff was seeking
and expecting a favorable judgment. ',7 The specific holding of PRE thus
would not apply to a different kind of suit. The Solicitor General pointed
out this constraint on the meaning of "baselessness," arguing that "the
inquiry into baselessness is malleable enough to reflect a judge's percep-
tion of whether a particular litigant was 'really' engaged in a sham-an
inquiry that boils down to subjective intent. 72
Era, ANTITRUST REPORT, June 1993, at 6; Richard M. Brunell, Can Sham Litigation Claims
Survive After Columbia Pictures? (unpublished manuscript Sept. 15, 1993).
6' 113 S. Ct. at 1931 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting 113 S. Ct. at 1928).
6' Id. at 1932 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 113 S. Ct. at 1926).
69 Id. at 1933 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
70 See infra note 95.
71 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 63,243.
72 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 17 n. 15.
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That subjective intent might continue to be an issue also is suggested
by the Court's application of its new test. The Court wrote that "sham"
requires "the pursuit of claims so baseless that no reasonable litigant
could realistically expect to secure favorable relief," but then, in the next
sentence, wrote that "[t]he existence of probable cause to institute legal
proceedings precludes a finding that an antitrust defendant has engaged
in sham litigation.""T The heart of the Court's reasoning consisted of
proof of the existence of probable cause "as understood and applied in
the commonlaw tort of wrongful civil proceedings."74
This part of the opinion may be a fountainhead of confusion. Perhaps
the existence of "probable cause" is the critical test, since that was the
issue on which the Court focused. Alternatively, perhaps proof of proba-
ble cause is merely one way a counter-defendant can prevail on the
objective test, i.e., probable cause is sufficient but not necessary to dis-
prove baselessness. Equally troubling, it is not clear whether any probable
cause test should turn on the common law (1) as described by the Court,
(2) as commonly understood, or (3) as applied by the Court. Unfortu-
nately, while the first two understandings of probable cause are very
similar, the third appears quite different.
The Court wrote that probable cause in the civil context "requires no
more than a 'reasonabl[e] belie[f] that there is a chance that [a] claim
may be held valid upon adjudication.' 7 5 The Court said that where the
' 113 S. Ct. at 1929.
7 Id. The Court noted that the better-known tort of "malicious prosecution" actually
refers to the wrongful instigation of criminal proceedings, but it dismissed concern about
distinctions between the two by explaining that the "threshold for showing probable cause
is no higher in the civil context than in the criminal." 113 S. Ct. at 1929 n.7 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674, Comment e at 454-55 (1977)).
The Court highlighted this tort largely on its own initiative. The subject barely arose at
oral argument. Of the 14 torts authorities cited by the Court, only 5 (including the RE-
STATEMENT and W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 893
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]) were cited in a brief.
The Court did not explain why it looked to the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings
rather than the related tort of abuse of process. Cf. Brief for the Respondents, at 36-38
(drawing analogies to both common law torts); Brief for the United States and the Federal
Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14-15 n. I1 (noting that
probable cause does not prevent a finding of abuse of process).
"' 113 S. Ct. at 1929 (brackets by the Court) (citing "Hubbard v. Beatty & Hyde, Inc., 343
Mass. 258, 262, 178 N.E.2d 485, 488 (1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 675,
Comment e, at 454-55 (1977)"). Although the Court failed to note this, the quoted language
from Hubbard itself was a quotation, from Comment e to RESTATEMENT (FIRST) § 675. The
comparable sentence in Comment e to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 675, at 459-60, says that
for civil proceedings, "all that is necessary is that the claimant reasonably believe that there
is a sound chance that his claim may be held legally valid upon adjudication." It is not
clear whether the Court meant to cite this, since it cited Section 675, but different pages
(454-55) which contain Comment e to Section 674 (which states, at 454, that "a reasonable
belief in the possibility that the claim may be held valid is sufficient to give probable cause
for the initiation of civil proceedings").
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predicate facts are undisputed, "a court may decide probable cause as a
matter of law., 7 6 Although these are not the only formulations of com-
mon law wrongful use of civil proceedings, neither statement is remark-
able.77 But the Court went on to say that the " 'question is not whether
[the defendant] thought the facts to constitute probable cause, but
whether the court thinks they did.' ,,78 The only "fact" at which PRE
looked was the state of copyright law in early 1986, when the district
court granted summary judgment on the copyright claim.7 9 The Court
pronounced that law very unsettled as shown by two opinions going
the other way,8 ° by subsequent scholarly criticism of the Ninth Circuit's
decision,8 1 and by the Seventh Circuit's refusal to follow the Ninth Cir-
cuit's lead. 2 PRE concluded that "[i]n light of the unsettled condition
of the law, Columbia plainly had probable cause to sue.',
8 1
That is not the way a common law court would likely analyze a charge of
wrongful use of civil litigation, in three respects. First, probable cause for
initiation of a proceeding is measured as of the date of its commencement"
76 113 S. Ct. at 1930.
" Cf. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 74, at 893 (one "is justified in bringing a civil suit
when he reasonably believes that he has a good chance of establishing it to the satisfaction
of the court or the jury").
71 113 S. Ct. at 1930 (quoting a false imprisonment case, Director General v. Kastenbaum,
263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923)).
79 113 S. Ct. at 1930.
80 Id. (citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir.
1984); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 315 (M.D. Pa. 1985),
affd, 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986)).
8' 113 S. Ct. at 1930 (citing 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 5.7.2.2, at 616-19 (1989); and 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 8.14[CI[3], at 8-168-73 (1992)).
82 113 S. Ct. at 1930 (citing Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1020
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 181 (1991)).
83 113 S. Ct. at 1930.
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 662, Commentf(1977) ("The question
of probable cause is to be determined in the light of those facts that the accuser knows or
reasonably believes to exist at the time when he acts.... [H]is position cannot be improved
by his subsequent discovery of incriminating facts" unless they result in conviction (since
conviction is a complete defense).); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 675,
Comment c (Comments e-g to § 662 (malicious prosecution) are generally applicable to
wrongful use of civil proceedings); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 195 (1879) (case
cited three times by Court) ("The conduct of the defendants is to be weighed in view of
what appeared to them when they filed their petition in the bankrupt court-not in the
light of subsequently appearing facts. Had they reasonable cause for their action when
they took it? Not what the actual fact was, but what they had reason to believe it was.")
(citations omitted); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 277 (1980) (case cited by Court) ("In
cases of malicious prosecution [there, of a civil action], the inquiry as to want of probable
cause is limited to the facts and circumstances as they appeared to defendant at the time
the prosecution was commenced.") (citations omitted); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 183 (1879) (discussion of malicious prosecution cited twice by Court)
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-here, April 25, 1983 8 -rather than the 1986 date chosen by the
Court. 6
Second, the common law tort turns on facts that the plaintiff personally
knows or believes he or she can establish. For instance, in Director General
v. Kastenbaum,7 the case quoted by PRE for the proposition that it is up
to the court to decide whether "the facts" constitute probable cause, the
Court wrote that "probable cause ... is measured by the state of the
defendant's knowledge, not by his intent. It means the absence of proba-
ble cause known to the defendant when he instituted his suit. '8 Although
the PRE Court was imprecise on this point, it appeared to have had little
interest in what the plaintiffs knew in 1983 (or, for that matter, in 1986).
Since there was no suggestion that the plaintiffs' information was flawed,
the Court's failure to address the question may have been an oversight;
but the Court departed from the common law.
Third, and more controversial, the more accepted view is that to estab-
lish probable cause a plaintiff must subjectively believe in his or her
case. s9 This is most clear for the tort of malicious prosecution (of criminal
("The test of probable cause is to be applied as of the time when the action complained
of was taken; and if upon the facts then known the party had no probable cause for action,
it will be no protection to him that facts came to his knowledge afterwards that might have
constituted a justification had he been aware of them.").
85 228 U.S.P.Q. at 745 (copyright infringement claim filed).
86 Even 1986 was before issuance of the two contrary opinions mentioned by the Court.
Although the Court could have meant to say that the 1984 and 1985 opinions and the
criticism that followed the Ninth Circuit's 1989 decision showed that the law was unsettled
in 1983, that is not what the Court said.
87 263 U.S. 25 (1923).
8 Id. at 27-28. To the language quoted by PRE is appended a citation to OLIVER W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 140 (1923), where Holmes explained the point nicely: "The
want of probable cause refers, of course, only to the state of the defendant's knowledge,
not to his intent. It means the absence of probable cause in the facts known to the defendant
when he instituted the suit."; see also sources cited supra note 84.
Kastenbaum was an action for false imprisonment. The Restatement of Torts explains that
one of the differences between malicious prosecution and wrongful use of civil proceedings
is that for the latter, proceedings may be initiated with less certainty about the facts. A
plaintiff cannot proceed based on facts known to be false, but "it is enough if their existence
is not certain but he believes that he can establish their existence to the satisfaction of
court and jury." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 675, Comment d.
89 In this respect, probable cause in tort law appears to differ from probable cause in
criminal procedure. A good discussion of the point is included in 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.2(b) (2d ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1993). Noting that the question will arise rarely, LaFave posits the case where the
individual (typically a police officer) does not subjectively believe that there is probable
cause, even though in fact there is. Although LaFave notes dictum going the other way,
he sets forth, as the "correct view," that police doubts about probable cause should not
prevent a search or arrest from being upheld. That LaFave's view is sound is made clear
by reading the referenced cases. Not infrequently, it seems, a police officer will claim not
to have made an arrest or a search, only to have a court find that he or she did-but,
unbeknownst to the officer, with probable cause.
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proceedings),90 which the Court treated interchangeably with the tort of
wrongful use of civil proceedings. But for civil proceedings, too, the
more accepted view is that a plaintiff should possess a specific belief in
the likely, or at least the possible, merits of his or her case. 91 A suit filed
without such a reasonable belief is protected if it succeeds since failure
usually is an element of the tort;92 but a failed suit usually is protected
only if there was an actual belief.
The definition of probable cause that the Court quoted, requiring a
reasonable belief in the chance that a claim may be upheld, is consistent
with the more accepted view that (1) the question is asked as of the date
proceedings were initiated, (2) the answer turns on facts the plaintiff
actually knew or believed he or she could establish, and (3) the plaintiff
must actually have had the belief that his or her claim may be valid. But
the Court's application of the standard to the facts relied on events
occurring after the initiation of proceedings and showed no apparent
interest in what the plaintiff knew or believed. Thus, the test as phrased
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 662(1977); see alsoJOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE NON-CONTRACT LAW § 239, at 95 (1889) (treatise cited by Court) ("Probable
cause ... is any such combination of facts and proofs as may fairly lead the reasonable
mind to the belief (and the person relying on it must believe) that, in the absence of hitherto
unknown qualifying or rebutting evidence, the prosecution ... ought to be successful.")
(footnotes omitted); COOLEY, supra note 84, at 183 ("Neither is he justified if he knew the
facts, but did not believe them."); JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 582 (6th ed. 1983)
("It is not enough that a discreet and reasonable man would have believed in the guilt of
the accused, unless the defendant himself honestly shared it. There must be both actual
and reasonable belief.") (footnote omitted). For criticism of the Restatement's subjective rule
and a highlighting of some cases going the other way, see PROSSER &'KEETON, supra note
74, at 877; Dan B. Dobbs, Belief and Doubt in Malicious Prosecution and Libel, 21 ARIZ. L.
REV. 607 (1979).
9' The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) states the black letter law of probable cause as requiring
that the plaintiff "reasonably believes in the existence of the facts upon which the claim
is based, and either (a) correctly or reasonably believes that under those facts the claim
may be valid under the applicable law, or (b) believes to this effect in reliance upon the
advice of counsel, sought in good faith .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 675
(1977). The Comment to this section indicates that the plaintiff must "reasonably believe
that there is a sound chance that his claim may be held legally valid upon adjudication."
Comment e, at 459-60. See also, e.g., Bradshaw v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
758 P.2d 1313, 1319 (Ariz. 1988) ("The proper test is subjective and objective. The initiator
of the action must honestly believe in its possible merits; and, in light of the facts, that belief
must be objectively reasonable.") (citations omitted); 1 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW
OF TORTS 462 (2d ed. 1986) ("the initiator of civil litigation is justified in terms of probable
cause by a reasonable belief in the possibility that the claim may be held valid"). Contra
Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity for Concerted Attempts to Influence Courts and Adjudicatory
Agencies: Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86 HARV. L. REV. 715,
729 (1973) (note blending malicious prosecution of criminal and civil actions asserts that
"common law courts generally have avoided determining whether the defendant subjec-
tively believed in the merit of his case; rather, the standard is fundamentally objective").
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674; see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 74,
at 892.
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and as drawing on common law sources retains a subjective element; the
test as applied may not.
2. Subjective Intent as an Element in Petitioning Immunity Other than
Through the Sham Exception
However much PRE limited the sham exception, it only did that-
limit an exception. The importance of the change depends on the impor-
tance of the exception. At one time the sham exception played a leading
role in litigation about petitioning since sham was regarded as a broad,
malleable concept that condemned improper petitioning. Were the ex-
ception that central, narrowing it would make quite a difference.
The effect of the Court's decision in Allied Tube & Conduit, Corp. v.
Indian Head, Inc., however, was to reduce significantly the scope and
importance of the sham exception.93 Once the sham exception was limited
to "activity that was not genuinely intended to influence governmental
action, 94 the exception became irrelevant to such unethical conduct as
misrepresentation, bribery, and conspiracy. 95 The applicability of Noerr
to such behavior turned not on any exception to Noerr but on whether
Noerr applied initially at all; the applicability of Noerr depended, in turn,
on whether a restraint resulting from petitioning was " 'incidental' to a
valid effort to influence governmental action" 96-and that depended "not
only on its impact, but also on the context and nature of the activity. '
The critical issues, of course, turn on the determination of what restraints
are "incidental" and what petitioning efforts are "valid."9 To the extent
that antitrust challenges to petitioning turn on these issues rather than
on the sham exception, PRE's limitation of the sham exception will have
less impact.
3. The Basis of Noerr
In PRE the Court again failed to address explicitly the perennial ques-
tion of whether Noerr is a First Amendment-based exemption from the
98 486 U.S. 492 (1988). This aspect of Allied Tube is discussed in Calkins, First Amendment,
supra note 6, at 338-40; see also Elhauge, supra note 54, at 1215. But cf. Calkins, Toward
Certainty, supra note 1, at 615-16 (Omni lessened clarity by unnecessarily presuming the
"sham" exception was at issue).
Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 508 n. 10.
9 PRE neither confirmed nor rejected this when it reserved the question of Noerr's
applicability to fraud and misrepresentation. 113 S. Ct. at 1929 n.6 ("We need not decide
here whether and, if so, to what extent Noerr permits the imposition of antitrust liability
for a litigant's fraud or other misrepresentations.") (citations omitted). Respondents' Brief
at 41, in contrast, had assumed that such behavior would be considered sham. Supra note
22 and accompanying text.
9 486 U.S. at 499.
9' Id. at 504.
" For a thorough analysis of these issues see Elhauge, supra note 54, at 1215-40.
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antitrust laws, or simply an interpretation of those laws.99 Respondents
stressed the "fundamental point[]" that Noerr was interpreting a statute,
so the Court "has a much freer hand to fashion sensible rules."'00 Petition-
ers objected.' ° ' The Court exercised the free hand urged by respondents
without making clear its basis for doing so. The opinion's tone is one of
statutory construction, however; 0 2 and to the extent that the Court has
implied an answer to this question' 3 the case has implications beyond
the sham exception.
D. CONCLUSION
The above criticism of the Court's reasoning and result is not premised
on the Court's overlooking some obviously correct' test for identifying
sham petitioning. There is no such test-which is why the Court should
have waited for a better vehicle to address the issue. The notion of
scrutinizing litigators' intent is frightening; 14 yet litigation sometimes is
filed solely to impose litigation costs on competitors.'0 5 Many courts and
commentators have advanced creative solutions to the dilemma, 0 6 but
a completely satisfactory approach has eluded all. Right or wrong, the
Court adopted a two-part, subjective-and-objective test. There may well
" This question is explicated in Calkins, First Amendment, supra note 6, at 329-32.
00 Respondents' Brief at 18-19; see also Transcript at 27 (lawyer opened with this argu-
ment, emphasizing the Court's "broader latitude").
'0' Petitioners' Reply Brief on the Merits at 8.
102 See also 113 S. Ct. at 1926 ("Nor did we 'impute to Congress an intent to invade'
the First Amendment right to petition.") (quoting Noerr); id. ("Noerr, however, withheld
immunity from 'sham' activities because 'application of the Sherman Act would bejustified'
when petitioning activity . . . 'is a mere sham ....'). But see id. at 1926-28, 1930-31
(repeated references to Noerr "immunity").
'03 The Court's opinion in Omni similarly failed to make clear the basis of Noerr's protec-
tion but implied a statutory origin (there, by suggesting that even bribery can be protected
petitioning). See Calkins, Toward Certainty, supra note 1, at 616-18.
'04 Respondents' Brief did a masterful job of arguing that guidance to courts and litigants
"hardly will exist if objectively reasonable lawsuits are left in the hands ofjuries deconstruct-
ing the subjective intent of collective actors." Respondents' Brief at 22-23.
'05 Elhauge, supra note 54, at 1229-30 ("strategic litigation is actually a far more useful
tool for driving competitors out of business than predatory pricing"); Gary Myers, Litigation
as a Predatory Practice, 80 Ky. L.J. 565 (1991-92); cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to
Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUDIES 437 (1988) (plaintiffs file even non-cost-
justified suits, hoping to extract settlements). But cf. Christopher C. Klein, Predation in the
Courts: Legal Versus Economic Analysis in Sham Litigation Cases, 10 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 29
(1990) (relative paucity of countersuits suggests that sham litigation may be less common
than had been thought).
106 Various tests are discussed in Calkins, First Amendment, supra note 6; Elhauge, supra
note 54; Handler & De Sevo, supra note 62; Hurwitz, supra note 54; Kintner & Bauer, supra
note 62; Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905 (1990) (no persuasive theory of sham
litigation is possible); and Myers, supra note 105.
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be good reasons for this, but the Court failed to set forth those reasons
persuasively. Although the Court sought objectivity and clarity, it failed
to establish a single, clear version of its test or to explicate the implications
of its decision.' °
II. SPECTRUM SPORTS
But if it's a question of a permissible inference of intent, I would think
it would be difficult to throw many of them out on summary judgment.
Because intent is very much a subjective thing.'l8
Even before oral argument in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, the
plaintiffs-respondents' chances were modest. Any remaining optimism
should have been dampened when Chief Justice Rehnquist asked that
question. Plaintiffs do not fare well when the Chief Justice expresses
concern about the difficulty of resolving cases on summary judgment.'
At issue in Spectrum Sports was the Ninth Circuit's unique rule for
attempted monopolization."0 This rule, which originated in Lessig v.
Tidewater Oil Co.,... permitted plaintiffs to prevail by showing unfair or
predatory conduct; specifically, the fact finder could infer from such
conduct the "dangerous probability" of successful monopolization that
107 One perhaps unforeseen result of PRE is that a lower court has reacted to PRE by
declaring sham litigation per se illegal. El Cajon Cinemas, Inc. v. American Multi-Cinema,
Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 70,367, at 70,937 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1993) (noting that
"there is no redeeming value to the practice"). This change would be consistent with the
equilibrating tendencies of the law, including antitrust law; if sham litigation is very difficult
to prove, courts might rely more heavily on it to find an antitrust violation. See generally
Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating
Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEo. L.J. 1065 (1986).
"' Transcript, Spectrum Sports, at 48 (Comment of Chief Justice Rehnquist, as identified
by lawyer's response).
109 Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.)
(somewhat arbitrary rule adopted to facilitate pretrial dismissal of claims). The Chief justice
expressed a similar concern during the Professional Real Estate oral argument. See supra
notes 28-29 and accompanying text. In contrast, during oral argument in Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992), the Chief Justice appeared
to object to what he interpreted as a suggestion by the Justice Department, arguing as
amicus for the defendant, that summary judgment in antitrust cases is subject to a unique
standard. Stephen Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: The Revenge of the Amici, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 298 (1992).
""The attempted monopolization offense is set out in Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 2 (Supp. 1993) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony .... ").
... 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). Lessig and the Ninth Circuit's
struggle to fashion a consistent, satisfactory doctrine of attempted monopolization are
reviewed and critiqued in Daniel J. Gifford, The Role of the Ninth Circuit in the Development
of the Law of Attempt to Monopolize, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021 (1986).
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was an independent element of the offense in other circuits. The Ninth
Circuit's rule had become so controversial that the respondents spent
more time arguing that Lessig was not in issue than defending it. Their
effort to deflect the Court's inquiry was unavailing, and the Court
squarely rejected Lessig and ruled that attempted monopolization re-
quires a dangerous probability of success."' Although unsurprising given
the tide of lower court opinions, this result was not compelled by Supreme
Court precedent and it departs from criminal law attempts by preferring
what is known as the "objectivist" approach. Spectrum Sports makes objec-
tive evidence of market power of central importance in every attempted
monopolization case, but since hard issues were not raised by the case,
however, the opinion leaves many questions unanswered.
Perhaps most remarkable about Spectrum Sports is that the Court
granted plenary review at all, especially over the opposition of the Solici-
tor General. 13 Eight years ago Justice White complained that the Court
ought to address Lessig to resolve what had become a "longstanding
conflict among the circuits."' 1 4 Yet time and again, as the Ninth Circuit
massaged, explained, elaborated, and limited Lessig," 5 the Supreme
Court declined to intervene. It is fitting that in his final year on the Court
Justice White was permitted to author a unanimous opinion retiring
Lessig.
A. IN THE LOWER COURTS
Stripped of its frills, this was an acrimonious dealer-substitution suit
colored by a suggestion of nepotism and a claim of resale price mainte-
nance. The McQuillans had learned of a new British-patented elastic
"2 113 S. Ct. at 891 ("there is little if any support for it [Lessig] in the statute or the case
law, and the notion that proof of unfair or predatory conduct alone is sufficient to make
out the offense of attempted monopolization is contrary to the purpose and policy of the
Sherman Act").
'13 The Solicitor General argued that although the Ninth Circuit's opinion made "three
manifest errors in legal analysis," Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
Spectrum Sports, at 6, plenary review was not warranted. The Solicitor General noted that
the opinion was unpublished and lacked precedential importance. Review of the Lessig-
based ruling was unnecessary because other Ninth Circuit decisions mitigate Lessig's harm;
moreover, the plaintiff might well have deserved to win on monopolization or conspiracy
to monopolize, on which the jury was properly instructed. Id. at 15-16. The Solicitor
General actually was more troubled by the non-Lessig errors (on the intra-enterprise conspir-
acy doctrine and antitrust injury) on which certiorari was denied.
"4 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Blanton, 471 U.S. 1007, 1009 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
.. It had become standard practice to discuss attempted monopolization law in terms
of a majority and a Ninth Circuit view. E.g., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note
53, at 262-69.
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polymer and conceived of using the polymer for horseshoe pads. The
licensed manufacturer (Hamilton-Kent Manufacturing Co., later to be
succeeded by a sister corporation, Sorbothane, Inc.) had made the
McQuillans exclusive distributors for equestrian purposes and, shortly
thereafter, for all uses in the Southwest. Within a year or two, however,
Hamilton-Kent was pressuring the McQuillans to sell their nonequestrian
distribution rights to Spectrum Sports, Inc., a firm half-owned by the son
of Hamilton-Kent's president. When the McQuillans refused, Hamilton-
Kent shortly terminated their distribution rights in favor of Spectrum
Sports. The McQuillans alleged that the changes were made partly to
bolster a rigid system of resale price maintenance." 6
A jury found that Spectrum Sports and its half-owner had not violated
Sherman Act Section 1 (a finding which the McQuillans' lawyer blamed
on a flawed but unchallenged jury instruction) but had violated Sherman
Act Section 2. The verdict sheet discloses that these defendants were
found liable for" 'monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and/or con-
spiring to monopolize.' ""7 The jury had been instructed that the plain-
tiffs had to prove, among other things, that the defendants had
" 'engaged in exclusionary or restrictive conduct'" and " 'that there was
a dangerous probability that Defendants could sooner or later achieve
[their] goal of monopoly power in the relevant market.' "The instructions
went on to state, however, that " '[i]f the Plaintiff has shown that the
Defendant engaged in predatory conduct, you may infer from that evi-
dence the specific intent and the dangerous probability element of the
offense without any proof of the relevant market or the Defendants'
marketing power.' "18
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in an unreported opinion. Its only basis
for affirming the Section 2 verdict was that the instruction was proper
under Lessig and the jury had applied it correctly." 9
116 The facts are set out in Spectrum Sports, 113 S. Ct. at 887, and in the Ninth Circuit's
opinion. The McQuillans also alleged (and the jury found) an illegal horizontal agreement
between Sorbothane, Inc., and a British sister corporation to refuse to supply the McQuil-
lans. This violation of Sherman Act § 1 was not a factor in the dispute before the Court.
"7 113 S. Ct. at 888 (quoting verdict sheet).
s Id. at 888 n.4. Although the Ninth Circuit originally wrote that there was no objection
to the invitation to infer power from conduct, McQuillan v. Sorbothane, Inc., Nos. 89-
55326, -55329, -55332, slip op. at 22 (9th Cir. July 3, 1990), the sentence denying the
existence of an objection was subsequently deleted, McQuillan v. Sorbothane, Inc., Nos. 89-
55326, -55329, -55332 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 1991) (amending memorandum opinion, denying
petition for rehearing, and reporting rejection of suggestion for rehearing en banc).
119 Slip op. at 24 ("There is sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that
the S.I. Group and the Spectrum Group engaged in unfair or predatory conduct and thus
inferred that they had the specific intent and the dangerous probability of success and,
therefore, McQuillan did not have to prove relevant market or the defendant's marketing
[sic] power."); see also Slip op. at 21 ("We are satisfied that if evidence of unfair or predatory
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B. IN THE SUPREME COURT
In the end, the Supreme Court decided to adhere to what it said was
the standard formulation of the attempt offense. This generally requires
"(1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive
conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous
probability of achieving monopolization." 20 In an opinion patterned
closely after the Solicitor General's brief on the merits, the Court favored
this majority view for reasons of precedent and policy.
The petitioners had billed the case as a trial of Lessig.12' Respondents
would have none of it. Without saying a good word about Lessig,
respondents argued that the jury had been required to find a dangerous
probability of success, and Lessig was "unnecessary" to the decision
below because the jury found monopolization as well as attempted
monopolization. 22 Courts should require proof of a dangerous probabil-
ity of monopoly, they said. 123 Ninth Circuit law assertedly had limited
Lessig merely to permit a rare, rebuttable inference of specific intent
and probability of success from conduct that is "plainly injurious to
competition."'' 24 Respondents' lawyer commenced oral argument by
backing away from Lessig.' 25 He did not begin addressing "the point
conduct is presented, it may satisfy both the specific intent and dangerous probability
elements of the offense, without any proof of relevant market or the defendant's mar-
ketpower.").
120 113 S. Ct. at 890-91 (citation omitted).
12' The petition for certiorari mentioned the case by name in four of its five key headings.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Spectrum Sports, at iii.
122 Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Sorbothane, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113
S. Ct. 1358 (1993) (Dkt. 91-32) ("The jury was instructed that it had to find specific intent
and dangerous probability of success on the attempt to monopolize claim. It was merely
instructed that it was permitted to infer these elements from petitioners' predatory conduct.
... [T]he Lessig inference was unnecessary to the attempt to monopolize finding."). (In
Spectrum Sports (Dkt. 91-10), respondents dealt with Lessig largely by cross-referencing their
opposition in Sorbothane (Dkt. 91-32), which had requested review of Lessig and other issues.
Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Spectrum Sports, at 1-2.) See also Brief [by
Respondents] in Response to Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Spectrum Sports,
at 10 ("any alleged Lessig error does not justify any action by this Court"). A month after
deciding Spectrum Sports, the Court denied certiorari and a motion for summary reversal
in Sorbothane. 113 S. Ct. 1358 (Feb. 22, 1993).
'23 Brief on the Merits by Respondents at 14 (" 'Dangerous probability of success' is the
element of an attempt to monopolize claim ... that ensures the defendant's conduct poses
a threat to competition, not merely to competitors.") (footnote omitted); id. at 26 ("To the
extent Lessig holds dangerous probability of success is not an element of a claim for attempt
to monopolize, it indeed violates basic antitrust principles.") (citing Justice White's dissent
from the Court's refusal to address Lessig in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Blanton, 471 U.S. 1007
(1985)).
124 Brief on the Merits by Respondents at 29.
125 He raised the "very important point" that "[t]he controversial Lessig inference ...
does not have to be reached in this case." Transcript at 24. "[T]hat may be so," a Justice
interjected, "but ... if we insist on reviewing what the Ninth Circuit decided, are you
defending it?" Id. at 25. "I'm saying it's superfluous," the lawyer replied. This led to a
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that the Court granted certiorari on" until more than half his time
was gone.
126
There likely was nothing respondents could do to win. The more
extreme versions of Lessig had been so discredited that even the Ninth
Circuit generally had abandoned them. 127 Respondents' dilemma, which
they sought to gloss over, was that their case depended on an extreme
version of Lessig, since the jury could have based its verdict simply on
"predatory conduct."'128 The opinion below showed none of the restraint
with which respondents sought to credit the Ninth Circuit. Since the
alleged wrong in their case basically was a dealer termination pursuant
to alleged resale price maintenance, respondents were reduced to ar-
guing that a Lessig inference was appropriately based on, among other
things, any per se violation. 129 Yet not all per se violations imply the
existence of market power or the prospect of monopoly power, as some
Justices noted during oral argument. 3 °
C. THE COURT'S CHOICE OF THE "OBJECTIVIST" VIEW OF ATTEMPTS
By endorsing a universal requirement of a dangerous probability of
success, the Court extended to the Ninth Circuit what has been called
stern reminder: "[W]e granted certiorari to decide the question ... that was presented."
Id. at 25. There followed a lengthy discussion of the consequences of reversal and argument
that the jury's verdict must have been based on conspiracy.
126 Id. at 33. One question that was not presented was whether a dangerous probability
of success was an element of a charge of conspiracy to monopolize. Yet Justice Stevens
inquired about this, one Justice noted his "own understanding" that dangerous probability
was required, Justice White expressed disappointment that the lawyer could not point to
any cases, and one Justice inquired about the views of petitioners' lawyer. Id. at 26-29,
51-52 (Justices Stevens and White identified by BNA and lawyer's response). At least until
now, this writer had been confident that dangerous probability of success was not an
element of the offense of conspiracy to monopolize. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 53, at 270-73.
'27 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 53, at 267-69; PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 832. la (Supp. 1992).
128 Chief Justice Rehnquist challenged respondents' lawyer, asking, "[W]ouldn't you at
least have to know ... what the defined market was before you could convict someone of
attempting to monopolize it? .. .[Tihat's like saying in a criminal prosecution the State
can charge you with attempt to murder because you were running around with a knife
without saying who you were going to murder." Transcript at 35-36. The lawyer conceded
"that, in fact, no harm ... can occur except in a relevant market." Id. at 36.
129 Brief on the Merits by Respondents at 27 ("the jury may infer dangerous probability
of success from ... conduct that is predatory or clearly in restraint of competition, such
as a per se violation of section 1"). By the end of his oral argument, counsel seemed
to be arguing for permitted inferences based on serious violations of Sherman Act
§ 1.
"' Transcript at 39 (question noting that even price fixing is not anticompetitive in a
"fully competitive market"); cf. id. at 45-46 (Justice Stevens asking whether an attempted
ineffective price fix should be sufficient).
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the "objectivist" view of attempt law."'3 This extension was not mandated
by fidelity to Supreme Court precedent. It confirms that antitrust attempt
law has departed significantly from criminal attempt law, which takes a
more subjective approach.
1. Precedent
The leading Supreme Court case, and the case principally relied upon
by the Spectrum Sports Court, is Swift & Co. v. United States.132 In Swift,
the Government had charged a group of meat processors, who together
had a 60 percent market share, with conspiring to lessen competition by
bid-rigging, price fixing, and securing advantageous rail shipping rates,
all for the purpose of monopolizing and attempting to monopolize. The
defendants argued that the acts individually were lawful and "that intent
can make no difference.'"" The Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes,
disagreed: The acts "are bound together as the parts of a single plan.
The plan may make the parts unlawful."'34 Later in this paragraph of
the opinion there follows the famous, much-quoted language referring
to a "dangerous probability":
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which
the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monopoly-but require fur-
ther acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result
to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a
dangerous probability that it will happen. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177
Massachusetts, 267, 272. But when that intent and the consequent dan-
gerous probability exist, this statute, like many others and like the com-
mon law in some cases, directs itself against that dangerous probability
as well as against the completed result.'"
But in Swift & Co. this language is preceded by a sentence making clear
that the Court was focusing not on "dangerous probability" but on intent:
"Intent is almost essential to such a combination and essential to such
an attempt."'
3 6
As Justice Scalia noted during oral argument in Spectrum Sports, Swift
does not really hold that a dangerous probability of success is a separate
element of the offense. 37 Rather, it explains the key role of intent.,3
131 See infra note 151.
132 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
3 d. at 396.
131 Id. (citation omitted).
I35 Id., quoted in Spectrum Sports, 113 S. Ct. at 890.
"r 196 U.S. at 396.
137 Transcript at 19. The question is attributed to Justice Scalia in Supreme Court Hears
Debate on Sherman Act § 2 Analysis, 63 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 581, 582 (Nov.
12, 1992).
138 This is further suggested by considering Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267
(1901) (Holmes, Ch. J.), the opinion written by Justice Holmes while on the Massachusetts
bench and cited by him in Swift. The question there was whether placing combustibles in
[Vol. 62
SUPREME COURT TERM IN ANTITRUST
The Assistant to the Solicitor General conceded that Justice Scalia was
correct, although he also pointed to language at the end of the opinion:
"Not every act that may be done with intent to produce an unlawful
result is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt. It is a question of proximity
and degree."'39 Spectrum Sports quoted this "proximity and degree" sen-
tence, too; 140 but Swift was about intent, not dangerous probability.' 4'
Spectrum Sports also gave significant weight to Walker Process Equipment,
Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.142 This is the famous case sug-
gesting that fraud on the patent office can violate the Sherman Act, but
which also added the following:
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade
or commerce under § 2 of the Sherman Act, it would then be necessary
to appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms
of the relevant market for the product involved. Without a definition
of that market there is no way to measure Food Machinery's ability to
lessen or destroy competition.
14
The language concerning attempts is pure dictum, however, since the
counterclaim in issue alleged only monopolization.
14
a building, without more, constituted attempted arson; the answer was no.
[Plreparation is not an attempt. But some preparations may amount to an attempt.
It is a question of degree. If the preparation comes very near to the accomplish-
ment of the act, the intent to complete it renders the crime so probable that the
act will be a misdemeanor although there is still a ... need of a further exertion
of the will to complete the crime. As was observed in a recent case, the degree
of proximity held sufficient may vary with the circumstances, including among
other things the apprehension which the particular crime is calculated to excite.
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 22 (See also Commonwealth v. Willard, 22
Pick. 476).
177 Mass. at 272. There was a suggestion that Peaslee had asked a third party to light the
combustibles, but this was not spelled out in the indictment and could not be considered.
'" 196 U.S. at 402, cited, Transcript at 19-20. The quotation continues: "The distinction
between mere preparation and attempt is well known in the criminal law. Commonwealth
v. Peaslee, 177 Massachusetts 267, 272. The same distinction is recognized in cases like the
present." 196 U.S. at 402 (citations omitted).
140 113 S. Ct. at 890.
'.' Spectrum Sports also cited Justice Holmes's dissent in Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S.
347, 387-88 (1912), a nonantitrust case where he wrote again that for an unlawful attempt
"[t]here must be dangerous proximity to success." But, as noted, this was a dissent in a
nonantitrust case.
142 382 U.S. 172 (1965); see 113 S. Ct. at 890.
143 382 U.S. at 177.
144 Id. at 174 ("Walker then amended its counterclaim to charge that Food Machinery
had 'illegally monopolized interstate and foreign commerce ....'"). Food Machinery's
brief had sharply stated that no one had charged an attempt or conspiracy. Neither the
United States nor Walker challenged this or wrote about attempts, and the oral argument
focused on market definition and monopolization in some detail without anyone men-
tioning attempted monopolization. Brief of Respondent at 12; Reply Brief of Petitioner;
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae; Transcript of Oral Argument (Oct. 12,
1965).
Spectrum Sports also quoted from Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
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The limited strength of these precedents has been discussed by a
number of commentators.'45 These and some other authorities 46 have
either supported Lessig or, more typically, advocated balancing the harm-
fulness of the conduct and the rigor of the required proof of power.
147
Perhaps the best known of the balancing approaches is the Areeda-
Turner "exception." Professors Areeda and Turner suggested that at-
tempts should include certain unusually invidious conduct without
proof of market power. 4 ' Spectrum Sports never mentioned this excep-
tion, although the Court's attention was called to it. 149 None of these
balancing approaches would have saved the lower court opinion from
reversal because the Ninth Circuit's decision had been a pure Lessig-
based declaration that markets need not be defined, and conduct
alone is enough.
U.S. 752, 768 (1984), but again quoted only dictum. As part of its discussion of Sherman Act
§ l's intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, Copperweld described a fundamental distinction
between unilateral and concerted action:
The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful only when
it threatens actual monopolization. It is not enough that a single firm appears to
"restrain trade" unreasonably, for even a vigorous competitor may leave that
impression. ... In part because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust
competition from conduct with long-run anticompetitive effects, Congress author-
ized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger of
monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that
the antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive entre-
preneur.
467 U.S. at 767-68 (footnote omitted). Spectrum Sports quoted from "Congress" to the end,
113 S. Ct. at 890.
' See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 137-40 (1977);
James F. Ponsoldt, Clarifying the Attempt to Monopolize Offense os an Alternative to Protectionist
Legislation: The Conditional Relevance of "Dangerous Probability of Success," 61 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1109, 1116-22 (1986); Mark E. Roszkowski & Ralph Brubaker, Attempted Monopoliza-
tion: Reuniting a Doctrine Divorced from its Criminal Law Roots and the Policy of the Sherman
Act, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 355 (1990).
146 E.g., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE A'rrORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 141 (Jan. 22, 1979) [herein-
after SHENEFIELD COMMISSION REPORT]; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW 169 (1985).
"' There also obviously has been widespread criticism of Lessig and its progeny, e.g.,
Gifford, supra note 111; Milton Handler & Richard M. Steuer, Attempts to Monopolize and
No-Fault Monopolization, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1980).
48 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 352 (1978) ("§ 2 might
reasonably be applied, without proof of significant market position, to conduct (1) which
is totally unrelated to competition on the merits-that is, lacking any plausible claim to
redeeming virtue; (2) which clearly implies the presence or prospect of some degree of
durable market power ... ; and (3) which has potentially significant exclusionary effects in
the generality of cases").
"' See Brief on the Merits by Respondents, Spectrum Sports, at 37-38 (describing in detail
the Areeda-Turner recommendation of a limited per se rule of attempted monopolization);
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 144, at 19 n. 11, 23 n. 14 (discussing
and rejecting both points); Transcript of Oral Argument, Spectrum Sports, at 19 (Assistant
Solicitor General argued that there should not be an Areeda-Turner exception but that
issue was not properly presented).
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2. Departure from Criminal Law
Sherman Act attempt law and the general law of criminal attempts have
sharply diverged.15 0 In Swift, Justice Holmes merely incorporated part of
the substantive criminal law of attempts. Justice Holmes's "dangerous
proximity" approach (he seems to have used "proximity" more than "prob-
ability") was-and remains-a leading example of what some criminal law
commentators have called the "objectivist" approach.15 ' In contrast, the
"subjectivist" approach, as typified by the Model Penal Code, gives priority
to a defendant's intention. 52 An attempt is shown, according to the Code,
whenever a person acting with the necessary culpability, among other
things, "purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circum-
stances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substan-
tial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of
the crime."'5' Conduct is important principally to corroborate purpose:
"The primary purpose of punishing attempts is to neutralize dangerous
individuals and not to deter dangerous acts."' 54 The drafters of the Code
deliberately sought to extend liability beyondJustice Holmes's "dangerous
proximity" approach. The Code succeeded, and now its subjective "sub-
stantial step" approach dominates the criminal law of attempts. 155
50 The divergence is highlighted in Roszkowski & Brubaker, supra note 145; see also SHENE-
FIELD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 146, at 146; Ponsoldt, supra note 145, at 1139-42.
15, Professor Dressier compares "subjectivism" and "objectivism," crediting Professor
Fletcher with the terms. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 27.03 (1987)
(citing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 3.1, 3.3 (1978)):
Subjectivists believe that the act of attempting a crime does not have significance
independent of the target offense. That is, inchoate crimes exist because they
provide the state with an opportunity to isolate and punish dangerous persons-
persons who subjectively intend to cause social harm.
In contrast, objectivists believe that in dealing with inchoate conduct society
should concern itself initially with the conduct rather than with the actor's inten-
tions and, therefore, should only permit punishment of individuals whose acts
are criminal on their face-i.e., acts that objectively manifest criminality at the
time that they are committed.
1-1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 5.01, Comment 1 (1985):
The literature and the decisions dealing with the definition of a criminal attempt
reflect ambivalence as to how far the governing criterion should focus on the
dangerousness of the actor's conduct, measured by objective standards, and how
far it should focus on the dangerousness of the actor, as a person manifesting a
firm disposition to commit a crime. Both criteria may lead, of course, to the same
disposition of a concrete case. When they do not, the proper focus of attention
is the actor's disposition.
(footnote omitted).
... MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(l)(c) (1985) (emphasis added).
114 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Comment to § 5.01, at 323 (1985). Thus,
the Code states that "[c]onduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step ... unless
it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2).
' GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3.5 (1978) ("The Ascendancy
of Subjective Criminality"); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
508 (2d ed. 1986).
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Although not mentioned in Spectrum Sports, the Supreme Court appar-
ently appreciated how far apart the two notions of attempts had grown.
15 6
In one sense this separation is somewhat surprising. Criminal liability is
usually narrower than civil liability,157 and Sherman Act Section 2 as
applied has become a civil statute. Whether through concern about per-
ceived excessive private treble damages litigation, doubts about our ability
to identify wrongful antitrust conduct and purposes, or an interest in
separating antitrust from the law of business torts, lower antitrust courts
and now the Supreme Court have chosen the objectivist approach to
attempts.
D. THE EFFECT OF SPECTRUM SPORTS
Before Spectrum Sports, attempted monopolization cases outside the
Ninth Circuit typically focused on the defendant's market share and
concluded that it was too low to support a finding of a dangerous proba-
bility of success. One recent review of the cases found that courts usually
find a dangerous probability where shares equal or exceed 50 percent
and reject such a finding where shares are below 30 percent; between
those amounts courts find a dangerous probability of success only in a
minority of cases."'
Now, as a result of Spectrum Sports, even in the Ninth Circuit, conduct
and intent alone are not sufficient to establish attempted monopolization.
156 ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted this during a colloquy with the Assistant to the Solicitor
General:
QUESTION: Your definition of attempt, for purposes of section 2, is much
more restrictive than the definition of attempt to commit crimes generally, is it
not?
MR. LONG: Yes, that's correct .... [W]e certainly don't advocate that as a
general criminal law standard.
We think in the special context of the Sherman Act, which is both a civil and
a criminal statute with a treble damages remedy, that applying something like
the model penal code, the substantial step requirement, would allow too many
ordinary business torts to be swept into the coverage and would essentially defeat
the purpose of section 2 by allowing, actually, a chilling of vigorous competition.
QUESTION: But you don't advocate that as to crimes generally, including...
[c]rimes that can lead to a RICO prosecution.
MR. LONG: Certainly not.
Transcript at 22-23 (initial question attributed to the ChiefJustice by BNA). The Solicitor
General's brief noted the Model Penal Code's approach, but argued against its adoption
for Sherman Act purposes. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 18 n.10.
"' See generally Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies, supra note 107 (penalties affect liability
standards).
58 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 53, at 264-65 (reviewing cases); cf. 3
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 148, at 350 (offering "rule of thumb" with presumptions
at 50% and higher, and 30% or lower; between those amounts, normally reject claims
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Attention must be given to the usually objective measures of market
power. But beyond this, the Supreme Court has given little guidance.
Discussing the courts of appeals, the Spectrum Sports Court wrote as
follows:
Consistent with our cases, it is generally required that to demonstrate
attempted monopolization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant
has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific
intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving mo-
nopoly power. In order to determine whether there is a dangerous
probability of monopolization, courts have found it necessary to consider
the relevant market and the defendant's ability to lessen or destroy
competition in that market. 9
Considering a firm's ability to lessen competition may or may not be
different from erecting what is in effect a substantial market share screen.
The Court paraphrased Copperweld by saying that under Section 2, single
firm conduct is unlawful "only when it actually monopolizes or danger-
ously threatens to do so,''160 and then explained that "demonstrating the
dangerous probability of monopolization ... requires inquiry into the
relevant product and geographic market and the defendant's economic
power in that market."' 6' In its concluding paragraph the Court wrote
that there may not be liability "absent proof of a dangerous probability
that they would monopolize a particular market."'162 Since the jury in-
structions permitted an inference of that dangerous probability from
predatory conduct, "without any proof of the relevant market or of a
realistic probability that the defendants could achieve monopoly power
in that market," error had been committed.'
63
Although the opinion includes what is only the latest caution against
overly aggressive application of the antitrust laws,' 64 the Spectrum Sports
except where conduct is especially "invidious" or likely, under the circumstances, to achieve
monopoly).
'5" 113 S. Ct. at 890-91 (citation and footnote citing cases omitted).
160 Id. at 892 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767).
161 id.
1 Id.
163 Id. The Ninth Circuit had affirmed on the attempt violation, and since the jury's
verdict could have been based on that alone, the judgment below had to be reversed.
'64 Id. at 891-92 (citations omitted):
The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from the working
of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market. The law
directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against
conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. It does so not out of
solicitude for private concerns but out of concern for the public interest. Thus,
this Court and other courts have been careful to avoid constructions of § 2 which
might chill competition, rather than foster it. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish
robust competition from conduct with long-term anticompetitive effects; more-
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holding leaves unanswered (at the Supreme Court level) many important
questions, including, among other things, (1) how precisely must any
market be defined; (2) how much market power and/or how great a
market share must defendant have before its wrongdoing will be pun-
ished; (3) whether the likelihood of achieving monopolization can be
shown other than by reliance on market definition and market shares;
16
(4) how likely must it be that the defendant will achieve monopoly power;
and (5) how, if at all, should any of these calculations be affected by
the egregiousness of the defendant's acts or the wrongfulness of its
intentions. 166
Spectrum Sports removes Lessig from the antitrust scene but does little
more. 161 Many Ninth Circuit courts are likely to follow the pattern of
courts elsewhere, granting summary judgment in attempted monopoliza-
tion cases whenever defendants cannot be shown to have significant or
even quite substantial market shares. This is not required by Spectrum
Sports, however, which merely extended to the Ninth Circuit the "objectiv-
ist" approach to attempts under Sherman Act Section 2.
over, single-firm activity is unlike concerted activity . which "inherently is
fraught with anticompetitive risk."
165 Cf. Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identifying and
Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1992).
166 This last point-that conduct can be considered when deciding what level of probabil-
ity to require-is suggested by Justice Holmes's original framings of the "dangerous proxim-
ity" test. This has been noted before. E.g., SHENEFIELD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
146, at 147-48. Holmes wrote that the line should be drawn by considering "the nearness
of the danger, the greatness of the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt." OLIVER
W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 56 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963). Some observers apparently
have focused only on the extent of the harm that would be caused by the contemplated
crime. ALl, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Comment on § 5.01, at 323 (1985)
(consider "the gravity of the offense intended, the nearness of the act to completion of
the crime, and the probability that the conduct would result in the offense intended").
Others have emphasized the seriousness of the act committed. See, e.g., LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 155, at 506. Although not altogether clear, this appears to have been Justice
Holmes's view. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 22 (1897) (Holmes, J.):
Every question of proximity must be determined by its own circumstances ....
Any unlawful application of poison is an evil which threatens death, according
to common apprehension, and the gravity of the crime, the uncertainty of the
result, and the seriousness of the apprehension, coupled with the great harm
likely to result from poison even if not enough to kill, would warrant holding the
liability for an attempt to begin at a point more remote ....
Thus, to the extent that the Court has reaffirmed the teaching of Swift, the nature of the
challenged conduct arguably may be considered when determining whether the now-
clearly-required "dangerous probability" test is met.
167 In contrast, the Solicitor General's brief, which the Court appears otherwise to have
followed closely, included a discussion of the role of market shares and of the timing of
the decision concerning probability of monopolization (arguing it usually should be a
"threshold matter"). Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 20-22. The Court conspicuously failed to follow the Solicitor General's lead in addressing
these issues.
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III. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
In Hartford Fire Insurance the Court entered the massive dispute be-
tween the states and the insurance industry. The Court had agreed to
resolve a difficult issue involving the so-called boycott exception' 68 to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's exemption 69 from the antitrust laws. And for
the first time the Court had before it the celebrated international comity-
based "jurisdictional rule of reason" associated with Timberlane Lumber. 7 0
Justice Scalia's majority opinion on the boycott issue sought its answer
in a precise definition of the term "boycott." On the comity issue, the
entire Court gave Timberlane a chilly reception. No Justice expressed
support for Timberlane's balancing test. The five-Justice majority side-
stepped the issue by straining not to find a triggering conflict. More
intriguing, Justice Scalia's four-Justice dissent on this issue argued that
the question was not one of discretion (as the parties argued) but one
of straightforward, objective statutory construction.
A. BACKGROUND
Hartford Fire Insurance somehow managed to be both immensely impor-
tant and yet quite marginal, at least to antitrust law. As in a grand epic
from an earlier era, a cast of thousands was assembled. On one side were
the attorneys general of nineteen states plus five plaintiffs' law firms,
some quite well known. On the other side were eighty lawyers from
thirty-five firms, including some of the nation's most prominent. The
parties were aided and abetted by a small army of lawyers working on
amicus efforts.
The setting, too, was epic. During the mid-1980s, the country was
wracked by an insurance crisis during which the availability of liability
coverage was sharply constricted. 7' Also during the 1980s the state attor-
'6 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) ("Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the... Sherman
Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation.").
169 15 U.S.C. § 1012:
(a) The business of insurance . .. shall be subject to the laws of the several
States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance... ; Provided, That... the Sherman Act... shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law.
170 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
17 1 E.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521 (1987); Symposium: Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988).
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neys general, perceiving a void in national antitrust enforcement, became
newly aggressive in asserting a national state antitrust agenda. Hartford
Fire Insurance resulted from the confluence of these two phenomena.
The states saw conspiracy at the root of the insurance crisis, and, believing
this conspiracy to be unprotected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act's ex-
emption of the business of insurance from the antitrust laws, sought to
do something about it.
The consequences-for the states and the insurance industry-also
loomed large. For the states, this was no small resale price-fixing case,
easily settled for cash and a promise to sin no more. It was major league
litigation that could establish for the foreseeable future that the states
were a force with which to reckon. For the insurance industry, the suit
threatened (1) fundamentally to change how they did business and (2)
massive liability. 172
Yet, for all the grandeur of the case, Hartford Fire Insurance is relatively
unimportant to the development of antitrust doctrine. The domestic
antitrust law issues before the Court were narrow ones involving the
"boycott" exception to McCarran-Ferguson.1 73 Ironically, the case even
may be relatively unimportant to the future of the insurance industry
since the McCarran-Ferguson Act is on the endangered list. The move-
ment to repeal the Act has become a centerpiece of Clinton Administra-
tion health care reform, and momentum is growing. The most lasting
significance of the case likely lies in its discussion of the application of
antitrust law to foreign conduct, a specialized subject that will be debated
endlessly in conferences and in print.
B. THE LITIGATION IN THE LOWER COURTS
This complex proceeding has a Never-Never Land quality about it.
There was no discovery and there are no facts, only allegations. District
Judge Schwarzer, an aficionado of aggressive case management and
summary procedures, 174 entered an early order soliciting motions that
could dispose of the case without resolving factual disputes. Defendants
172 Speaking of the two petitions for which certiorari was eventually granted, Professor
Geoffrey P. Miller said that " '[b]oth are blockbusters in their own right .... It's fair to
say this is the most important Supreme Court case for the insurance industry since World
War 11.' " Henry J. Reske, Was It Collusion or Just Good Business?, ABA J., May 1993, at 76,
76 (quoting Miller).
"' Although the Court relied on Sherman Act § I boycott cases in interpreting the
McCarran-Ferguson boycott exception, there is no suggestion that Hartford Fire Insurance's
analysis has applicability for non-McCarran issues.
"' Calkins, Revenge of the Amici, supra note 109, at 287-88 (Judge Schwarzer entered
the summary judgment that was reversed in Kodak).
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filed motions on multiple grounds, and the complaints, which had been
filed in March 1988 (the so-called California complaints) and June 1988
(the so-called Connecticut complaints), were dismissed in a lengthy opin-
ion filed October 1989.175
According to the complaints, the origin of the dispute lies in the desire
of four major insurance companies (the primary defendants) 176 to change
several features of commercial general liability insurance policies.177 The
two key changes were to switch policies from an "occurrence" basis to a
"claims-made" basis and to curtail pollution coverage. Both changes
greatly reduce an insurer's risk: It is easier to monitor claims than events
that might, at some distant point, lead to claims; and pollution liability
is potentially catastrophic. The insurers also sought (1) to include a
"retroactive date" in claims policies, i.e., a provision that a claims-basis
insurer would bear no responsibility for incidents occurring before a
certain date regardless when claims were filed, and (2) to limit responsibil-
ity for legal defense costs by including such costs within the policy lim-
its. 178 The litigation was conducted as though dramatic changes were
effected since allegations must be taken as true-although an occasional
comment suggested discovery would have painted quite a different
picture. 1
79
Had the four primary defendants made these changes on their own,
there would have been no -liability. According to the states, however,
such a course was stymied by the unwillingness of competing insurance
companies to go along. Frustrated, the primary defendants allegedly
used two mechanisms to coerce compliance. First, they pressured defen-
dant Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO), the almost exclusive source
of actuarial and rating information (claims filed, defense costs, etc.), to
deny essential statistical support for disfavored policies. Second, they
encouraged domestic and London brokers and reinsurance firms 81 to
promote these desired changes by denying certain reinsurance and by
7 In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
176 Allstate Insurance Co., Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
and CIGNA Corp.
177 A sympathetic reading of the complaints can be found in Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman,
The Economics of the Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward an Exclusionary Theory, 63 TULANE L.
REv. 971 (1989).
171 113 S. Ct. at 2896.
179 See Transcript at 8 (When aJustice sought to confirm that occurrence-based insurance
was "not offered by anybody," the insurers' lawyer corrected the misunderstanding: "Well,
as a matter of fact, 98 percent of the commercial general liability policies today are written
on occurrence forms.").
'80 In essence, reinsurance firms insure insurers against specific risks, further spreading
risks. Reinsurance firms, too, can spread risks through "retrocessional reinsurance."
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asking ISO and U.S. insurers to change coverages.'' The states claimed
that this was an unprotected conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws.
Although it found that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue the claims
and had shown causation, the district court found multiple bases for
dismissing the suit. The court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the
London reinsurers but should dismiss the claims filed exclusively against
them for reasons of international comity. 8 2 The activities in which the
domestic defendants allegedly were engaged were protected, the court
found, by McCarran-Ferguson. Specifically, the activities engaged in (in-
cluding reinsurance) were the "business of insurance," were regulated
by the states, and did not consist of unprotected "boycott, coercion, or
intimidation."'83 Finally, the court found that the state action doctrine
protected collective form-making efforts in all but four states. 184
The court of appeals reversed on every issue won by the defendants
below. 8 5 (It affirmed the findings of standing and causation.) It applied
the same Timberlane comity factors but found that the balance tipped
against abstention. 186 Although it agreed that reinsurance was the busi-
ness of insurance, the London reinsurers did not enjoy McCarran
18' 113 S. Ct. at 2896-99.
182 The court relied on Timberlane but not without noting significant criticism of it, 723
F. Supp. at 487 n.30 (citing one case and two articles).
The court also granted the London reinsurers' motion to dismiss a charge of a global
conspiracy involving property and casualty insurance and reinsurance because the plaintiffs
had not shown linkage between the two kinds of insurance. Id. at 483-84. Leave to amend
the complaints was denied. Id. at 490-91.
183 Id. at 474-79. The court ruled that if its comity ruling was not sustained, it would
"be because American regulatory laws apply to them [the London reinsurers] and hence
the McCarran Act as well." id. at 479. On the boycott issue, the court reasoned that the
defendants never engaged in a complete refusal to do business (i.e., on any terms), and
never excluded others from the market.
184 Id. at 479-82. The state action doctrine, which is closely associated with Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1934), protects state-imposed restraints on competition where there
is a clear state policy and active state supervision. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980); ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 53, at 965-89. Defendants did not seek this exemption for activities in Alaska,
California, Colorado, and Montana-states which lacked a procedure for reviewing and
approving insurance forms.
185 In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (Noonan, J.), noted, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1414 (1992) (criticizing opinion). The panel included Judge Beezer and
District Judge Singleton. Perhaps not too surprisingly, given the size of the Ninth Circuit,
the three Ninth Circuit opinions reviewed by the Court this term featured nine different
judges.
16 938 F.2d at 931-34. The Ninth Circuit also objected to the district court's dismissal
of the global conspiracy charge linking property and casualty insurance, see supra note
182. It ruled that the plaintiffs deserved an opportunity to amend their complaint. Id. at
931.
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immunity because the states did not regulate them. All of the domestic
insurers lost whatever immunity they enjoyed, moreover, when they
conspired with nonexempt foreign firms.'8 7 McCarran immunity also
was unavailable, according to the Ninth Circuit, because the defendants
had engaged in impermissible boycotting.'88 Finally, the state action de-
fense was no protection, it ruled, because any approval by states of
submitted forms did nothing to exempt coercive behavior leading to the
agreement on the forms to submit.189
C. IN THE SUPREME COURT
Four different petitions for certiorari were filed, all of which were
opposed by the Solicitor General.' 90 In Docket 91-1128, in which certio-
rari was granted, a group of London reinsurance firms questioned the
extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws.' 9' In Docket 91-1111, the
U.S. insurance and reinsurance firms posed three issues. Certiorari was
granted on the first two, which addressed the two grounds on which the
Ninth Circuit denied McCarran-Ferguson Act protection. 9 2 Certiorari
was denied on the third issue, which challenged the Ninth Circuit's ruling
that the state action defense was unavailable. 93 Certiorari was denied
completely in Dockets 91-1131 and 91-1146, which raised antitrust stand-
ing issues but otherwise were duplicative. 1
94
187 Id. at 928.
'Bs Id. at 927-31. The Court ruled that a boycott includes more than refusals to deal
regardless of the terms, and included, in this case, denials of insurance coerced by conspira-
cy-caused unavailability of reinsurance.
18 Id. at 931.
'90 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (consolidated opposition). The
Court invited the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. 112 S. Ct.
1469, 1470 (March 23, 1992).
'1' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Dkt. 91-1111, at i ("Did the court of appeals properly
assess the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws ... when it held that a U.S.
district court may apply U.S. law to the conduct of a foreign insurance market regulated
abroad?").
192 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Dkt. 91-1128, at i:
1. Whether domestic insurance companies whose conduct otherwise would be
exempt from the federal antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act lose
that exemption because they participate with foreign reinsurers in the business
of insurance.
2. Whether agreements among primary insurers and reinsurers on such matters
as standardized advisory insurance policy forms and terms of insurance coverage
constitute a "boycott" outside the exemption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
'9 121 L. Ed.2d 22 (Oct. 5, 1992) (also granting petition in Dkt. 91-1128 and consolidating
cases).
194 113 S. Ct. 3034 (June 28, 1993).
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Even the logistics of briefing and argument were challenging. Briefs
were filed on one of the two Dkt. 91-1111 issues;195 on both issues;96
on those issues plus the Dkt. 91-1128 issue;' 97 on all three issues, but
supporting petitioners on one and respondents on two;198 and on the
91-1128 issue alone.' 99 Participating in the ninety-minute oral argu-
ment 00 were lawyers for the States, the domestic insurers and reinsurers,
the London reinsurers, and the United States. The private parties-plain-
tiffs, and one London reinsurer that claimed a particularly limited role,
had to content themselves with briefing.
Tracking the opinions is just as challenging as following the litigants.
Hartford Fire Insurance was issued on the last day of the term, and haste
is evident. Justice Souter's opinion starts out as a unanimous opinion for
the Court (parts I and II-A). Then it loses the votes of the four other
most junior Justices and the Chief Justice, and becomes a four to five
dissent (part II-B). Finally, it regains the Chief Justice, becoming a five-
four majority opinion (parts III and IV). Justice Scalia's opinion con-
versely begins as a five-four majority opinion (part I), then loses the
Chief Justice and becomes a four to five dissent (part II). For clarity this
article will refer frequently to the authors of the opinions.
1. Forfeiture of McCarran Immunity
The Court had little trouble with the so-called forfeiture issue. As
noted above, the Ninth Circuit held that domestic insurers forfeited
whatever McCarran-Ferguson immunity they had when they allegedly
conspired with non-state-regulated, nonexempt foreign reinsurers."0 '
The Ninth Circuit relied on language in Group Life & Health Insurance
Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,20 2 where the Court wrote that "an exempt entity
forfeits antitrust exemption by acting in concert with nonexempt
,,203parties.
This was error, the Supreme Court ruled. Relying on a dictionary (as
was common this year),Justice Souter, for a unanimous Court, explained
195 E.g., Brief for the National Conference of Insurance Legislators, as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners.
196 E.g., Brief for the Petitioners in No. 91-111.
'9' Brief for Respondents (Private Parties-Plaintiffs).
'98 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents.
'99E.g., Brief for Respondent States in No. 91-1128.
200 113 S. Ct. 402 (Nov. 2, 1992) (extending time from 60 to 90 minutes).
201 938 F.2d at 928.
202 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
2
0o Id. at 231.
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that the exempt "business of insurance" refers to activities, not entities. °4
The Royal Drug language was taken out of context; that Court was merely
describing how some previous cases had interpreted statutes that had
focused on entities. Domestic insurers do not forfeit McCarran immunity
by conspiring with (assumedly) nonexempt foreign reinsurers.
This was a critical victory for the defendants and others, °5 and it may
have consequences on remand, but it is unremarkable. Indeed, the States'
defense of the Ninth Circuit's ruling on this point was halfhearted at
best,20 6 and the Solicitor General, otherwise the States' ally, deserted
them on this issue.20' The unanimity of the vote is consistent with the
difficulty in finding fault with the reasoning or the result.
2. International Comity
The glamorous part of Hartford Fire Insurance addressed international
comity. Abstention-based balancing tests typified by Timberlane Lumber
had dominated debates about international antitrust since 1976,08 but
the Supreme Court had not spoken on the matter. In addition to the
Ninth Circuit, balancing tests had been offered by the Third Circuit,
20 9
204 113 S. Ct. at 2901 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 362 (2d ed.
1942)).
20- Two amicus briefs were devoted exclusively to urging reversal on this point. Brief for
the National Conference of Insurance Legislators as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners;
Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Casualty and Surety Agents, and
National Association of Professional Insurance Agents, Independent Insurance Agents of
America in Support of Petitioners.
206 See Brief for Respondent States in No. 91-1111 at 42-45 (only last 4 pages of 45-
page brief).
207 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10-13.
208 E.g., JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD § 6.11 (2d ed. 1981) (applauding case); Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of Antitrust Laws: The United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1 (1992) (same); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of
Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DE COURS:
.COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT'L LAW 311 (1979) (leading advocate
of comity); cf. Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities
Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (1992)
(preferring a presumption in favor of application of U.S. law). Timberlane set out a seven-
factor balancing test turning on
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of
the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the
extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance,
the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad.
549 F.2d at 614 (footnote omitted).
209 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
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a Restatement, 210 and the Antitrust Division. 21' Now, with the matter
scheduled to be addressed in the context of a quintessentially British
industry, briefs were filed by the parties, the United States, Britain, and
Canada.212
The three 91-1128 interests represented at oral argument (the States,
the London reinsurers, and the Solicitor General) each took a different
approach. The London reinsurers and the Solicitor General supported
a Timberlane-like balancing test but disagreed, as had the district court
and the court of appeals before them, on whether it tipped in favor of or
against judicial abstention from exercising jurisdiction.2 3 The reinsurers
210 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987) declares that "a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law ... when the
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable," and then elaborates as follows:
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Subsection (3) goes on to specify that "when it would not be unreasonable for each of two
states to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the[ir] prescriptions ... are in
conflict," a state should defer to one with a "clearly greater" interest based on the Subsection
(2) factors.
211 U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Oper-
ations (1988, amended 1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109.10, at 20,613
n.170. In addition to generally applicable factors, the Department noted that it may, in
extraordinary cases, consider implications for U.S. foreign relations, but this factor should
not be considered by courts "since the conduct of foreign relations is constitutionally
reserved to the Executive Branch." 4 Trade Reg. Rep. at 20,613 & n.171.
212 Also filing briefs in 91-1128/91-1111, but emphasizing the McCarran-Ferguson issues,
were industry associations, local governments, and 19 states as amici.
2 " Brief at 14-19 (reviewing various tests). The Court quoted from the reinsurers'
lawyer's oral argument on this point:
Our position is not that the Sherman Act does not apply in the sense that a
minimal basis for the exercise of jurisdiction doesn't exist here. Our position is
that there are certain circumstances, and that this is one of them, in which the
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argued that "extraterritorial jurisdiction by a U.S. court must be tem-
pered by restraint to accommodate principles of international law and
comity and to avoid conflict,"'21 4 and that the court of appeals had not
appreciated the extent of conflict.2 1 5 They relied on a trio of Supreme
Court decisions involving foreign seamen to show that "Congress must
be presumed to have acted with respect for principles of international
law and comity. ' ' 2 16 They emphasized that the United Kingdom had
identified a substantial conflict 217 that existed because the special British
insurance market, as designed by British authorities, permitted and even
required collaboration. ls
The Solicitor General agreed that a balancing test was appropriate,
even though the court had subject matter jurisdiction.1 9 Whatever test
interests of another State are sufficient that the exercise of thatjurisdiction should
be restrained.
Transcript at 37, quoted at 113 S. Ct. at 2909; see also Brief for Petitioner Sturge Reinsurance
Syndicate Management Ltd. in No. 91-1128 (calling for Timberlane-like balancing test). But
cf. Brief of the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Certain Petitioners
(Ninth Circuit erred in applying a balancing test and should be reversed). Compare Brief
for the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, No. 91-1128
(balancing test calls for reversal) with Brief for the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners on Writ
of Certiorari (no subject matter jurisdiction).
"4 Brief for Petitioners in No. 91-1128 at 8 (heading of first point of argument).
215 Id. at 19-29 (also arguing that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a, did not control). The FTAIA provides as follows:
Section 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect-
(A) on [domestic] trade or commerce . or on import trade or import com-
merce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this
title, other than this section .....
216 Brief at 10-11 (citing Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Romero v. Interna-
tional Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963)). The reinsurers also quoted from the
recent case, EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991),
which reiterated the "long-standing principle of American law that 'legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.' " (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
2 7 Transcript at 35 ("The United Kingdom says there is a conflict and their statement
should be determinative of their view, at least, that there's a conflict.").
218 E.g., Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 91-1128 at 7 ("The subscription nature of the
London reinsurance market requires common understandings about the risks perceived
to threaten prudent underwriting.").
2 9 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 22-27.
The Solicitor General relied on Sherman Act case law and the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982, supra note 215.
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was adopted would tilt against the reinsurers, according to the Solicitor
General, because there was no conflict. A conflict exists only when the
defendants act pursuant to orders or when they "could not have avoided
engaging in the disputed conduct without frustrating clearly articulated
policies of the foreign government. 2 ° No clear policies would have been
frustrated had the reinsurance firms not engaged in a boycott, according
to the Solicitor General.
Only the States opposed a balancing test.2 2' They argued that settled
antitrust law required simply an effects test, and that the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) compelled the assertion
ofjurisdiction 2 Any balancing test, moreover, should require a genuine
conflict, namely, an act of state or foreign sovereign compulsion.2 3
a. Justice Souter's Majority Opinion on Comity
For all the attention to and support of comity and balancing, the
Supreme Court gave it short shrift.22 4 Both the Justice Souter-led majority
and the Justice Scalia-led minority treated comity dismissively, preferring
more objective approaches and relying in significant part on analyses
not championed by the parties.
The five-Justice majority, per Justice Souter, were even less concerned
about comity than the dissenters. Citing an array of cases and secondary
authorities, the Court wrote that there is now no doubt, if there ever
was, that courts have broad subject matter jurisdiction over Sherman
Act claims.2 2 5 There is a "general understanding that the Sherman Act
220 Brief for the United States at 28.
22 1 But cf. Brief Amici Curiae of Service Industry Council and California State Electronics
Ass'n in Support of Respondents at 24-29 (arguing that balancing tests support jurisdic-
tion); Brief for Respondents (Private Party Plaintiffs) at 39-49 (calling for Sherman Act
jurisdiction but emphasizing application of effects test).
222 Brief for Respondent States in No. 91-1128 at 12-26; see supra note 215.
223 Brief for Respondent States at 31. The states opened their discussion of the (absence
of) conflict by pointing to European authorities supporting an effects test, and arguing
that both nations' laws prohibit the questioned conduct. Id. at 27-34.
224 The Court was unusually quiet during the reinsurers' argument, asking only five
substantive questions. The Deputy Solicitor General mentioned comity only briefly at oral
argument (one and a half pages of eight and a half pages of transcript total), although
his brief gave almost as much attention to the 91-1128 issue as the two McCarran issues.
The States, which filed a separate brief on Docket 91-1128, also gave little emphasis to
the comity issue during oral argument (only 5 of 22 1/2 pages of transcript, beginning
when a Justice inquired, "Were you going to get to the comity issue?," Transcript at 68).
The Court was even quieter during this comity argument than during the reinsurers',
asking only a single substantive question.
225 Quoting the London Reinsurers' confirmation of this at oral argument, supra note
213, the Court noted that "[t]he parties do not question prescriptive jurisdiction ... , and
for good reason: it is well established that Congress has exercised such jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act." 113 S. Ct. at 2909 n.22 (citation omitted).
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covers foreign conduct producing a substantial intended effect in the
United States, and that concerns of comity come into play, if at all, only
after a court has determined that the acts complained of are subject to
Sherman Act jurisdiction. 22 6
There was no need to decide whether comity can ever justify absten-
tion, the Court ruled, because under the facts of this case a comity
argument would fail because there is no " 'true conflict.' ,,227 The Court
read the concept of "conflict" very narrowly. "Since the London rein-
surers do not argue that British law requires them to act in some fashion
prohibited by the law of the United States [citing brief], or claim that
their compliance with the laws of both countries is otherwise impossible,
we see no conflict with British law. ' 228 This "impossibility of compliance"
standard seems even more restrictive than the standard suggested by
the Solicitor General.229
b. Justice Scalia's Dissent Regarding Comity
Justice Scalia, writing for four Justices, assailed the Court's "breathtak-
ingly broad proposition" concerning the existence of a conflict.230 He
pointed to Lauritzen v. Larsen, 3' which had denied a Jones Act claim to a
seaman where Denmark had constructed a comprehensive compensation
scheme, even though paying Jones Act damages was not prohibited by
Denmark. A "conflict-of-laws analysis" is needed, wrote Justice Scalia,
whenever "applicable foreign and domestic law provide different sub-
stantive rules of decision., 23 2 As for the majority's reliance on a Comment
to the Restatement (Third), Scalia wrote that the Court "completely misin-
terpreted this provision. 2 3
226 Id. at 2909 n.24.
227 Id. at 2910 (quoting Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States Dis-
trict Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). The Court said that it need not decide whether a Court "should ever decline to
exercise such jurisdiction on ground of international comity" because, "even assuming that
in a proper case a court may decline to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction ... , international
comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged
here.").
228 113 S. Ct. at 2911. The Court cited, in support of this conclusion, "RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS § 403, Comment e, § 415, Commentj."
229 Supra text at note 220.
230 113 S. Ct. at 2922.
231 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
232 113 S. Ct. at 2922. Justice Scalia relied on two introductory pages from RUSSELL J.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW 2-3 (2d ed. 1980), a source cited only
by the States and for an unrelated point, Brief for the Respondent States in No. 91-1128
at 30 (citing WEINTRAUB at 267-69), and the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,
which no one cited to the Court.
21- 113 S. Ct. at 2922. Justice Scalia has the better of this disagreement. The Court cited
Comment e to Section 403 and Commentj to Section 415. Comment e addresses Subsection
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Justice Scalia rejected the concept of comity as it had come to be
understood in international antitrust and took a more objective, statute-
based approach.2 4 He identified four distinct issues: (1) the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of a court; (2) the substantive reach of a statute (here,
the Sherman Act); (3) "comity of courts," in whichjudges decide whether
to exercise jurisdiction; and (4) "prescriptive comity" or the "comity of
nations," whereby sovereign nations show each other respect by substan-
tively limiting the reach of their laws. In a single paragraph he concluded
that the first point was satisfied, i.e., the court had subject matterjurisdic-
tion. This conclusion was based not on antitrust law but simply on normal
"arising under" jurisdiction. 25 Even more quickly, Justice Scalia dis-
pensed with the third point, "comity of courts," saying that courts had
erred by considering balancing tests to be an issue of abstention.236
For Justice Scalia, the key was his second issue, the substantive reach
of the Sherman Act 2 7 -the answer to which, he said, should be informed
(3), which says that when two states reasonably could exercise jurisdiction but their "pre-
scriptions ... are in conflict," the state with the clearly greater interest should receive
deference. See supra note 210. The essential part of the comment is as follows:
Subsection (3) applies when an exercise of jurisdiction by each of two states is
not unreasonable, but their regulations conflict....
Subsection (3) applies only when one state requires what another prohibits, or
where compliance with the regulations of two states ... is otherwise impossible.
It does not apply where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply
with the laws of both .... It does not apply merely because one state has a strong
policy to permit or encourage an activity which another state prohibits .... Those
situations are governed by Subsection (2), but do not constitute conflict within
Subsection (3).
That something is not a "conflict within Subsection (3)" does not mean that the Subsection
(2) factors quoted supra note 210 have no applicability; indeed, the comment anticipates
that they often would apply. It is revealing that only one brief cited Comment (e), and
then only in passing on a different point. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5. The London
reinsurers, rather than arguing against applicability of Subsection (3), squarely called for
its application, quoting more than half of it. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 9.
The Court also cited Commentj to Section 415, which declares that "[o]rdinarily, the
fact that conduct is lawful in the state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar application
of the United States antitrust laws." This contributes little, and was not cited in any brief.
234 Cf. Diane P. Wood, International jurisdiction in National Legal Systems: The Case of
Antitrust, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 56, 67 (1989) (the "two primary options" are the
'jurisdictional rule of reason" and the "objective effects rule").
25 justice Scalia relied on two of the three Jones Act cases emphasized by the London
reinsurers in their brief, 113 S. Ct. at 2917 (discussing Lauritzen and citing Romero).
2136 113 S. Ct. at 2920 & n.9.
237 To the argument that the London reinsurers had conceded jurisdiction and Sherman
Act applicability, Justice Scalia wrote that decisions by lawyers should not prevent parties
from enjoying correct results. Id. at 2921 ("To be sure, the parties did not make a clear
distinction between adjudicative jurisdiction and the scope of the statute. Parties often do
not, as we have observed (and have declined to punish with procedural default) before.")
(citations omitted).
Justice Scalia prefigured his position during oral argument. Transcript at 37:
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by his fourth issue ("comity of nations"). In an argument structured
quite similarly to that in the Canadian amicus brief, he wrote that the
interpretation of the Sherman Act should be guided by two canons of
construction: First, legislation is normally assumed to apply only within
the United States, and second, statutes should be interpreted whenever
possible as not violating the "law of nations" (which "includes limitations
on a nation's exercise of its jurisdiction to prescribe"). 2' 8 Having devel-
oped these canons at length, Justice Scalia then proceeded to apply them
without quoting from or even discussing the Sherman Act. He surveyed
the same Restatement factors emphasized by the parties as going to absten-
tion;23 9 his reading accorded with the district court's; he wrote that "it
is inappropriate to assume, in the absence of statutory indication to
the contrary, that Congress has made such an assertion [of legislative
jurisdiction]"-and that was it. Whereas the Canadian brief that his argu-
ment paralleled discussed the language and the legislative history of the
Sherman Act and the FTAIA (and cases interpreting same),2"' the posi-
tive part of Justice Scalia's opinion simply ended, seemingly half-fin-
ished.241
c. A Comment on Comity
The discussion of comity was a disappointing part of a disappointing
opinion. When a concept such as comity-based abstention has dominated
QUESTION: Is it the exercise of the jurisdiction, or maybe it's just not an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade? ... [W]e've always had a lot of room not to fiddle
around with ourjurisdiction but to fiddle around with what constitutes a restraint
of trade under the Sherman Act. It's essentially a common law antitrust that we've
developed ourselves.
Why couldn't we say that ... the Sherman Act applies fully, and we have full
jurisdiction, however, it's not an unreasonable restraint of trade given that these
people are acting in England and subject to English regulation?
(justice identified by BNA, see Insurers and States Engage in Debate on Boycott Issues Before
Supreme Court, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 200 (Feb. 25, 1993)). The reinsurers'
lawyer expressed contentment with such an outcome but noted that others might not be
comfortable with it.
238 113 S. Ct. at 2918-19; cf. Brief of the Government of Canada at 9-10 (same two
"canons of construction"). The London reinsurers also discussed these two principles but
without highlighting them as canons of construction or employing them to argue that the
Sherman Act did not apply. Brief for Petitioners at 10-13. In its amicus brief on the writ
of certiorari (unlike its brief on the petition), the United Kingdom reviewed these principles
and argued against jurisdiction, although it did not neatly identify two canons of construc-
tion. Brief for the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners on Writ of Certiorari.
219 See supra note 210.
240 Brief of the Government of Canada at 14-17; see also Brief (on Writ of Certiorari)
for the Government of the United Kingdom (same).
2" The opinion itself continued, but only with criticism of the majority. 113 S. Ct. at
2921-22.
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thinking about an issue for fifteen years, it deserves serious consideration.
Justice Souter's opinion for the Court avoided squarely ruling on comity
by adopting a narrow definition of conflict not advanced by any party.
The opinion gives only an impression that the Court would reject comity-
based abstention. Justice Scalia erected a careful structure to re-position
balancing as part of substantive law, but then rather hastily applied
the Restatement's version of balancing and never analyzed the statute he
purported to be interpreting.
Although both the majority and the dissent distanced themselves from
the more amorphous balancing approaches in favor of perceived objectiv-
ity, the law cannot be seen as stable. There is no holding on whether
courts should abstain in proper cases. Few cases will involve conflicts as
that concept has been explained by the Court, but this explanation must
be considered vulnerable given how much it departs from prior under-
standings, how briefly and unpersuasively the Court discussed the ques-
tion, and the seriousness of the kinds of international tensions that led
to comity-based interest balancing in the first place. The majority has
lost Justice White, moreover, and nothing in Hartford Fire Insurance is so
definitive that stare decisis would prevent Justice Scalia from prevailing
by recruiting a fifth vote. Yet although Justice Scalia's approach would
shift the focus to substantive law, he interpreted the Sherman Act with
so little attention to it that his approach might seem simply to reintroduce
comity-based interest-balancing behind a facade of objective statutory
interpretation.
3. The Boycott Exception
The difficult insurance issue required the Court to interpret the boy-
cott exception to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The plaintiffs charged that
the four primary defendants sought to lessen their financial exposure by
changing the terms of insurance coverage. When their competitors would
not agree to the changes, these four insurers allegedly (and there was
disagreement aboutjust what had been alleged) sought to coerce compli-
ance by arranging for reinsurance to be denied in certain circumstances
242
and by ending statistical support for forms not reflecting these changes.
The legal question was whether "boycott, coercion, or intimidation" had
been adequately pled.
242 At oral argument the Justices expressed skepticism about the motivation of the rein-
surers. When the States' lawyer said the "reinsurers agreed to provide that muscle" he
was asked, "In exchange for what?" To his reply that "[i]n exchange, they would have an
American market ... with less risk and potentially more profit," Justice Scalia exclaimed,
"Someone had to talk them into that. (Laughter.)" Transcript at 54-55 (Justice identified
by lawyer's response).
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No party was bold enough to champion a specific standard. 43 Justice
Souter's opinion followed the McCarran-Ferguson tradition of impreci-
sion. Justice Scalia's majority opinion, however, sought a clear, generaliz-
able rule in a "precise definition of the word 'boycott.' ,,144 The Court's
new test, which was not promoted by any party, may or may not bring
the clarity the Court sought.
a. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion Regarding Boycott
The Court first rebuffed petitioners' effort to limit boycotts to uncondi-
tional refusals to deal245 by relying on two dictionaries (neither cited to
the Court on this point) and the story of Captain Charles Boycott, who
gave the word its name.246 One dictionary extended the term "boycott" to
partial boycotts, and the other dictionary's definition discussed coercing
victims to abandon positions. When Captain Boycott refused to accede
to a political movement's demand that landlords lower rents (and instead
evicted his tenants), the entire citizenry shunned him; but the Court
speculated that since he eventually resumed peaceful relations with his
boycotters, the boycott might have been conditional.
The Court employed the story of Captain Boycott and two other exam-
ples of boycotts to craft a different limitation on "boycott" than the one
proposed by petitioners. (The Court explained away "coercion" and
243 E.g., Brief for Respondent States in No. 91-1111 at 19 ("cases cannot be distilled to
a single boycott test").
214 113 S. Ct. at 2911.
2" Although petitioners expended few resources advancing any particular standard,
preferring instead to criticize the States and the Court of Appeals, their apparently pre-
ferred standard turned significantly on unconditional refusals to deal. See Brief for the
Petitioners in No. 91-1111 at 31-32 ("Only when an agreement is accompanied by other
anti-competitive conduct-such as an absolute refusal to deal on any terms, or discrimina-
tory activity that excludes competitors or customers from the market-does an alleged
antitrust violation fall outside the protection of the statutory safe harbor.") (footnote
omitted); Reply Brief for the Petitioners in No. 91-1111 at 12 ("absolute refusals to deal
and discrimination are the traditional hallmarks of a boycott"); cf. Transcript at 21 ("Our
position is it wasn't a boycott because this was a uniform, nondiscriminatory agreement
that applied to everybody the same way.").
216 113 S. Ct. at 2911-12 (quoting 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 468 (2d ed.
1989), and WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 321 (2d ed. 1950)). Only one brief
mentioned the derivation of the word "boycott," apparently as a point of interest. Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari at 10 n.9
(citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 264 (1986)). A good summary
of the Captain's story is included as a "word history" in an acclaimed new dictionary not
cited by the Court, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 227
(3d ed. 1992).
Although it is a phenomenon that extends well beyond antitrust law, one cannot help
noticing the striking discrepancy in Hartford Fire between the enthusiasm for legislative
history shown by the brief writers and the opinion writers; so also, dictionaries play a
much more prominent role in opinions than in briefs.
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"intimidation" as subsumed within "boycott., 247) The critical factor in
the community's shunning of Captain Boycott, wrote the Court, was the
use of "unrelated transactions" as leverage.24 S In the classic boycott case,
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States,249 retail lumber
dealers "refused to buy lumber from wholesale lumber dealers who sold
directly to consumers., 250 Conditioning trade on an agreement not to
sell directly was held "to be an 'artificial conditio[n]' . . . . In other words,
the associations' activities were a boycott because they sought an objective
... that was collateral to their transactions with the wholesalers. '25' Simi-
larly, in the Pullman Strike 252 and other labor disputes, work stoppage
is a "boycott" only when it seeks "to obtain action ... unrelated to the
employment contract., 25 3 The Court completed its analysis (apart from
some criticism of Justice Souter's opinion) by interpreting the leading
McCarran-Ferguson boycott case, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
254Barry, as involving an "artificial condition": When three malpractice
insurers agreed not to write insurance for former customers of the defen-
dant insurance company, the "condition" was "not being a former [defen-
dant] policyholder., 255
The Court then applied its test and concluded that a boycott had been
adequately pled in six claims. The Court read the complaints, at times
247 113 S. Ct. at 2915 n.6:
Once it is determined that the actions of the reinsurers did not constitute a
"boycott" ... it follows that their actions do not constitute "coercion" or "intimida-
tion" within the meaning of the statute. That is because, as previously mentioned,
such concerted agreements do "not coerc[e] anyone, at least in the usual sense
of the word," L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 257 (1977), and because they are
precisely what is protected by McCarran-Ferguson immunity.
248 113 S. Ct. at 2912 (emphasis added).
249 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
250 113 S. Ct. at 2912.
251 Id. at 2913 (quoting Eastern States, 234 U.S. at 611) (emphasis added; brackets by
Hartford Fire Insurance Court).
2512 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
253 113 S. Ct. at 2913 (emphasis added).
254 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
211 113 S. Ct. at 2914. One can find foreshadowing of the Court's test in the briefs.
Petitioners' reply brief adhered to the absolute refusal to deal/discrimination test previously
mentioned, but distinguished United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533 (1944), in part because in that case nonmembers were denied reinsurance "for reasons
entirely unrelated to the terms on which the primary insurance was written;" whereas here,
it was claimed, reinsurance was denied only "for unacceptable primary coverages." Reply
Brief for the Petitioners in No. 91-1111 at 13-14 (emphasis in original). One amicus brief
recommended an approach congruent to the one the Court adopted, calling for automatic
protection of restraints that are "ancillary to standardized rates or terms." Brief of American
Insurance Ass'n, National Ass'n of Independent Insurers, etc., as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 25 ("the allegations should initially be scrutinized to determine whether
the conduct resulted in some anti-competitive restraint different from the restrictions that
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generously, as having alleged notjust that reinsurers agreed or intended
not to reinsure risks on objectionable forms (i.e., forms with pollution
coverage, or forms with occurrence-based insurance), but that reinsurers
planned to boycott entirely any insurance company that used any objec-
tionable form at all. 56 This might (but might not) be a boycott, the Court
said, and did not deserve dismissal at an early stage.
b. Justice Souter's Boycott Opinion
Justice Souter, who would have sustained the same six claims as the
majority, issued a somewhat amorphous opinion for four Justices that
emphasized that the reinsurers were acting "at the behest of the four
primary insurers.,,257 The key for Justice Souter was the existence of
so-called enforcement activities that distinguish boycotts from simple
agreements on prices and terms. This approach, which was generally
advocated by the States and the Solicitor General,5 8 is derived from
Barry.25 9 The Barry Court broadly defined boycotting, explaining (as Jus-
tice Souter noted) that the term "does not refer to a 'unitary
are a foreseeable consequence or anticipated result of joint action on rates and coverage
terms").
256 The complaints alleged that several reinsurers "agreed to boycott the [objectionable]
1984 ISO forms unless a retroactive date was added to the claims-made form, and a
pollution exclusion and a defense cost cap were added to both forms." California Complaint
66, Jt. App. at 25; Connecticut Complaint 70, Jt. App. at 78, quoted at 113 S. Ct. at
2917. "Liberally construed, this allegation may mean that the defendants had linked their
demands so that they would ... refuse to do business on either form until both were changed
to their liking. Again, that might amount to a boycott." 113 S. Ct. at 2917. The complaints
alleged that a representative of Lloyd's of London announced that Lloyd's "was withdraw-
ing entirely from the business of reinsuring primary U.S. insurers who wrote on the
occurrence form." Cal. Complaint 89, Jt. App. at 31; Conn. Complaint 93, Jt. App. at
83, quoted in part at 113 S. Ct. at 2916. The Court explained that this could be construed
to mean that "primary insurers who wrote insurance on disfavored forms would be refused
all reinsurance, even as to risks written on other forms." Id. at 2916 (emphasis in original).
This reading of the complaints was explored at oral argument. A Justice suggested that
the complaints alleged that reinsurers "will not reinsure the company if the company
writes that [objectionable] kind of insurance that might be reinsured with someone else."
Transcript at 15-16. The insurers' lawyer denied that this had been alleged. When asked
whether he agreed that "if that were alleged, that would be a boycott," the lawyer responded,
"I agree it would be a closer question. I wouldn't concede it's a boycott, but it would be a
closer question." A Justice responded, "You agree that you ought to concede it's a boycott.
(Laughter.)" Transcript at 17.
2517 113 S. Ct. at 2907. Relying on more traditional case law and legislative history,Justice
Souter (as had the Court) ruled partial and conditional boycotts are included within the
definition of that term. Justice Souter rejoiced at the "common ground" with the majority
on this and three other issues. Id. at 2903-04 (only collective refusals are boycotts; a boycott
need not involve unequal treatment of targets and other boycotters; and concerted activity
alone is not sufficient to prove an exception).
258 Brief for Respondent States in No. 91-1111 at 20 ("Enforcement conduct is, therefore,
the hallmark of a boycott."); Brief for the United States at 15-18.
259438 U.S. 531 (1978).
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phenomenon.' ,,260 Then the Barry Court, responding to criticism in the
dissent, denied that any decision had found simple price fixing to be a
"boycott" or "coercion". "in the absence of any additional enforcement activ-
ity." 26 1Justice Souter would have found such "enforcement activity" when
the four primary defendants sought and obtained the assistance of rein-
surance firms to force other insurers to change policy coverages.262 He
would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit, sustaining most but not all of
the claims.263
c. A Comment on the Court's "Collateral" Test
The Court's analysis, which turns on what it says is a precise definition
of the term "boycott," has flaws. The Court makes much of a comparison
between Eastern States and concerted refusal to deal cases, such as Para-
mount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States,2 64 and United States v. First
National Pictures, Inc.,265 which assertedly did not involve boycotts even
though defendants sought better contract terms. Although Eastern States
may deserve different antitrust treatment than the other two cases, it is
doubtful that when McCarran-Ferguson was written only Eastern States
260 113 S. Ct. at 2905 (quoting Barry, 438 U.S. at 543).
26' 438 U.S. at 545 n.18 (emphasis added).
262 113 S. Ct. at 2905. Justice Souter found support for this view in South-Eastern Underwrit-
ers, the case that exposed the insurance industry to the antitrust laws. Justice Souter pointed
out that when Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act to restore insurance's protected
status, it exempted boycotts, using language from the South-Eastern Underwriters indictment.
Id. at 2904 n. 14. In South-Eastern Underwriters, an association managed to" 'cut off [nonmem-
bers] from the opportunity to reinsure their risks;' " Justice Souter speculated that this
might have been accomplished by the kind of promptings from insurers to reinsurers that
occurred in Hartford. Id. at 2905 (quoting South-Eastern Underwriters). Justice Souter also
relied on the South-Eastern Underwriters dissent, which would have applied the exception
only to "attempts by members of the insurance business to force other members to follow
the industry's private rules and practices." 438 U.S. at 565 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoted
at 113 S. Ct. at 2906). Justice Scalia's majority opinion distinguished South-Eastern Underwrit-
ers as a case in which willingness to deal turned on membership in an association, a factor
"having no discernible bearing upon the terms of the refused reinsurance contracts." 113
S. Ct. at 2915-16.
It is noteworthy that both sides agreed on the importance of South-Eastern Underwriters.
In contrast, in Barry the Court specifically rejected the dissent's reliance on South-Eastern
Underwriters as the source of the words at the center of the dispute, 438 U.S. at 549 n.22.
For reviews of McCarran's legislative history, see Larry D. Carlson, The Insurance Exemption
from the Antitrust Laws, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1127 (1979); Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-
Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J.
587.
261 113 S. Ct. at 2906 n.18 (district court correctly dismissed charge of conspiracy to
draft restrictive "umbrella" coverages, since plaintiffs had not alleged a refusal to deal).
264 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
265 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
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was thought to involve a boycott.26 6 Nor is it clear that the Eastern States
Court attached the same meaning to the words "artificial" and "collateral"
as the Hartford Fire Court.2 67 Hartford Fire buttressed its argument with
an assertion that up until 1945, when McCarran-Ferguson was passed,
the word "boycott" had been used in only seven Supreme Court nonlabor
antitrust opinions, "not once ... as Justice Souter uses it-to describe a
concerted refusal to engage in particular transactions until the terms of
266 Hartford Fire Insurance mentions, as evidence of the different treatment, (1) that a noted
article called Eastern States "one of the 'leading case[s] involving commercial boycotts,' " 113
S. Ct. at 2912-13 (quoting Charles F. Barber, Refusals to Deal under the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 873 (1955) [bracketed insert by Court], and (2) that the
term "boycott" does not appear in the other two opinions.
The reliance on Mr. Barber is misplaced. Barber wrote that the "same reasoning [as in
Eastern States] has been echoed in subsequent decisions," including both Paramount Famous
Lasky and First National Pictures. Barber specifically included these cases as examples of
boycotts; for him, the "distinguishing feature of the group boycott cases is group action
to coerce third parties to conform to the pattern of conduct desired by the group or to
secure their removal from competition." 103 U. PA. L. REV. at 875 (citing all three cases,
plus others). If Barber is the test, all three cases involve "boycotts."
So, too, the Court's line cannot be drawn by searching for the word "boycott." Although
"boycott" does not appear in Paramount Famous Lasky or First National Pictures, it also does
not appear, in any meaningful sense, in Eastern States. It is used only twice, once in a
quotation from an earlier case listing ways restraints can be" 'occasioned,' " 234 U.S. at
611 (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 438 (1911)), and once
while describing another case, 234 U.S. at 610. The analytical part of Eastern States no
more includes the word "boycott" than does the analytical part of the other cases. If use
of the word "boycott" is the test, none of the three cases involves a "boycott."
267 In Eastern States (quoted supra text at notes 250-51), a retailers' trade association
collected the names of wholesalers who sold directly to consumers, and distributed this
list of names to its members. "Should any wholesaler desire to have his name removed
from the list he can have it done upon satisfactory assurance to the local secretary that he
is no longer selling in competition with the retailers." 234 U.S. at 608. The Hartford Fire
Insurance Court wrote that the retailers had created an" 'artificial conditio[n],' " 113 S. Ct.
at 2913 (quoting 234 U.S. at 611-12), by seeking an objective "that was collateral to their
transactions with the wholesalers." 113 S. Ct. at 2913. Perhaps; yet the transactions also
can be seen as withholding patronage until satisfactory terms and conditions are offered,
including a promise of exclusivity for retailers. There is nothing obviously "artificial" or
"collateral" about such an arrangement.
Some light is shed by looking behind the word "artificial." Although the Court cited to
Eastern States, in fact Eastern States was merely quoting United States v. Patten, 226 U.S.
525,541 (1913), see 234 U.S. at 611-12. Patten held that "running a corner in cotton," i.e.,
manipulating prices on the cotton exchange, violated Sherman Act Section 1. To the
argument that this was quite unlike an agreement among specific firms to suppress competi-
tion, the Court responded with language quoted by Eastern States: "Section 1 of the act
... is not confined to voluntary restraints, as where persons engaged in interstate trade
or commerce agree to suppress competition among themselves, but includes as well involun-
tary restraints, as where persons not so engaged conspire to compel action by others, or
to create artificial conditions, which necessarily impede or burden the due course of such
trade .... " 226 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added). The Court added that a "corner" tended
"to enhance the price artificially." 226 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added). All that was meant
by "artificial," it would seem, is an outcome attained other than by independent action,
i.e., not the meaning contemplated by the Court.
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those transactions are agreeable. 2 6 This claim is a matter of interpreta-
tion.2 69 Finally, there is no suggestion in Barry that the Court even consid-
ered whether there was anything resembling an "artificial condition."'2 7
In short, the reasoning behind the Court's reliance on what it claimed
is a precise definition of "boycott" is unpersuasive.
268 113 S. Ct. at 2913 (emphasis in original) (citing cases).
269 The Court described Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941), as involving a "boycott of retailers who sold competitors' products." 113 S. Ct. at
2913 n.4. But Fashion Originators' used terms much closer to Justice Souter's. Fashion
Originators' was the challenge to a manufacturer guild's self-regulation of style piracy.
Thousands of retailers "signed agreements to 'cooperate' with the Guild's boycott program,
but more than half of these signed the agreements only because constrained by threats
that Guild members would not sell to retailers who failed to yield to their demands." 312
U.S. at 461-62. The program violated the Sherman Act because, among other things, it
"subjects all retailers and manufacturers who decline to comply with the Guild's program
to an organized boycott," 312 U.S. at 465 (citing Eastern States). Although Fashion Originators'
is distinguishable from Hartford Fire for many reasons, it does not appear that Justice
Black, who wrote that opinion, was using the word "boycott" in the Hartford Fire majority's
sense.
So, also, the distinction of United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707,
722 (1944), is flawed. The Court said "boycott" was "used in reference to a refusal to deal
as means of enforcing resale price maintenance," which is accurate as far as it goes. But
the details are important. Bausch & Lomb was describing how, in FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441, 451, 454-55 (1922), Beech-Nut had been found to have suppressed
competition by, among other things, "boycotts of price cutters." 321 U.S. at 722. But this
boycott consisted of terminating discounters "who are only to be reinstated as one whose
record is 'clear' and to whom sales may be made upon his giving satisfactory assurance
that he will not resell the goods of the company except at the prices suggested by it, and
will refuse to sell to distributors who do not maintain such prices." 257 U.S. at 454. This
sounds very much like refusing to sell until there are satisfactory terms and conditions.
Finally, the Court's review dismisses Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376 (1913),
as using the word "boycott" only "in passing." 113 S. Ct. at 2913 n.4. This, too, is true as
far as it goes, but there is more. Justice Holmes, for the Court, was summarizing an
indictment of a naval stores dealer and others. The defendants allegedly sought to harm
competition by predatory pricing and other nefarious acts, including "by inducing consum-
ers, by payments and threats of boycotts, to postpone dates of delivery of contract supplies,
and thus enabling defendants to postpone purchasing when to purchase would tend to
strengthen the market." 229 U.S. at 375-76. Although not important to the case, once
again the Court used the word "boycott" seemingly to refer to an effort to coerce a contract
party's agreement to a desired term or condition.
270 Justice Souter pointed out that the Barry Court wrote that "boycott" is not a" 'unitary
phenomenon.' " 113 S. Ct. at 2905 (quoting Barry, 438 U.S. at 543, in turn quoting PHILLIP
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 381 (2d ed. 1974)). The majority dismissed this:" 'Boycott' is
a multifaceted 'phenomenon' that includes conditional boycotts, punitive boycotts, coercive
boycotts, partial boycotts, labor boycotts, political boycotts, social boycotts, etc. It merely
does not include refusals to deal because of objections to proposed terms." 113 S. Ct. at
2913 n.3.
But the majority removed the context from the Barry quotation. The quotation came at
the end of a paragraph discussing cases giving broad meanings to the term "boycott." E.g.,
Kor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) ("concerted refusals by traders
to deal with other traders"), quoted at 438 U.S. at 543. "Hence," wrote Barry," 'boycotts are
not a unitary phenomenon.' "438 U.S. at 543 (citing the 1974 edition of Areeda's casebook).
The 1974 edition of Areeda's casebook clearly contemplated that some concerted refusals
to deal except on certain terms could be boycotts. The cited "paragraph," to use Areeda's
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Although the Court overtly sought precision and clarity, it may not
have succeeded. One can find three tests in the opinion: There is a
boycott only if there are "unrelated transactions," or if the conspirators
sought a "collateral objective," or if the new condition has an "artificial
relationship" with the proposed contract. As in Professional Real Estate,
one is left to speculate about whether the tests are alternatives or cumula-
tive. Even more confusingly, the opinion leaves open two major ques-
tions: Using "collateral" as shorthand for the alternatively phrased test,
what is "collateral," and collateral to what?
Even within the Court's opinion the ambiguity about the meaning of
"collateral" is patent. Some denials of reinsurance would be boycotts, the
Court said. But the Court also said that more is protected than simple
organizational structure, is as follows:
It is often said that the concerted refusal to deal-or its evil-sounding equivalent,
"boycott'-is unlawful per se. But there may be restraints with some boycott charac-
teristics that are not or should not be automatically unlawful. If that be accepted,
either the initial position must be abandoned or "boycott" must be so defined as
to exclude the possibly permissible situations. Such definitions are not meant to
be precluded by the allocation of cases and problems to this section .....
The order of discussion for this variety of collaboration among competitors is
as follows: (1) express agreements which set the terms of dealing with customers
and which have certain features beyond those previously considered; (2) collective
dissemination of information that tends to similar effects; (3) express agreements
which set the terms of dealing with customers and which affect the behavior of
competitors; .... As the student will see, boycotts are not a unitary phenomenon.
AREEDA, supra, 371, at 380-81 (emphasis added). Areeda's first three "boycott" cases are
Paramount Famous Lasky, First National Pictures, and Eastern States.
Nor was Areeda alone back in 1978, when Barry was decided, in thinking of "boycott"
as an inclusive term. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx 330 (1978)
("According to conventional wisdom, boycotts (or agreements among competitors to refuse
to deal) are illegal per se.") (arguing that the per se label should be reserved for naked
boycotts). The Supreme Court shared this thinking. Boycotts and concerted refusals to
deal appear to have been equated in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207, 212 (1959) ("Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other
traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category."), and in Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953) ("group boycotts, or concerted
refusals to deal, clearly run afoul of § 1") (citing cases). When Barry referred to boycotts
as not a "unitary phenomenon," it was using the term much more broadly, in an antitrust
sense, than the Hartford Fire majority.
Hartford Fire quoted Professor Sullivan's powerful argument that there is no boycott
when, for instance, firms agree not to do business without charging a security deposit (an
authority that the parties omitted from their briefs but petitioners highlighted at oral
argument, see Transcript at 18); and, indeed, Sullivan distinguishes Eastern States from
Paramount and First National Pictures, SULLIVAN, supra note 145, at 257. But Sullivan was
not identifying boycotts for McCarran purposes; instead, he was identifying "per se illegal
boycotts." Referring specifically to Sullivan's analysis, the Barry Court wrote that "the issue
before us is whether the conduct in question involves a boycott, not whether it is per se
unreasonable." 438 U.S. at 542. Sullivan's distinguishing feature, moreover, had nothing
to do with "artificiality," but rather looked to whether a group of firms were seeking to
harm competitors by pressuring suppliers or customers to deny them needed relationships,
SULLIVAN, supra note 145, at 261-62.
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refusals to reinsure risks on certain forms. Focusing on the reinsurers'
contracts, the Court said a boycott would be found if the reinsurers
refused to write any reinsurance (even on preferred forms) with a pri-
mary insurer also using some disfavored forms, but a boycott would not
be found if "the primary insurers' other business were relevant to the
proposed reinsurance contract (for example, if the reinsurer bears
greater risk where the primary insurer engages in riskier businesses.)"27'
Were one to take such relatedness to an extreme, little would be collat-
eral, 7 ' but the opinion gives no guidance on how far one should go.
So, too, ambiguity becomes apparent when one asks, "collateral to
what?" The Court's examples principally involved reinsurance decisions.
The above example, which inquired into increased risks to which rein-
surers would be exposed, is typical. The boycott issue was important
because, as the Court noted, McCarran-Ferguson "makes that [reinsur-
ance] conspiracy lawful (assuminF reinsurance is state-regulated), unless
the refusal to deal is a 'boycott.' , 3 But some or all reinsurance-particu-
larly by foreign reinsurers-may not be state regulated, in which case
agreements among reinsurance firms would not be exempt whether
boycotts or not.274 In the pure case, with no reinsurance being exempt,
the only boycott question would be whether agreements among primary
insurers are boycotts. Presumably the Court's test would focus on the
insurance decision, and the question would be whether an agreement
that reinsurance should be withheld was collateral to that decision.
Focusing on the insurance decision suggests that agreements on rein-
surance might well be "collateral," but the Court apparently assumed
271 113 S. Ct. at 2916 (citing two reinsurance books not cited in any brief). At oral
argument the insurers declined to make this "solvency" argument. "We're not defending
that, because here something different is being asserted." Transcript at 22.
272 This point is made by Justice Souter, who wrote that "[o]ne can only imagine the
variety of similar arguments that may slowly plug what remains of the [boycott] exception."
113 S. Ct. at 2908 (Souter, J.). At some point, at least in the context of forms-approval, the
Court's test would protect everything except unconditional refusals to deal-the standard
advocated by petitioners and rejected by the Court, see supra note 245 and accompanying
text.
27  113 S. Ct. at 2916.
274 Cf Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12 n.9
("The insurance industry has long recognized that there may be no McCarran-Ferguson
immunity for agreements among foreign or domestic reinsurers ... because such agree-
ments typically are not subject to state regulation.") (citing authorities). But cf. Reply Brief
for the Petitioners in No. 91-111 at 2-6 (domestic petitioners argued that reinsurance,
including even by the London reinsurers, is regulated). The Court remanded to the court
of appeals the question whether the activities of the domestic reinsurers were regulated
and immune; the Ninth Circuit's earlier positive conclusion rested on a flawed analysis.
113 S. Ct. at 2903 n.12 (unanimous opinion). The Supreme Court expressed no opinion
on whether the London reinsurers were subject to state regulation, since the issue was not
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that most agreements about reinsurance would not be boycotts. This
assumption does not appear to have been premised on a view that deci-
sions not to reinsure certain forms are related to the insurance decision;
indeed, the Court was willing to consider protecting (as related agree-
ments) reinsurance decisions going well beyond the selection of forms
on which to write reinsurance. By assuming that reinsurance agreements
would be exempt (if not boycotts), the Court apparently blended insur-
ance and reinsurance decisions, and never considered to which decision
a refusal to deal must be related to avoid being a boycott. Such blending
might not be feasible if only one of the two decisions is McCarran-
protected. This would leave matters quite confused since a court would
have to choose whether to be governed by the Court's definition-based
test as written or by the conclusion that the Court apparently assumed.
4. Conclusion
On the two most controverted Hartford Fire Insurance issues, the Court
relied on objective approaches not advanced by the parties. On what was
known as the "comity issue," the Justice Souter-led majority refused to
endorse a balancing test, while the Justice Scalia-led dissent promoted a
more objective, statute-based approach. On the boycott issue, the Justice
Scalia-led majority sought to rely on a precise definition of the term
"boycott," although, as in Professional Real Estate, the clarity the Court
sought may have eluded it.
IV. BROOKE GROUP LTD. (LIGGETT)
Brooke Group27 was the oligopoly-recoupment predatory pricing case
featuring Liggett & Myers (Liggett) against Brown and Williamson
(B&W), and Professor Phillip Areeda against former Judge Robert
Bork-an eagerly anticipated "clash of the titans. 2716 But Areeda and
Bork spent as much time debating what were their differences as debating
the differences themselves. Whether or not the result of this absence of
joinder, the Court produced an unsatisfying opinion. As in Kodak, an-
before it. Id. at 2902. The Ninth Circuit had held that the London reinsurers were not
subject to state regulation, and thus were not exempt. 938 F.2d at 927-28.
275 Brooke Group is the successor corporation to Liggett & Myers, but the parties and
the Court referred only to Liggett.
276 Areeda represented Liggett at the court of appeals and at the Supreme Court; Bork
was added as B&W's lead attorney at the Supreme Court, possibly to counter Areeda. At
the court of appeals Areeda had faced former Attorney General Griffin Bell (neither
appeared at the trial level, although I understand that Liggett consulted Areeda during
the trial). Bell, plus Robinson-Patman guru Frederick M. Rowe, were among the lawyers
listed on the B&W brief; Areeda was assisted on the briefs by former Solicitor General
and fellow Harvard Professor Charles Fried.
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other case that arrived at the Court with a confused past,2 " the Court
issued an important opinion that is a challenge to interpret and will often
be distinguishable on its unique facts.
Perhaps the case's most important holding was undisputed by the
litigants: Brooke Group ruled that predatory pricing violations require
proof of "recoupment., 278 Plaintiffs must satisfy this objective test in
addition to an objective cost-based test. In deciding whether the recoup-
ment had been shown, moreover, the majority placed considerably less
weight on subjective evidence than did the dissent.
A. BACKGROUND
Brooke Group's origins lie in the initial fissures in the great cigarette
oligopoly. Liggett, which had become a minor player in branded ciga-
rettes, introduced "black and white" generics, and began taking sales
away from the majors and disproportionately from B&W. B&W was the
third largest U.S. cigarette firm, with a market share that never exceeded
12 percent. B&W responded with its own generic, which closely resem-
bled Liggett's and had the same list price but a lower wholesale price.
Even before B&W sold a single generic cigarette, Liggett sued (in 1984),
alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition. Eventually Lig-
gett added the Robinson-Patman Act count at issue before the Supreme
Court, namely, an allegation that the volume rebates to certain wholesal-
ers constituted illegal price discrimination. 27 9 Liggett alleged that B&W
sought to achieve a sufficient share of the generic business to be in a
position to limit and then reduce the spread between generic and regular
cigarette prices, thus limiting the growth of generics and helping to
maintain sales of supracompetitively priced branded cigarettes for the
benefit of B&W and the rest of the cigarette oligopoly.
1. Overview of the Litigation
A 115-day trial beginning in fall 1989 ended in a verdict for Liggett
only on the Robinson-Patman claim. Damages were $49.6 million, trebled
to $148.8 million. The district court wrote that the documentary evidence
was "more voluminous and detailed than any other reported case. This
177 See Calkins, Revenge of the Amici, supra note 109, at 285-310; see also, e.g., Comments
on Kodak, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 177-216 (1993) (symposium).
278 See infra parts IV(B)(I), IV(C)(4).
279 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... , either directly or
indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality ... where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly . . ..
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evidence not only indicates B&W wanted to injure Liggett, it also details
an extensive plan to slow the growth of the generic cigarette segment."2 '
The court found that B&W priced its generics "well below B&W's average
variable cost, '2 8 ' but granted JNOV for B&W because Liggett had not
adequately shown competitive injury, causation, or antitrust injury. 82
The Fourth Circuit affirmed on the first ground. It expressed grave
doubts about the plausibility of a theory of predation based on oligopolis-
tic recoupment. 83
Liggett filed a powerful petition for certiorari. 284 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari without asking the Solicitor General for his views.
The key to a thorough understanding of the case lies in the questions
presented in that petition and in the instructions on which the challenged
jury verdict was based.
2. The Jury Instructions
The jury's principal finding (in the form of a yes-or-no question) was
that "Brown & Williamson engage[d] in price discrimination that had a
reasonable possibility of injuring competition in the cigarette market as
a whole in the United States. ' 285 The remaining questions went to injury,
damages, defenses, and trademark infringement. This meant that the
instructions on proof of that "reasonable possibility of injuring competi-
tion" were critical.
Parsed carefully, the instructions permitted thejury to find the possibil-
ity of competitive injury based solely on B&W's intent; but the instruc-
tions were sufficiently ambiguous that Liggett could (and did) insist that
they required proof of the real prospect of recoupment. 2 6 The opening
280 748 F. Supp. 344, 354 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
281 id.
282 The court found that Liggett's injuries had been caused by the low prices, not, as
required, by the price discrimination, and that antitrust injury was missing because there
was no below-cost pricing in the cigarette market as a whole. Id. at 358-64.
280 964 F.2d 335, 342 (4thCir. 1992) ("To rely on the characteristics of an oligopoly to
assure recoupment of losses from a predatory pricing scheme after one oligopolist has
made a competitive move is ... economically irrational.").
284 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12-13 ("In conflict with this Court and with
other circuits, the Fourth Circuit created a rule of per se legality for discriminatory, below-
cost pricing by a sophisticated oligopolist undertaken for the express predatory purpose and
with the demonstrated effect of raising prices to the detriment of consumers.") (footnote
omitted).
285 Issue No. 1, Jt. App. at 27; see also Instruction No. 10 ("Competitive Injury Require-
ment"), Jt. App. at 829 (same).
286 Transcript at 4 ("The instructions, fairly read, did require the jury to find that B&W
engaged in below-cost pricing with a reasonable prospect of recoupment ....").
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instruction on competitive injury, on which Liggett placed great weight,
was Instruction 12, "Meaning of Injury to Competition":
By injury to competition, I mean the injury to consumer welfare which
results when a competitor is able to raise and to maintain prices in a
market or well-defined submarket. s7 above competitive levels. In order
to injure competition in the cigarette market as a whole, Brown and
Williamson must be able to create a real possibility of both driving out
rivals by loss-creating price cutting and then holding on to that advan-
tage to recoup losses by raising and maintaining prices at higher than
competitive levels.28
This instruction would seem to require some showing of likely recoup-
ment. As an additional hurdle, the instructions also seemed to require
proof that "Brown & Williamson possessed market power ',2 89 or at least
"a realistic prospect of obtaining market power. ''211
287 The instructions are contaminated with repeated references to a possible "price-value
cigarette submarket," e.g., Instruction No. 13, Jt. App. at 830 ("Earlier I instructed you
to determine whether price-value cigarettes are a well-defined submarket of the cigarette
market. Your decision on that question will be very important in determining whether
Brown & Williamson's activity had a reasonable possibility of injuring competition in the
cigarette market."). The parties had stipulated that the relevant market was "the entire
United States cigarette market," 748 F. Supp. at 351, and in the end the jury was asked only
about that market, but the integrity of the jury's decision was lessened by the instructions'
erroneous discussion of submarkets.
28 Instruction No. 12, Jt. App. at 829-30; see Brief for the Petitioner at 20 & n.22.
Instruction 12 continued with the following paragraph:
You must remember that the Robinson-Patman Act was designed to protect com-
petition rather than just competitors and, therefore, injury to competition does
not mean injury to a competitor. Liggett & Myers cannot satisfy this element
simply by showing that they were injured by Brown & Williamson's conduct. To
satisfy this element, Liggett & Myers must show .. .that Brown & Williamson's
conduct had a reasonable possibility of injuring competition in the cigarette market
and not just a reasonable possibility of injuring a competitor in the cigarette
market.
289 "[M]arket power is the power of a company to control prices and to exclude rivals
in a market or well-defined submarket. The power to control prices is simply the ability
of a company to establish and to maintain higher price points for its products in a market
or well-defined submarket without suffering a loss of business to its rivals." Instruction
No. 14, Jt. App. at 831-32.
290 In the initial instruction (No. 13) on market power, entitled "Threshold Requirement
of Market Power," the instructions seemed to require the fact or the prospect of market
power.Ji. App. at 830-31 ("Brown & Williamson could not have had a reasonable possibility
of injuring competition in the cigarette market unless Brown & Williamson had market
power, or a realistic prospect of obtaining market power, in the cigarette market as a
whole.") (instruction repeated for any possible "well-defined price-value submarket"). But
this instruction was followed by Instruction No. 15 ("Importance of Market Power"), which
referred only to existing market power. Jt.. App. at 832 ("If you find that Brown &
Williamson did not possess market power, then you must find for Brown & Williamson.
... This is because Liggett & Myers cannot demonstrate that Brown & Williamson had a
reasonable possibility of injuring competition ... unless Brown & Williamson possessed
market power."). Two other instructions also referred to actual rather than actual-or-
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But the instructions then abandoned the recoupment requirement.
Instruction 16, "Alternative Methods of Proving Reasonable Possibility of
Injury to Competition," said that the necessary possibility of competitive
injury could be shown either by actual injury to competition, or by show-
ing "predatory intent, from which you may infer that Brown & William-
son's price discrimination . . . had a reasonable possibility of injuring
competition., 291 "Predatory intent, from which a reasonable possibility
of injury to competition may be inferred, can be shown in either one of
two ways:" pricing below "reasonably anticipated average variable cost,"
or "through direct evidence of Brown & Williamson's statements, docu-
ments or conduct.
2 92
These instructions were unclear, inconsistent, and fatally flawed. They
referred repeatedly to submarkets although the parties had stipulated
that there were none. Parts of them could be read as requiring proof of
current market power. Most serious (and although Liggett argued to the
contrary), the instructions seem to have permitted the jury to find for
Liggett without finding either below-cost pricing or likely recoupment.
prospective market power. Instruction No. 16 ("Alternative Methods of Proving Reasonable
Possibility of Injury to Competition"), Jt. App. at 832 ("If you determine that Brown &
Williamson possessed sufficient market power...."); Instruction No. 18 ("Proof of Reason-
able Possibility of Injury to Competition through Predatory Intent"),Jt. App. at 835 (liability
only if "sufficient market power").29 1 Jt. App. at 832-33. This is one of the instructions with the curious reference to actual
market power: "If you determine that Brown & Williamson possessed sufficient market
power, then a reasonable possibility of injuring competition in the cigarette market can
be shown in either one of two ways .... ").
292 Instruction No. 18 ("Proof of Reasonable Possibility of Injury to Competition through
Predatory Intent"), Jt. App. at 834-35. The instruction then cautioned, however, that a
"reasonable possibility of injury to competition" could be inferred only "if you find Brown
& Williamson had sufficient market power."
"Predatory intent" and "predatory pricing" were confusingly defined in Instruction No.
19:
Predatory intent is the state of mind in which a company plans to discipline
and to exclude rivals from a market or a well-defined submarket so that it can
earn higher than competitive profits on its products in that market or well-defined
submarket.
Predatory pricing happens when a company forgoes short-term profits in order
to develop a market position such that the company can later raise prices and
recoup profits. Predatory pricing differs from healthy competitive pricing in its
motive: a predator ... seeks to impose losses on other firms, not garner gains
for itself....
Jt. App. at 835. The independent importance of "direct evidence of predatory intent" was
made clear by its role as the title of a separate jury instruction, Instruction No. 29, Jt.
App. at 843 ("Direct Evidence of Predatory Intent. The second way that Liggett & Myers can
establish predatory intent is through direct evidence of Brown & Williamson's statements
and conduct. Statements that show predatory intent can be oral or written statements by
Brown & Williamson personnel....").
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Instruction 12 discussed the "meaning of injury to competition," but the
"methods of proving reasonable possibility of injury to competition"
were set out in Instructions 16 and 18, where there was no mention of
recoupment, and pricing below cost was only an alternative method of
showing predatory intent. At the heart of the instructions was the dated
double-inference test, which permitted intent to be inferred from direct,
subjective evidence, and then permitted likely harm to competition to
be inferred from intent.
293
The instructions were not before the Court-B&W's challenge to them
remained pending29 4-but their weakness provided a crucial backdrop
to the appeal. The opening nine pages of B&W's brief dissected the jury
instructions and concluded triumphantly-with italics in the original-
that "[a]bsolutely nothing about the elements of proof of competitive injury can
be inferred from the juy's general verdict on that issue., 295 As noted, there is
considerable merit to this position. Yet since Liggett persisted in arguing
that the jury had made important findings, the jury instructions also
served to complicate the briefing and arguing and to distract the litigants
and the Court from other issues.
3. The "Questions Presented"
Also important were the "Questions Presented" by petitioner Liggett.
After describing the litigation below, the petition for certiorari posed
three questions of law:
1. Does the Robinson-Patman Act's prohibition of price discrimination
that "may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
or injure ... competition with (the discriminating seller]" retain inde-
pendent force or does it address only a monopoly or conspiracy already
covered by the Sherman Act?
2. May a court's theoretical speculation about the rational calculations
of a hypothetical oligopolist vitiate a jury verdict based on the calcula-
tions, conduct, and success of the actual respondent?
292 E.g., Double H Plastics, Inc. v. Sonoco Prods. Co., 732 F.2d 351, 354 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 900 (1984). Although Liggett argued that the instructions required more,
it also stated that the double inference test is "[iun accord with Robinson-Patman Act
precedent." Brief for the Petitioner at 19 (citing cases). But see ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS, supra note 53, at 414-15 (reviewing cases requiring below-cost pricing).
294 748 F. Supp. at 348 (trial court denied alternative motion for new trial based in part
on jury instructions).
295 Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 10 [hereinafter "Respondent's Brief"]; see also
Transcript at 25 ("I wanted to meet first the assertion that there is a jury verdict here
which must be respected.. . . But in fact ... these instructions thejudge gave clearly permit
the jury to find liability solely on the basis of ... generalized bad intent in Brown &
Williamson documents.").
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3. Even accepting the Court of Appeals' erroneous conclusion that
consumers were not injured, must actual injury to consumers-as dis-
tinct from a reasonable threat of injury-be demonstrated before Rob-
inson-Patman Act liability can be found?
These simple, compelling questions, perhaps along with the glamour of
a price discrimination petition filed by a father of the modern approach
to predatory pricing, helped persuade the Court to grant certiorari. But
things fell apart for Liggett when, after certiorari had been granted,
B&W agreed with Liggett's answer to each question.2 96
Liggett insisted that the Fourth Circuit had erred as a matter of law;
297
B&W said it agreed with Liggett on the law, but the evidence was lack-
ing; 298 Liggett denied that B&W agreed with it;2 99 B&W again reviewed
the evidence; and so on. Later, at the 1993 Spring Meeting of the ABA
Section of Antitrust Law, Bork quipped that his Supreme Court oral
argument was so fact-laden he wondered whether to start with "Mr.
Chief Justice, and may it please the Court," or "Ladies and Gentlemen
of the jury."' 00
296 "B&W is prepared to answer each of Liggett's questions as Liggett wants.
Respondent's Brief at 34; see also id. at 31:
This case requires resolution of none of the questions Liggett presents for this
Court's consideration. The disputes between the parties are entirely factual. B&W
does not maintain, nor did the Court of Appeals ... hold, (1) that in a primary-
line case the Robinson-Patman Act merely duplicates the Sherman Act by requiring
a monopoly or a conspiracy, (2) that theory can override facts, or (3) that Robinson-
Patman requires actual injury to competition rather than a reasonable possibility
of such injury. Thus, there is no legal dispute for this Court to resolve.
27 E.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2 ("The Fourth Circuit held that, absent a
conspiracy, an oligopolist could never be sufficiently certain of a pay off to threaten
competition.").
'98 Respondent's Brief at 31 ("there is no legal dispute for this Court to resolve"). At
the opening of his argument Bork was asked, by Justice Kennedy, to confirm that "[tihere's
no legal difference between you and the petitioner." "I don't think there is, Your Honor."
Justice Kennedy suggested that Areeda "would disagree and say that your position is that
this sort of suit simply cannot be maintained ... when an oligopolist is the defendant."
Bork responded, "But I don't accept it and I hope I am not estopped from denying that
that's my position. (Laughter.) No, I think oligopolistic predation could occur in some
circumstances." Transcript at 22-23 (Justice identified by BNA, Rival Generic Cigarette
Makers Spar Over Predatory Pricing Ruling, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 339 (Apr.
1, 1993)).
299 Areeda's rebuttal opened with Justice Scalia asking whether Areeda agreed with Bork
"that this seems to be mostly just an argument about sufficiency of the evidence." Areeda
disagreed. The court of appeals's decision, he said, "was not based on facts." Areeda "read
the court of appeals . .. as saying that only a monopolist or a cartel can successfully
predate." Transcript at 43-44 (Justice identified by BNA).
300 B&W's brief on the merits does not turn from its factual counterstatement of the
case until page 31, leaving only 16 pages for its legal and policy argument.
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B. THE OPINIONS
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy for a six to three major-
ity, o' made only two specific rulings of law. This article will note these
briefly, review the Court's remarkable weighing of the evidence, and
discuss Justice Stevens's dissent. The article will then consider more
generally the case's implications.
1. Recoupment
The Court held that plaintiffs challenging predatory pricing must
show both below-cost pricing and some likelihood (how great a likelihood
is discussed below) of the predator's eventually "recouping its investment
in below-cost prices. 30 2 Although making recoupment an element of the
offense was something of a change in the law-and one that enhances
the importance of objective evidence-the Court's action was not too
surprising. Courts were increasingly considering recoupment issues303
and, although B&W championed recoupment, Liggett agreed with it.10 4
2. Oligopoly Recoupment
The Court "decline[d] to create a per se rule of nonliability for preda-
tory price discrimination when recoupment is alleged to take place
through supracompetitive oligopoly pricing. 30 1 "A predatory pricing
scheme designed to preserve or create a stable oligopoly, if successful,
01 The Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas joined the
majority opinion. justice Stevens dissented in an opinion joined by Justices White and
Blackmun.
302 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
303 See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 53, at 236-37. Until Brooke Group,
recoupment as a separate element of the offense was exceptional. Recoupment was associ-
ated most closely with judge Easterbrook's opinion in A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre
Farms, 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).
304 Brief for the Petitioner at 40-41, 43 & n.56; Transcript at 5 ("We accept the burden
of showing that prices were discriminatory, below average variable cost, and were under-
taken with a reasonable prospect of recoupment."). It would have been awkward for Areeda
to have done otherwise, since his writings seemed to support a recoupment requirement.
3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 148, at 151:
(predatory pricing would make little economic sense to a potential predator unless
he had (1) greater financial staying power than his rivals, and (2) a very substantial
prospect that the losses he incurs in the predatory campaign will be exceeded by
the profits to be earned after his rivals have been destroyed.),
quoted at Respondent's Brief at 24 and Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at
24; see also Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future,
75 CAL. L. REV. 959, 965 (1987) ("The uncertain future gains must greatly exceed the
present actual losses to overcome the uncertainty that rivals will be destroyed or disciplined
and that monopoly profits can be reaped in the face of future entry.") (footnote omitted),
quoted at Respondent's Brief at 40.
305 113 S. Ct. at 2591.
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can injure consumers in the same way, and to the same extent, as one
designed to bring about a monopoly. 3 °6 This also was not too surprising:
it was Liggett's point, but B&W agreed.0 7 The Court viewed oligopoly
recoupment as extraordinarily unlikely but not impossible as a matter
of law. The Fourth Circuit opinion could be read as making an erroneous
legal ruling, the Court said, and, to the extent it did, it was corrected.
3. Evidentiary Review
The astonishing part of the opinion is the evidentiary review. The
Court wrote that it "is not customary for this Court to review the suffi-
ciency of the evidence"° 8'-and then, by engaging in such a review,
demonstrated why such reviews are so rarely profitable. The Court devel-
oped arguments not made by the parties and even delved into parts of
the trial record not included in the joint appendix, some of which had
not been cited by the parties.
a. B&W's Argument
It is helpful to contrast B&W's argument with the Court's discussion.
The argument took sixteen pages of the brief. It included the following
points: (i) B&W is willing to answer affirmatively each of Liggett's "ques-
tion's presented" (two pages); (ii) "oligopoly recoupment" is impossible
and "oligopoly predation" is irrational given B&W's small market share
and the complicated game that would be required for successful coordi-
nation (five and a half pages); (iii) the Robinson-Patman Act was con-
cerned principally with geographic price discrimination, it should not
be extended to situations in which plaintiffs and defendants service the
same product and geographic markets, and it permits findings of in-
creased competition to overcome inferences of competitive injury (three
pages); 0 9 (iv) the Fourth Circuit concluded that competition actually
increased as a result of B&W's entry into generics (two and a half pages);
506 Id.
3 0 7 See supra note 298. Although B&W agreed that oligopoly recoupment should not be
rejected as a matter of law, it based much of its argument on the implausibility of any
such theory in general and in the cigarette industry in particular. See, e.g., Respondent's
Brief at 39 ("Liggett's economic theory is impossible .... ").
For an appraisal attaching more weight to the Court's acceptance of the theoretical
possibility of oligopoly recoupment, see Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Liggett:
An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. Issue 3 (forthcoming 1994). B&W's concession
would not have prevented the Court from rejecting the theory or refusing to reach the
issue, as is clear from the dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance, see supra note 237.
'08 113 S. Ct. at 2591 (adding "but we will do so when the issue is properly before us
and the benefits of providing guidance concerning the proper application of a legal stan-
dard and avoiding the systemic costs associated with further proceedingsjustify the required
expenditure of judicial resources").
309 Respondent's Brief at 41-43, 47-48.
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and (v) holding B&W liable would chill vigorous price competition (three
pages)." ° B&W reported that as evidence of increased competition the
Fourth Circuit had relied upon B&W's small market share, testimony
from Liggett's executives that competition was increasing, the expansion
of the economy share of the cigarette market (from 0.4 percent in 1981
to 15 percent in 1990), and the increase in discounting that followed
B&W's entry into generics.
b. The Court's Evidentiary Review
The Court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence was quite differ-
ent from B&W's argument. (Where similarities exist, they are noted
below.) Rejecting many of B&W's claims,"' the Court ruled that a jury
could find that B&W intended to lessen competition by using predatory
pricing to get control of the generic segment of the cigarette market,
that B&W priced below any appropriate measure of costs, and that this
pricing imposed losses on Liggett that Liggett could not sustain given
its parent corporation's interest in selling Liggett. 1 2 But the proof was
flawed, according to the Court, because the evidence did not show that
B&W "had a reasonable prospect of recovering its losses from below-
cost pricing through slowing the growth of generics." ''1 Missing from
the evidence was any indication that B&W was "likely to obtain the power
to raise the prices for generic cigarettes above a competitive level," which,
according to the Court, was the "linchpin" of Liggett's scheme because
"a slowing of growth in the economy segment, even if it results from an
increase in generic prices, is not itself anticompetitive. '1 4
The Court then examined whether (1) "oligopolistic price coordination
in fact produced supracompetitive prices in the generic segment," and
(2) whether "the alleged scheme was likely to have brought about tacit
coordination and oligopoly pricing in the generic segment, even if it did
"o Id. at 43-44, 48-49. Except where noted, the points are made in order, id. at 34-49.
"' Cf. Respondent's Brief at Sections C.4-.6 ("B&W Did Not Intend to Price Below
Cost" "B&W Did Not in Fact Sell Below Cost" "B&W Had No Plan to Recoup Any Losses
on Generic Sales").
112 113 S. Ct. at 2592.
33 Id.; cf. Respondent's Brief at 24-28 (counterstatement of the case) (B&W neither
planned to nor did recoup any losses).
314 113 S. Ct. at 2592-93 ("Only if those higher prices are a product of nonmarket forces
has competition suffered. If prices rise in response to an excess of demand over supply
... the market is functioning in a competitive manner. Consumers are not injured from
the perspective of the antitrust laws by the price increases; they are in fact causing them.").
Although true generics are only part of the economy segment, the Court seemed to use
the terms "generic" and "economy" interchangeably, see id. at 2582 ("The economy segment
of the market, sometimes called the generic segment, is characterized by its bargain prices
and comprises a variety of different products ....").
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not actually do so. '3 5 To conclude that generic prices did not become
supracompetitive, the Court relied principally on the increase in sales
of generics: Their share of the cigarette market increased from 0.4
percent in 1980 to 15 percent in 1989.316 The Court noted that one could
speculate whether the increase could have been even faster but for B&W,
but this was unlikely given that a planning document had predicted a
slower growth rate."I'
The Court was not persuaded by Liggett's evidence about pricing.
Although list prices for generic and branded cigarettes increased by
similar dollar amounts twice a year from 1986-89, with generics increas-
ing at the faster percentage rate and with generics and brandeds both
increasing faster than inflation, (a) discounts were assuming increased
importance, so list prices could be misleading, 3 8 (b) a "subgeneric" ciga-
rette had been introduced,1 9 (c) rising generic cigarette prices could be
explained by increasing demand, and (d) "an inference of supracompeti-
tive pricing would be particularly anomalous in this case" because "Lig-
gett's own officers and directors consistently denied that they or other
firms in the industry priced their cigarettes through tacit collusion or
reaped supracompetitive profits. 32 °
The Court also concluded that supracompetitive generic pricing was
unlikely. The Court pointed to the many product and pricing variations
and reasoned that "the inherent limitations of tacit collusion suggest that
' Id. at 2593.
316 Id.; cf. Respondent's Brief at 46 (court of appeals relied on same increase in economy
segment share); id. at 15 (counterstatement of the case) (same comparison, but adding
that the economy segment had more than a 31% share "today"). The evidence on which
the Court apparently relied reported shares of the "value for money segment" of the
cigarette industry.
s1' Id. at 2594 (economy segment had 12% share in 1988, compared to a May 1984 B&W
projection of 10%); cf. Respondent's Brief at 14 (citing plan's projection as evidence of
commitment to the economy segment). The plan had assumed that two-thirds of the
economy segment would be represented by "black and white/private labels" and one-third
by "branded generics," whereas the evidence from which the Court apparently computed
the 12% figure (actually 11.57%, before rounding) showed that in 1988 "plain/private
label" cigarettes had only a 2.25% market share. Jt. App. at 354-55. The plan had seriously
overestimated the growth of true generics and underestimated the growth of low-price
branded cigarettes. B&W's brief does not make the same comparison as the Court and
does not address the possibility that true generics or the economy segment in general
might have grown faster but for B&W.
318 Cf. Respondent's Brief at 26 (counterstatement of the case) ("discounts, rebates and
promotions ... made list prices meaningless").
"' Cf. Respondent's Brief at 27 (counterstatement of the case) ("by the time of trial, five
manufacturers offered cigarettes at a discount of at least 50%").
'20 113 S. Ct. at 2595; see also infra text at notes 342-347; cf. Respondent's Brief at
19 (counterstatement of the case) ("Liggett's senior executives also demolished Liggett's
theory.").
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such multivariable coordination is improbable., 2 ' R.J. Reynolds had
introduced a "branded generic" (Doral) in 1984 and appeared not to be
acting as a participating member of the oligopoly. 22 Any claim that B&W
was signaling its interest in maintaining prices by offering rebates to
wholesalers (rather than by reduced list prices) rang hollow since Liggett
already followed that pricing scheme 32 and no evidence suggested that
a competing cigarette company had recognized any such signal.2 4 Finally,
B&W did not act as though it wanted to limit the generic segment since
it introduced generics to a thousand wholesalers that had not carried
them before;3 25 its volume rebates tended to spur sales efforts because
generics could not be returned;3 26 and B&W spent $10 million placing
discount coupons on its generic cartons. 27
The Court concluded:
We hold that the evidence cannot support a finding that Brown &
Williamson's alleged scheme was likely to result in oligopolistic price
coordination and sustained supracompetitive pricing in the generic seg-
ment of the national cigarette market. Without this, Brown & Williamson
had no reasonable prospect of recouping its predatory losses and could
not inflict the injury to competition the antitrust laws prohibit.128
c. Comments on the Comparison
Although, as noted, parts of the Court's analysis draw on B&W's factual
recitation, the Court's reasoning differs in important ways from B&W's.
321 113 S. Ct. at 2596. The Court cited ROBERT DORFMAN, THE PRICE SYSTEM 99-100 &
n. 10 (1964), and F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 279 (3d ed. 1990), as had Respondent's Brief at 37.
322 113 S. Ct. at 2596; cf. Respondent's Brief at 13-14 (counterstatement of the case)
("Doral radically changed the marketplace.").
3 2 Cf. Respondent's Brief at 21 (counterstatement of facts) ("Why would competitors
read B&W's rebates as a 'signal' when both Liggett and RJR had already used volume
rebates on their own generics?").
24 Cf. Respondent's Brief at 20 (counterstatement of case) ("there are no documents, or
any other evidence, showing that any of the other four cigarette manufacturers understood
B&W to be disciplining Liggett or trying to contain the generic segment").
325 Cf. Respondent's Brief at 21 (counterstatement of the case) ("The signal B&W actually
sent-that it intended to compete and thereby expand the segment-was conveyed by
B&W's offer to sell generics to one thousand wholesale customers who had never previously
purchased generics. B&W reinforced that signal by investing $10 million in stickering on
its generics during the alleged period of predation.") (citations omitted).
326 113 S. Ct. at 2597. The Court cited no authority for this point, which was not made
in the briefs. The only reference to returns was by respondents, who complained that
Liggett publicized its lawsuit to exploit fears that customers "would be left with unsaleable
and non-returnable inventory of B&W generics." Respondent's Brief at 28 n.23 (citing
record); cf Liggett Group, 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,583 at 61,106 (M.D.N.C. 1987)
(magistrate's findings and recommendations) (B&W sold only its generics on a nonreturn
basis).
127 Supra note 325.
328 113 S. Ct. at 2598.
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Critical to the Court's conclusion was its dismissal of the evidence of
price increases subsequent to the alleged predation. The Court said that
although a reasonable jury could have concluded that net prices rose,"'
i.e., after discounts, promotions, and introduction of subgenerics,330 any
price increases simply reflected increasing consumer demand.3 '
The Court's discussion of price increases is problematic. All cigarette
prices-economy and regular-were increasing in the face of excess
capacity and declining overall demand.3 ' The Court never asked why,
if prices were responding to demand, regular prices were rising. The
Court also failed to explain why it analyzed economy cigarette pricing
separately from regular pricing. The parties had stipulated to the exis-
tence of a single cigarette market without an economy submarket. The
existence of a single market at least suggests that manufacturers could
accommodate any increase in demand for economy cigarettes by shifting
production from regular cigarettes without increasing prices. The Court
never discussed whether this should have happened. Instead, the Court
merely asserted that economy price increases were demand-driven, a
critical assertion that was conspicuously not made by B&W.
Another respect in which the Court differed from B&W's argument
was in the Court's sharp focus on the existence and likelihood of supra-
competitive pricing in the economy segment. B&W argued that cigarette
pricing in general was competitive, that sales of economy cigarettes were
increasing, and that no net price increase had been shown, but it did
129 Id. at 2594-95; see also id. at 2585 ("at least some portion of the list price increase
was reflected in a higher net price to the consumer").
330 The Court discussed the introduction of subgenerics at some length without noting
that at time of trial they accounted for less than 1% of the market, Jt. App. 354 ("third
price point" on market share report relied on by Court).
' The Court's entire discussion is as follows:
[R]ising prices do not themselves permit an inference of a collusive market dy-
namic. Even in a concentrated market, the occurrence of a price increase does not
in itself permit a rational inference of conscious parallelism or supracompetitive
pricing. Where, as here, output is expanding at the same time prices are increasing,
rising prices are equally consistent with growing product demand. Under these
conditions, a jury may not infer competitive injury from price and output data
absent some evidence that tends to prove that output was restricted or prices were
above a competitive level. Cf. Monsanto, 465 U.S., at 763, 104 S. Ct. at 1470.
113 S. Ct. at 2595.
This analysis was foreshadowed during the oral argument. While describing the increase
in prices of regular-brand cigarettes and of generics during oral argument, Areeda was
challenged by a Justice, "Well, I guess the project wouldn't be successful, though, if the
... price gap was narrowed but the volume of... generics increased substantially." Areeda
responded that although volume was higher, so was the average price, so consumers were
"therefore hurt." Transcript at 15-16.
312 113 S. Ct. at 2585, 2595.
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not argue that a price increase could be dismissed as competitive."3 3 The
Court's conclusion, quoted above, 34 seems to have required Liggett to
show recoupment in the generic segment.335 Perhaps the Court meant that
there could not be recoupment in any segment because there could not be
supracompetitive pricing in the economy segment.3 6 Such a proposition,
which was not advanced by B&W, would deserve more attention than
the Court gave it;3 37 but the Court's great emphasis on the unlikelihood
of "sustained supracompetitive pricing" in the economy segment suggests
that the Court was looking to that segment for recoupment, which would
clearly be error.
4. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens's dissent, which was joined by Justices Blackmun and
White, would have accorded substantially greater weight to B&W's sub-
jective intentions. He would have remanded the case to permit resolution
of remaining issues, but if there was to be a review of the sufficiency of
the evidence, he would have upheld the jury verdict. (Justice Stevens
wrote as though the jury instructions had not been flawed.) Justice Ste-
vens relied on the history of supracompetitive pricing, the sharp post-
'" During oral argument, Bork summarized Liggett's argument as saying that B&W
sought to recoup its investment in predation through slowing the switching of smokers
from brandeds to generics. This argument was flawed, he said, because it requires "supra-
competitive profits and prices in brandeds," which, he said, did not exist. In addition, he
said, B&W never intended to narrow the price gap between brandeds and generics, and
never did. See Transcript at 35-41 (adding, "[t]hat's about all I can say, Your Honors.").
The Court apparently concluded that B&W did intend to narrow the price gap, and
succeeded at narrowing it (although some low-volume "subgenerics" established a new
gap), but B&W should prevail anyway.
... Supra text at note 328.
135 113 S. Ct. at 2598 (without "oligopolistic price coordination and sustained supracom-
petitive pricing in the generic segment" B&W "had no reasonable prospect of recouping
its predatory losses").
336 For this reading of the opinion see Baker, supra note 307.
37 The Court's view of prices as being demand-driven is problematic, as noted above.
Nor is it clear that supracompetitive pricing in generics must be the "linchpin" for recoup-
ment, as the Court said, 113 S. Ct. at 2593. B&W documents set forth a strategy of
maintaining high list prices to slow segment growth, while using discounts to slash wholesale
prices and build volume. B&W hoped to prevent an increase in the pricing spread between
economy and regular cigarettes, and eventually to reduce the spread. It is counterintuitive
to think that one can maintain consumer prices by using wholesaler discounts in lieu of
price cuts; but not everything counterintuitive should be rejected as a matter of law. And
if B&W had set out deliberately to control and then reduce the price spread between
economy and regular cigarettes, and had accomplished this by use of below-cost pricing
and thereby profited handsomely in sales of supracompetitively priced regular cigarettes,
one should hesitate before concluding that as a matter of law no harm was done because
pricing in the economy segment was not supracompetitive (even assuming it was not).
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predation price increases,33 and, especially, the well-informed views of
B&W. "That B&W executives were willing to accept losses of this magni-
tude during the entire 18 months is powerful evidence of their belief
that prices ultimately could be 'managed up' to a level that would allow
B&W to recoup its investment. 33 9 Under the Robinson-Patman Act a
plaintiff need only show a " 'reasonable possibility' of injuring competi-
tion," wrote Justice Stevens, and "the jury would surely be entitled to
infer that B&W's predatory plan, in which it invested millions of dollars
for the purpose of achieving an admittedly anticompetitive result, car-
ried" such a possibility.340
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BROOKE GROUP
Brooke Group's most important holding was its clear statement that
recoupment is an element of a predatory pricing case. The case may
also have implications for judicial review of jury verdicts, for antitrust
economics, and for other Robinson-Patman Act issues.
Any application of Brooke Group, however, should recognize the many
respects in which it was a unique case. As noted above, the challenged
jury verdict was contaminated by vulnerable jury instructions. Liggett's
case also may have been weakened by doubts about causation."' More-
over, the extended debate about whether there was any legal disagree-
ment tended to prevent joinder between the parties on key questions
going to evidentiary support for the verdict.
Most important, Liggett was badly hurt by the failure of its executives
to agree with its lawyers' depiction of the state of competition in the
1-1 113 S. Ct. at 2601, 2606 (between the end of 1985 and June 1989, branded cigarette
cartons increased from $33.15 to $46.15, generic cartons from $19.75 to $33.75, based
on list prices). Justice Stevens said that promotions did not offset these price increases and
were used primarily with branded cigarettes, and the jury must have resolved any dispute
about pricing in Liggett's favor. Id. at 2604.
53 9 Id. at 2601.
340 Id. at 2606. Justice Stevens criticized the Court's excessive reliance on theoretical
barriers to tacit coordination. The Court relied
on the supposition that an "anticompetitive minuet is most difficult to compose
and to perform, even for a disciplined oligopoly .... I would suppose, however,
that the professional performers who had danced the minuet for 40 to 50 years
would be better able to predict whether their favorite partners would follow them
in the future than would an outsider, who might not know the difference between
Haydn and Mozart.
Id. at 2605 (footnote omitted).
341 As noted above, the district court had found that the discrimination, as such, did not
cause any injury, but the Fourth Circuit did not address this issue. See supra note 282.
Areeda was nonetheless peppered with causation questions as he tried to start his argument.
Transcript at 3-11.
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cigarette business. 42 This point had been hammered home at oral argu-
ment by Bork. "[T]hese Liggett executives," he said, "are the people who
were authorized by law to bind the company, and they come in and say
an essential element of our case is missing and we want triple damages." '43
Opposing counsel essentially presented Liggett executives with a choice
between undermining their lawsuit or risking conviction in court for a
felony or in the court of public opinion for profiteering. 44 The executives
142 See supra text at note 320. The Court dismissed Liggett's explanation that business-
people view competition and collusion differently from economists by quoting the lengthy
rejoinder provided by the district court:
"This argument was considered at the summary judgment stage since these execu-
tives gave basically the same testimony at their depositions. The court allowed
the case to go to trial in part because the Liggett executives were not economists
and in part because of affidavits from the Liggett executives stating that they
were confused by the questions asked by B[rown] & W[illiamson] lawyers and did
not mean to contradict the testimony of [their economic expert] Burnett. However,
at trial, despite having consulted extensively with Burnett and having had adequate
time to familiarize themselves with concepts such as tacit collusion, oligopoly, and
monopoly profits, these Liggett executives again contradicted Burnett's theory."
113 S. Ct. at 2595 (quoting 748 F. Supp. at 356).
343 Transcript at 36. AJustice asked whether "what you're saying to us is that the manage-
ment people said the profits were perfectly routine and the expert said that they were...
abnormally high, and because the expert and the management disagreed we must agree
with management?" Bork responded as follows:
He [the expert] said ... profits are abnormally high and it was due to tacit collusion
or oligopolistic interdependence. The management denied both of those things.
And ... it's not a question of who you believe. I don't see how a company can
come in-the client itself can walk in and deny its own case, and then the lawyers
say yes, but I have an economist over here ... who will contradict. That just
doesn't make any sense to me.
Id. at 37-38.
... To show that Liggett's executives had denied the existence of supracompetitive
profits, the Court cited parts of the record where witnesses were asked questions such as
the following: "Are you aware of any agreement ... to fix the prices that are charged for
branded cigarettes?" "Does Liggett have any unwritten or unstated understandings with
any other tobacco manufacturers to coordinate the prices which it charges for branded
cigarettes?" "Do you agree or disagree that cigarette manufacturers are engaged in tacit
collusion to fix prices on branded products?" "Do you agree or disagree that Liggett has
reaped excessive profits on its branded cigarettes?" "Do you agree or disagree that the
major United States cigarette manufacturers including Liggett, have controlled the price
...; that the public has been denied the benefits of free and open competition ... ; that
the prices of cigarettes ... have been fixed at artificial and non-competitive levels?" 11
Tr. 170-74, cited at 113 S. Ct. at 2595. "Was the company of which you were a director
making higher than competitive profits on its branded products while you were there?"
64 Tr. 53-54, cited at 113 S. Ct. at 2595. "I want to know-yes or no-sir, whether or not
you say that the price you charged for branded cigarettes ... was a fair and equitable
price ... "." I want to know, sir, if you testified under oath that the cigarette industry is
not a collusive oligopoly?" Jt. App. at 396, 398, cited at 113 S. Ct. at 2595. "You are aware
that Mr. Dey told ... the United States Congress that the cigarette industry was, quote,
,a very, very highly competitive business ... [a]nd that on another part of his testimony
before the Congress of the United States ... he said, 'This is a highly competitive business.
We fight tooth and nail.' "" [D]oes Liggett make monopoly profits on its branded cigarettes?
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chose to undermine the lawsuit. It is one thing for an academic or the
Supreme Court to say that "there was no significant price competition"
in cigarettes; that "[l]ist prices for cigarettes increased in lock-step, twice
a year ... irrespective of the rate of inflation;" or that "the industry
reaped the benefits of prices above a competitive level." '345 It is another
thing for a cigarette company executive to announce that, effectively, to
the world. 46 The Supreme Court apparently agreed with Bork that
Liggett should not be able to have it both ways, and the Court's conclusion
not to consider prices as supracompetitive became an important part of
the Court's reasoning.
347
1. Judicial Review of Jury Verdicts
Some judges may follow the Court's lead and begin reviewing the
sufficiency of evidence supportingjury verdicts with new vigor. Although
it is clear that the jury instructions were flawed, Brooke Group was not a
jury instruction case. Instead, the trial court granted JNOV based on a
searching review of the evidence; the Court endorsed the JNOV based
on its own searching review.
Judges looking to Brooke Group to support aggressive review of jury
verdicts need only look to the Court's concluding paragraph. A "reason-
able jury is presumed to know and understand [1] the law, [2] the facts
of the case, and [3] the realities of the market. 3 48 The wild card, of
course is "the realities of the market." The court is the expert on the
law; the jury on the facts. If the court views itself as expert on "the
realities of the market" (which might formerly have been considered
facts), much less deference is required.
Brooke Group should not quickly be read to change traditional deference
to jury verdicts. Because of the flawed instructions, the verdict here
deserved (and received) no deference. Any judge would have been loathe
... do the other tobacco manufacturers make monopoly profits ... does Liggett make
higher than competitive profits on its branded cigarettes?' " Jt. App. at 624-29, cited at
113 S. Ct. at 2595.
341 113 S. Ct. at 2583.
S16 Justice Stevens pointed out that it made little sense to rely on testimony about modest
profits since the testimony "relate[d] to the period before the price war, as well as after,"
and before the price war "there is no real dispute but that prices were supracompetitive."
113 S. Ct. at 2605 n.15. He added that the jury was free to disregard the executives'
testimony-which would have been more compelling were it clearer that the jury had done
SO.
"7 See supra text at note 320. Of course, it may be that prices were not supracompetitive,
or were not during the relevant time periods, after adjusting for risks and making allow-
ances for accounting rules. See Respondent's Brief at 20 n.15. But it is hard to imagine
any corporate official publicly announcing that his or her firm is charging monopoly prices.
348 113 S. Ct. at 2598 (bracketed numbering added).
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to continue a nine-year-old case challenging pricing in an industry in
which traditional pricing seemed to be disintegrating. It would be a
mistake to read this part of Brooke too broadly.
2. Antitrust Economics
Brooke Group serves as a rejoinder to commentators who thought Kodak
marked the end of Chicago-School dominance of the Supreme Court
and the dawning of the "post-Chicago" era.3 49 If Brooke Group is any
indication, the Court is firmly in the Chicago School. None of the "new
new learning" on predation or oligopoly theory was cited.350
The Court wrote about the "general implausibility" of predatory pric-
ing by relying principally on its 1986 Matsushita opinion 35' without even
a nod to those economists who regard predatory pricing as at least some-
what more plausible than it once seemed. The Court showed less concern
than ever about predatory pricing:
As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant
measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged
predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond
the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting
intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting....
Even in an oligopolistic market, when a firm drops its prices to a
competitive level to demonstrate to a maverick the unprofitability of
straying from the group, it would be illogical to condemn the price cut
.... Even if the ultimate effect of the cut is to induce or reestablish
supracompetitive pricing, discouraging a price cut and forcing firms
to maintain supracompetitive prices, thus depriving consumers of the
benefits of lower prices in the interim, does not constitute sound antitrust
policy.
... Without [recoupment], predatory pricing produces lower aggre-
gate prices .. , and consumer welfare is enhanced. Although unsuccess-
ful predatory pricing may encourage some inefficient substitution to-
ward the product being sold at less than its cost, unsuccessful predation
is in general a boon to consumers.
These prerequisites [that the Court had erected] to recovery are not
easy to establish, but they are not artificial obstacles to recovery; rather,
349 Cf., e.g., Steven C. Salop, Kodak as Post-Chicago Law and Economics, CHARLES RIVER
AssocIATES PERSP., April 1993.
350 For reviews of "post-Chicago" economics see Baker, supra note 307; Jonathan B.
Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 645 (1989); Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust,
in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig
eds., 1989); Janusz A. Ordover & Daniel M. Wall, Proving Predation after Monfort and
Matsushita: What the New "New Learning" Has to Offer, ANTITRUST, Summer 1987, at 5.
For an argument that the Court's acceptance of the theoretical possibility of oligopoly
recoupment indicates that it is stepping away from the Chicago School, see BAKER, supra
note 307.
.. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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they are essential components of real market injury. As we have said
in the Sherman Act context, "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried,
and even more rarely successful," and the costs of an erroneous finding
of liability are high .... 352
The Court also was inhospitable to claims of oligopolistic coordination.
Tacit coordination among cigarette companies in the 1980s (suit was
filed in 1984) would have been "unmanageable," the Court said.
Tacit coordination is facilitated by a stable market environment, fungible
products, and a small number of variables upon which the firms seeking
to coordinate their pricing may focus .... By 1984, however, the ciga-
rette market was in an obvious state of flux ...
The larger number of product types and pricing variables also de-
creased the probability of effective parallel pricing .... [T]he inherent
limitations of tacit collusion suggest that such multivariable coordination
is improbable."5 '
By themselves there is nothing remarkable about the oligopoly factors
mentioned by the Court. But it was writing about the cigarette industry,
one of the most celebrated oligopolies of all time. Even during the 1980s
the cigarette industry was among the most concentrated and profitable
of all businesses. 54 A major price break finally came in 1993, 355 but that
was nine years later. Nor did the Court discuss theories of oligopolistic
behavior facilitated by strong brands 56 (cigarette companies having some
of the strongest). Although the Court reconfirmed that Clayton Act
Section 7 addresses' oligopolistic practices, it did so while relying on
analyses of Section 7 to interpret identical wording in the Robinson-
Patman Act.357 Merger defendants can be expected to use this reasoning
in reverse by pointing to Brooke Group and explaining how much more
competitive their industries are than one about which the Court was not
too troubled . 5
352 Id. at 2588-89 (citations omitted).
353 Id. at 2596; see also id. at 2590 ("tacit coordination among oligopolists must be consid-
ered the least likely means of recouping predatory losses").
... SCHERER & Ross, supra note 321, at 251 (despite falling consumption, between 1980
and 1988 manufacturers increased their profits per thousand cigarettes from $3.80 to
$11.55).
315 See infra note 389.
356 Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of Nonfungible
Goods, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1625 (1987).
317 113 S. Ct. at 2591 ("In the § 7 context, it has long been settled that excessive concentra-
tion, and the oligopolistic price coordination it portends, may be the injury to competition
the Act prohibits.") (citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963)).
The Court added, "We adhere to 'the normal rule of statutory construction that identical
words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.'"
Id. (citations omitted).
3'8 Cf. Petition for Certiorari at 16 (arguing that oligopolistic uncertainty is inevitable
but does not preclude an oligopoly-based merger enforcement program). But cf. Respon-
dent's Brief 43 n.33 (Section 7 has a very different text, purpose, and enforcement history).
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3. Robinon-Patman Act
The Court declared that the Robinson-Patman Act had primary line
vitality separate from the Sherman Act (as both B&W and Liggett had
agreed), i.e., that there are "differences." "For example" (its only exam-
ple), the Sherman Act requires a "dangerous probability" of monopoliza-
tion, "whereas the Robinson-Patman Act requires only that there be 'a
reasonable possibility' of substantial injury to competition."'359 But "the
essence of the claim under either statute is the same."360 And any differ-
ence had effectively dissolved by the end of the Court's opinion when
it concluded, in this Robinson-Patman case, that "Brown & Williamson
had no reasonable prospect 36' of recouping its predatory losses and could
not inflict the injury to competition the antitrust laws prohibit" because
"the evidence cannot support a finding that Brown & Williamson's al-
leged scheme was likely to result in oligopolistic price coordination and
sustained supracompetitive pricing. 3 6 2 If there was any doubt before,
the Court's ruling that plaintiffs must show "likely" supracompetitive
pricing makes clear that Utah Pie,365 which has been subjected to so much
criticism, has been buried. 64
359 113 S. Ct. at 2587 (citing Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S.
428, 434 (1983)). This distinction became important when the Court addressed oligopoly
recoupment. Without mentioning B&W's argument that primary line Robinson-Patman
should be limited to geographic price discrimination or its equivalent, the Court accepted
the theoretical validity of oligopoly recoupment as the basis for a Robinson-Patman viola-
tion. "Unlike the provisions of the Sherman Act, which speak only of various forms of
express agreement and monopoly, the Robinson-Patman Act is phrased in broader, disjunc-
tive terms, prohibiting price discrimination 'where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.' "Id. at 2591 (citations
omitted).
360 Id. at 2587 (also noting that "it has become evident that primary-line competitive
injury under the Robinson-Patman Act is of the same general character as the injury
inflicted by predatory pricing schemes actionable under § 2 of the Sherman Act").
361 Query whether the casual use of the phrase "reasonable prospect" elevates the thresh-
old beyond "reasonable possibility." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (Second College
ed. 1982) defines "prospect" as "something hoped for or expected; anticipated outcome."
"Possibility" is "the quality or condition of being possible." "Possible" is merely "that can
be; capable of existing," or, second definition, "that can be in the future; that may or may
not happen."
362 113 S. Ct. at 2598 (emphasis added). Before reaching this conclusion, the Court wrote
that a plaintiff must demonstrate that its "competitor had a reasonable prospect, or, under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-
cost prices." Id. at 2588. The Court implied that the "reasonable prospect" and "dangerous
probability" differ; in the end, the Court seemed to require "likelihood" at least of supra-
competitive pricing, which may have a third meaning.
363 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 704 (1967) (primary line
Robinson-Patman violation found based on geographic price discrimination, below (appar-
ently total) cost pricing, predatory intent, and a "drastically declining price structure").
364 113 S. Ct. at 2587 ("We do not regard the Utah Pie case itself as having the full
significance attributed to it by its detractors. Utah Pie was an early judicial inquiry in this
area and did not purport to set forth explicit, general standards for establishing a violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act.").
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Although the Court indicated at least twice that it was analyzing
primary line Robinson-Patman Act law, 6 the intriguing question con-
cerns secondary line Robinson-Patman injury. (Primary line injury is at
the seller's level; secondary line injury is at the disfavored customer's
level.) Until now, relatively settled law permitted secondary line injury
to be shown prima facie by proof of substantial, nontransitory price
discrimination, i.e., without proof of pricing below cost or of recoup-
ment.3 66 Yet the Court's discussion about the importance of encouraging
aggressive pricing would seem equally applicable, as a matter of econom-
ics, to secondary line Robinson-Patman litigation. The Court showed no
hesitancy in applying Sherman Act reasoning to this Robinson-Patman
case; 67 defense lawyers surely will argue that the language and logic of
the Court's predatory pricing analysis apply equally to secondary line
cases.
Although Brooke Group's holding obviously is limited to primary line
litigation, its reasoning is not. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the
Court never reiterated its approach to secondary line cases.3 68 Separate
primary line and secondary line standards have coexisted for quite a
while369 and could continue doing so-but a future Supreme Court or
even a lower court might find it tempting to extend Brooke Group's think-
ing to secondary line cases.
4. Predatory Pricing Law
In 1975 Professors Areeda and Turner revolutionized predatory pric-
ing law by proposing a cost-based, objective test.37 0 Areeda and Turner
65 Id.
'6 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 53, at 415-17. For explanation and sup-
port of the relaxed standard for proving secondary line injury, see Note, The Courts' Assault
on the Robinson-Patman Act, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 634 (1992). But cf. Boise Cascade Corp. v.
FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (inference of competitive harm "can also be
overcome by evidence showing an absence of competitive injury").
367 113 S. Ct. at 2588 (citations omitted):
Although Cargill and Matsushita reserved as a formal matter the question
" 'whether recovery should ever be available ... when the pricing in question is
above some measure of incremental cost,' "the reasoning in both opinions suggests
that only below-cost prices should suffice, and we have rejected elsewhere the
notion that above-cost prices ... inflict injury to competition cognizable under
the antitrust laws. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328,
340 (1990). "Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set,
and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten
competition .... We have adhered to this principle regardless of the type of
antitrust claim involved." Ibid.
368 Cf. 113 S. Ct. at 2603 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting two secondary-line cases that
make clear that actual harm is not necessary for a violation).
369 See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 53, at 414-17.
3"0 Phillip Areeda & Donald F, Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
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argued that predatory pricing decisions should turn almost exclusively
on cost data. This would achieve only rough justice-erroneous outcomes
were guaranteed-but it would be administrable. 37' The test was deliber-
ately permissive because its authors (and many others) regarded preda-
tory pricing as rare and were troubled by the anticompetitive potential
of threatened litigation.372
The cost-based approach to predatory pricing swept the field,373 and
now in every circuit costs play a critical role in predatory pricing cases.
There are (or were) generally strong presumptions of illegality below
average variable cost and/or marginal cost, and presumptions of legality
above average total cost; between these points some courts presume
legality, whereas other courts evaluate factors such as entry barriers, the
short-run profit-maximizing price, and subjective intent.374 Brooke Group
squarely held that "a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury
resulting from a rival's low prices must prove that the prices complained
of are below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs. '37 5 Although the
Court again declined to resolve the conflict over the appropriate measure
of cost,3 6 the implication appears to be that the appropriate measure is
something other than total cost.
3 77
When Areeda and Turner proposed their objective test, it was at least
in theory a two-way predatory pricing test: Plaintiffs could win or lose
on cost data. Prices below marginal (or average variable) costs were
conclusively deemed predatory and unlawful; all other prices were
371 See also Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983)
(Breyer, J.) (importance of administrability emphasized in adopting cost-based standard);
Daniel J. Gifford, The Role of the Ninth Circuit in the Development of the Law of Attempt to
Monopolize, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1040-43 (1986); Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law
& Economics, and the Courts, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 195-98 (1987) (per se rules
and cost-based pricing rules driven by administrative rather than economic considerations).
372 See Areeda & Turner, Harvard article, supra note 370, at 698-700.
3
"Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories
and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981); Wesley J. Liebeler,
Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1052 (1986); Note, Single Firm Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law: The Rose Acre Recoupment
Test and the Search for an Appropriate jndicial Standard, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1757 (1991).
17' ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 53, at 227-37.
17. 113 S. Ct. at 2587 (footnote omitted).
376 Id. at 2587 n. I.
377 That total cost is not the anticipated answer is suggested by the Court's discussion of
the importance of encouraging price-cutting and competition on the merits. Also, the
Court noted that it had previously reserved "as a formal matter" on whether ever to permit
recovery for prices " 'above some measure of incremental cost,' " but "the reasoning in
both [those] opinions suggests that only below-cost prices should suffice." 113 S. Ct. at
2588 (quoting Cargill and Matsushita). The Court apparently thought it was now deciding
that prices may be illegal only when below some measure of incremental, not total, cost.
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deemed nonpredatory and lawful.378 In practice, however, plaintiffs al-
most always lost in the end, which made sense to the many commentators
who doubted that true predatory pricing was widespread.
Now, in Brooke Group, the Court has followed the Seventh Circuit's
lead by adding a second objective test and requiring plaintiffs to hurdle
both. As B&W's expert has written, "[elach is a one-way test., 379 The
cost-based pricing test has already proven extremely demanding. The
recoupment test could bejust as challenging, although the exact structure
of it is unclear.The Court appears to have fashioned a two-part recoup-
ment test. First, the specific target of predation must be "likely [to]
succumb." This turns on the nature and extent of the predation, and
the relative positions of the predator and the target.8 0 Second (and in
addition), the market must appear conducive to supracompetitive pric-
ing. Predatory pricing suits should be summarily rejected, "for example,
where the market is highly diffuse and competitive, or where new entry
is easy, or the defendant lacks adequate excess capacity to absorb the
market shares of his rivals and cannot quickly create or purchase new
capacity. ' 8 '
One can imagine at least three different ways to think about re-
coupment: (1) whether the defendant reasonably believed recoupment
was likely; (2) whether recoupment in fact was likely (measured at the
start of the alleged predation); and (3) whether recoupment in fact
occurred (or would have occurred but for, litigation). The original Su-
preme Court formulation, in Matsushita, seemed to intend the first ver-
sion. "For the investment to be rational, the [predator] must have a
reasonable expectation of recovering ... more than the losses suf-
fered.3 82 Brooke Group quoted this language with apparent approval.8 3
But as Brooke Group stated its test, it seemed to adopt the second meaning,
which is slightly different. Four times the Court discussed whether B&W
had a "reasonable prospect" of recouping its losses. 384 The focus was
378 Areeda & Turner, supra note 370, at 732-33.
379 Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Testing for Predation: Is Recoupment Feasible?, 34
ANTITRUST BULL. 869, 871 (1989). Professor Elzinga testified for B&W.
3'0 113 S. Ct. at 2589.
381 Id.
ss1 475 U.S. at 588-89. But cf. id. at 591 (Court relied in part on factual developments
subsequent to the commencement of the alleged predatory pricing).
383 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
384 Id. at 2588, 2592-93, 2598. As noted above, supra note 362, the Court indicated that
for § 2 the test would turn on whether there was a "dangerous probability" of recoupment.
The "dangerous probability" language is out of place here. The attempt violation requires
a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power by one means or another, or a
combination of means. But achieving monopoly power and achieving recoupment may be
quite different things, depending on the rigor of the latter test. The Court may reasonably
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not on B&W's expectations or their reasonableness. 85
As the Court reviewed the evidence, however, it seemed to be using
the third meaning, i.e., whether with hindsight recoupment in fact oc-
curred or would have occurred but for litigation. The first half of the
Court's analysis explicitly examined post-predation evidence and found
no evidence of actual recoupment. Liggett had argued that recoupment
had succeeded, so the Court was obliged to address the question; it is
disconcerting, nonetheless, to have a case turn so heavily on events oc-
curring during and after trial.38 6 The second half of the Court's analysis
purported to examine whether recoupment was likely in spring 1984,
when B&W introduced its generic cigarette. Yet, almost inevitably, the
Court relied in part on subsequent events-R.J. Reynolds did not raise
generic prices in June 1985, and "no documents appeared that indicated"
that R.J. Reynolds or Philip Morris understood B&W's generic pricing
to signal an interest in controlling pricing.38 7 This comes close to using
hindsight to conclude that recoupment was not likely to succeed. B&W
invited attention to post-trial developments by informing the Court that
use of generics continued to soar.388 Although the Court did not mention
want to protect aggressive pricing by immunizing it absent a "reasonable expectation" or
"prospect" of recoupment. But one "dangerous probability" test is enough. Cf. Continental
Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 70,334, at 70,753
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1993) (jury instructions in predatory pricing case with a post-Brooke
Group defense verdict):
To prove that a dangerous probability of success existed, Plaintiffs must prove
... that Defendants had a dangerous probability not only of getting a monopoly,
but also of keeping that monopoly long enough to recover or recoup their losses,
including a reasonable return on the sum lost, by charging monopoly prices. This
is called recoupment.
Evidence of below-cost pricing is not enough to show recoupment. Rather,
Plaintiffs have the burden of proving that if Defendants had gotten monopoly
power by driving other airlines from a relevant market, they could have kept that
monopoly long enough, and exercised monopoly power long enough, to recover
all their earlier losses, including a reasonable return on the sum lost, by raising
and keeping prices above competitive levels.
... The Court said that a reasonable jury could conclude that B&W "envisioned or
intended" to predate and recoup, but "whatever its intent," "no evidence suggests that
Brown & Williamson ... was likely to obtain the power to raise the prices for generic
cigarettes above a competitive level." 113 S. Ct. at 2592.
18' Nowhere did the Court discuss the reliability of evidence relating to behavior in the
shadow of litigation.
3" 113 S. Ct. at 2596-97; cf. Transcript at 32 (Bork) ("Liggett subpoenaed the executives
and the documents of Phillip Morris and RJR. And ... nowhere in ... those documents
or in their testimony, was there any indication that they thought they were getting any
kind of a signal from ... Brown & Williamson.").
3s8 Respondent's Brief at 15-16 ("the economy segment has grown from 4% of the
market in 1984 to 15% at time of trial and over 31% of the market today") (emphasis in
original) (citing Oct. 30, 1992 sales report); Transcript at 42 ("Then five of the six [cigarette]
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post-trial information, it would be difficult for anyone to conclude both
that recoupment had utterly failed.. 9 and that in 1984 it had been likely
to succeed. 9 °
Although not litigated and not explored in the opinions, there are
respectable arguments that pricing below expected incremental cost
(whatever the appropriate measure) is harmful, regardless of recoup-
ment, where notjustified as promotional.3 9' Such pricing cannot continue
without bankruptcy, and it can drive an equally or more efficient firm
out of business. 92 As the Court acknowledged, "unsuccessful predatory
companies sold generics, today all six do. We started with 2.8 billion cigarettes being sold
in generics, that jumped to 80 billion, and today it's about twice that."). In its reply to
B&W's opposition to certiorari, Liggett responded to similar arguments by noting that the
evidence is not in the record and by pointing out that cigarette prices, including especially
generic prices, continued to increase at substantially more than inflation. Reply Brief for
Petitioner on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9 n. 17. Liggett did not include this response
in its reply brief on the merits.
"9 The Court voted on the case on Wednesday, March 31, only two days before the
Friday that Philip Morris cut the price of Marlboro by 40 cents a pack, leading to a 22%
decline in Philip Morris's stock price and a 69 point drop in the Dow Jones Industrial
average. Steven Pearlstein,Jobs Report Shakes Faith in Recovery; March Rate Stuck at 7%; Dow
Off 69, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1993, at Al (quoting an analyst as saying that " '[alt the very
least, this will mean a major price war' "); Allen R. Myerson, Philip Morris Cuts Cigarette
Prices, Stunning Market, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993, § 1, p. 1, col. 3 (opening sentence
described move as "an acknowledgement that its flagship brand was threatened by competi-
tion from discount brands and the changing habits of smokers;" article reported analysts'
predicting "sharp price cuts" as "all but certain").
"o The third meaning of recoupment is not necessarily wrong. Assume, for example,
that the diamond business is a well-defined market in which there is a dominant firm.
Assume further that the dominant firm engaged in pricing below the usual measures of
incremental cost specifically to discipline a competitor, after which it planned to raise prices
to supracompetitive levels. Assume further that as of the predation all experts agreed this
recoupment was certain to succeed-but that just before trial a mother lode of diamonds
was discovered and diamond prices plummeted, to remain depressed for the foreseeable
future. It is not easy to decide whether the defendant should lose a treble damages predatory
pricing suit. If the defendant is liable, for what harm? If it is not liable, does this mean
that records should remain perpetually open, legal outcomes should explicitly turn on
subsequent events, and wrongful acts should go unpunished?
sgiE.g., STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 69-72 (1993); Rose Acre Note,
supra note 373; Note, Intent as an Element of Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1242 (1991) (questioning recoupment; advocating attention to
subjective intent). For an argument that "below cost pricing by a firm with more resources
than its competitors should be sufficient, in itself, to sustain an attempted monopolization
judgment," see Roszkowski & Brubaker, supra note 145, at 415. But see, e.g., Note, Predatory
Pricing: The Retreat from Subjective Intent Analysis and the Move Toward a Likelihood of Recoupment
Inquiry, 24 SUFFOLK L. REv. 975 (1990).
s92 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer,
J.) ("At a minimum, one would wonder why the firm would cut prices on 'incremental
production' below its 'avoidable' costs unless it later expected to raise its prices and recoup
its losses."). But cf. Baker, supra note 307 (unless cost is computed correctly, some below-
marginal-cost pricing may be consistent with competition on the merits).
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pricing may encourage some inefficient substitution toward the product
being sold at less than its cost. '3 93 The Court's adoption of a universal
recoupment requirement has implicitly rejected these arguments. The
arguments have less weight if recoupment has the first meaning given
above, more weight with the second, and yet greater weight with the
third. It is unfortunate that the Court was not clearer about what it
meant by recoupment.
3 9 4
By itself this new recoupment requirement is a potent weapon in
defendants' arsenals. Requiring plaintiffs to pass this objective test and
to prove pricing below (for instance) average variable cost would make
predatory pricing violations rare indeed. Perhaps courts will respond to
the addition of the new recoupment test by adjusting their cost tests,
e.g., by immunizing only profit-maximizing costs or only average total
costs.395 Perhaps even more likely, plaintiffs may seek predatory pricing
relief in state court,396 in trade policy, or in the marketplace.
V. CONCLUSION
It was a disappointing term for Supreme Court antitrust. No outcome
was obviously wrong: Lessig had lived too long as an aberration; the
copyright suit in PRE did not appear sham under any definition; the
London reinsurers in Hartford Fire probably always expected to be held
to account, it was too early in the litigation to invoke the boycott exception,
and the Ninth Circuit had simply erred when it ruled that an unprotected
agreement forfeits McCarran-Ferguson protection; and most observers
thought Brooke Group was a close call.
The disappointment lies in the litigation process and the quality of
the opinions. The Solicitor General played only a marginal role.397 Time
'9' 113 S. Ct. at 2588 (but adding that "unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to
consumers"); see also Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U.
CH. L. REv. 506, 519 (1974) ("There is no reason consistent with an interest in efficiency
for selling a unit at a price lower than the cost that the seller incurs by the sale.").
39' The Court was surprisingly clear and aggressive on one recoupment question not at
issue before it. Recoupment could refer generally to the likelihood of post-predation
supracompetitive pricing. Although not important to the case, the Court appeared to
contemplate considerably more: "The plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a likelihood
that the predatory scheme alleged would cause a rise in prices above a competitive level
that would be sufficient to compensate for the amounts expended on the predation, including the time
value of the money invested in it. 113 S. Ct. at 2589 (emphasis added). Although this is dictum,
it already has been followed by a court (in the American Airlines predatory pricing jury
instructions quoted supra note 384).
395 But cf. supra note 377 (Court appears to contemplate an incremental cost test).
396 Cf. American Drugs, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 70,382
(Ark. Ch. Ct. Oct. 12, 1993) (enjoining Wal-Mart's below-cost pricing).
117 The Solicitor General was conspicuously, missing from Brooke Group, his views not
having been sought. He argued unsuccessfully against the grant of certiorari in Spectrum
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and again there was a lack of joinder on key issues, or a lack of advocacy
of an anticipated position or a position found persuasive by the Justices.
In Brooke Group, the parties disagreed even to the end of oral argument
on what the case was about, and the Court's conclusion was based in
significant part on an argument (that price increases were demand-
driven) not made by a party. The Court heard Brooke Group in part to
consider a Fourth Circuit holding of law, but the respondent argued
vigorously that there was no such holding. The Court heard Spectrum
Sports to consider a Ninth Circuit Lessig-based decision, but the respon-
dent insisted Lessig was not in issue. In PRE, petitioners changed their
recommended legal standard even during oral argument. In Hartford
Fire Insurance Justice Scalia relied on arguments not made by the parties
to interpret McCarran-Ferguson's boycott exception (a 5-4 majority
opinion) and to establish the analytical structure for determining whether
to hear antitrust cases involving foreign conduct (a 4-5 dissent).
The Court's opinions are no more satisfying than the appellate litiga-
tion that preceded them. Spectrum Sports does little more than remove
Lessig, leaving many questions unanswered. The analysis in PRE is unper-
suasive, the announced standards varying, and the consequences unclear.
The majority's approach to the McCarran boycott exception, in Hartford
Fire Insurance, suffers from some of the same flaws. Also in that case,
comity was treated quite cavalierly, the majority's test for the existence
of a conflict was based on an apparent misreading of the Restatement,
and the difficult issues were not resolved. In Brooke Group, the Court
engaged in an ill-advised review of the sufficiency of the evidence.
The single clear lesson from the Term is that the movement toward
antitrust objectivity continues.39 s The objectivist view of attempts pre-
vailed in Spectrum Sports, and the extension of the requirement of showing
a dangerous probability of success increased the importance of objective
Sports and Hartford Insurance. On the merits, the Solicitor General prevailed in the unre-
markable Spectrum Sports but little else. In Professional Real Estate his argument for a subjec-
tive approach to the "sham" exception was rejected (although the Court and he both
thought respondents should win). The Court in Hartford Fire Insurance and the Solicitor
General both favored continuing the suit against the London reinsurers but only the
Solicitor General favored Timberlane-type balancing. Also in Hartford Fire Insurance, the
Solicitor General favored a relatively broad boycott exception but the Court disagreed.
3"' The same issue is debated outside antitrust, although a different trend is perceived.
See Mark L. Evans, Business Had Winning Record, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at S7: "In several
less-important cases, the court carried on an intriguing debate regarding the desirability of
crisp and understandable legal rules. But those calling for simple bright-line tests were in
the minority, and the court's apparent affinity for vague, case-by-case balancing tests
remained unshaken, at least for now." (citations omitted). As discussed in a brief appendix,
the trend toward antitrust objectivity is unlikely to be slowed by the replacement of justice
White with Justice Ginsburg.
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market information. In Hartford Fire Insurance both the majority and the
dissent shied away from international comity-based balancing tests. On
the boycott exception the Court sought an answer in a precise definition
of "boycott," although certainty may prove illusory.
Perhaps most interesting in this respect are PRE and Brooke Group.
Each case placed an additional objective hurdle in front of antitrust
plaintiffs. Before PRE, plaintiffs alleging sham litigation had to pass a
subjective test; now they have to pass that test plus an objective test.
Before Brooke Group, many predatory pricing plaintiffs had to pass an
objective test (below-cost pricing). Now all plaintiffs have to pass that
test plus another objective test (recoupment). As the Court keeps adding
one-way-only objective hurdles, one is reminded, with some irony, of
Judge Easterbrook's query, "Is there a ratchet in antitrust law?"3 99
APPENDIX
A Comment on the Replacement of
justice White by Justice Ginsburg
The trend toward objectivity discussed in the text is unlikely to be
stemmed by the first Democratic Supreme Court appointment since
1967. Justice Ginsburg presents a mixed picture on antitrust issues. She
voted for defendants in Rothery Van Lines (joining Judge Robert Bork's
provocative opinion), in Baker Hughes (joining then-Judge Thomas's sur-
prising attack on the Justice Department), and in Weyerhaeuser (writing
the opinion denying an FTC request for a preliminary injunction).0 0
On the other hand, she voted for the plaintiffs in the DetroitJOA case,4 '
which she told the Senate "gives the best picture of my views." In her
Senate confirmation testimony, she testified in ways quite unlike a Chi-
cago School disciple: "There is also an interest in preserving the indepen-
dence of entrepreneurs.. . . I don't think the antitrust laws are adopting
'99 Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705 (1982)
(complaining about the one-way movement toward more widespread condemnation of
business practices).
o United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,084 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (joining Judge Thomas's opinion denying preliminary injunction); Rothery Storage
& Van Lines, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (preferring
Judge Bork's emphasis on market power to the balancing in Judge Wald's concurrence),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (Ginsburg, J.) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction; Judge Mikva dissented).
40 Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1297
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), affirmed by equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38
(1989) (for discussion of the case see Calkins, First Amendment, supra note 6, at 375-78,
and Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399 (strongly
criticizing majority opinion as ignoring accepted canons of statutory construction)).
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any one particular theory."'4 2 Justice Ginsburg's antitrust views must be
considered mixed and not yet fully developed.
In contrast, the antitrust views ofJustice White, whomJustice Ginsburg
replaced, were well established; and objectivity advocates rarely attracted
his vote in close cases. In recent years Justices White and Stevens were
the most consistent friends of antitrust plaintiffs on the Court.40 1 Many
recent antitrust disputes at the Supreme Court have turned on whether
to entrust more to rule-creation or more to fact-finding. The leading
protagonists for each position have been Justices Scalia and Stevens.
Justice Stevens's most reliable ally was Justice White.40 4
Although Justices Brennan and Marshall may have been perceived as
allied with liberal causes on many issues, in antitrust cases Justice White
was a more consistent supporter of plaintiffs.4 5 Justice White voted for
402 Antitrust Issues in the New Supreme Court, FTC: WATCH No. 395, Aug. 2, 1993, at 3, 4.
40' In Barbara White's grouping of Justices into antitrust pigeonholes, only Justices
Stevens and White were what she called "modern populists." Barbara Ann White, Counter-
vailing Power-Different Rules for Different Markets? Conduct and Context in Antitrust Law and
Economics, 41 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1055 n.40 (1992).
404 These two positions are discussed in Calkins, Toward Certainty, supra note 1, at 615.
Ironically, during the 1992-93 Supreme Court Term as a whole Justice White voted least
often with Justice Stevens, most often with ChiefJustice Rehnquist. The greatest agreement
was between Justices Scalia and Thomas (91%), the least between Justices Stevens and
Thomas (61%). Voting Alignments: 1992-93 Term, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at S 1. Similar
patterns held in earlier years. For the 1991-92 Term, Justice White agreed least often with
Justices Blackmun (57.9%) and Stevens (58.8%), most often with Chief Justice Rehnquist
(71.9%). The greatest agreement was between Justices Scalia and Thomas (85.9%), the
least between Justices Scalia and Stevens (35.1%). The Statistics, 105 HARV. L. REv. 378,
379 (1992) (Table 1). For the 1990-91 Term, Justice White again agreed least often with
Justice Stevens (59.2%) and most often with Chief Justice Rehnquist (79.2%). With Justice
Thomas not on the Court, the greatest agreement was between Justices O'Connor and
Souter (88.9%), the least again between Justices Scalia and Stevens (41.2%). The Statistics,
105 HARV. L. REv. 419, 420 (1991) (Table I).
405 See Stephen Calkins, The October 1989 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: Power, Access,
and Legitimacy, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 339, 376-77 (1990) (comments on antitrust consequences
of Justice Brennan's retirement). Justice Marshall voted for antitrust defendants in impor-
tant cases such as Atlantic Richfield v. USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. 328 (1990); Business
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado,
Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986); and Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48
(1985). But cf. Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1984) (Brennan,
J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring) (strongly reaffirming per se illegality of tying);
Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 546 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (only Marshall voted for standing); Great Atlantic
& Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 85 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (voting with FTC
against Court's derivative standard for price discrimination buyer liability); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 71 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined
by Marshall) (United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), should not
be overruled).
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plaintiffs in majorities in Ticor (6-3),4o6 Kodak (6-3),407 Summit Health (5-
4),401 Jefferson Parish (9-0, butJustice O'Connor and three junior Justices
concurred), °9 McCready (5-4),4 ° Maricopa County (4-3),4lI Professional
Engineers (one of four Justices to join all of Justice Stevens's opinion for
the Court), 41 2 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. (one of three Justices to join all
of Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court),15 Otter Tail Power (4-3),4l4
Topco (6-1),4 15 S&H (7-0) (authored Court's opinion),1 6 California Motor
Transport,417 Albrecht (7-2) (authored Court's opinion), 4 8 Grinnell Corp.
(6-3),4' 9 Von's Grocery (6-2),42o Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC (6-3),42l Conti-
nental Can (7-2; authored Court's opinion),422 Utah Pie (authored Court's
opinion), and Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Co. (8-0) (authored
Court's opinion).423
406 Ticor Title Ins. v. FTC, 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992); see Calkins, Revenge of the Amici, supra
note 109, at 270-79.
407 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992); see
Calkins, Revenge of the Amici, supra note 109, at 285-310.
408 Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991). Summit Health, by a 5-4 vote
margin, continued the confusion surrounding the Sherman Act's commerce requirement.
Justice Scalia, in dissent, would have increased certainty by shifting power from juries to
judges. See Calkins, Toward Certainty, supra note 1, at 618-37.4
1
9 Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
410 Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
41 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
412 National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Justice Blackmun,
with Justice Rehnquist, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice
Burger concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Brennan did not participate.
4 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Chief Justice Burger concurred in part and concurred in the
judgment. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment. Justice Stewart,joined by Justices
Powell and Rehnquist, dissented
414 OtterTail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (Douglas,J., for the Court;
Stewart, J., with Ch. J. Burger and J. Rehnquist, concurred in part but dissented in
substantial part; Blackmun and Powell, JJ., took no part).
... United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
4 16 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
417 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (Douglas, J.). Justice Stewart, with Justice Brennan, concurred
in the judgment. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate.
4. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented.
Justice Douglas joined the Court's opinion and concurred.
41' United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). Justice Harlan dissented, and
Justice Fortas, with Justice Stewart, also dissented.
420 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). Justice Fortas did not
participate. Justice Stewart, with Justice Harlan, dissented.
421 381 U.S. 357 (1965) (justice Clark for the Court;Justice Stewart, withJustice Harlan,
dissented; Justice Goldberg dissented).
4122 United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (Justice Goldberg con-
curred; Justice Harlan, with Justice Stewart, dissented).
423 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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Justice White joined Justice Stevens's dissent in Brooke Group and all
ofJustice Souter's opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance, and dissented, voting
for plaintiffs, in Omni Outdoor Advertising,424 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co. (7-2),425 Kansas v. Utilicorp United Inc. (5-4) (wrote opin-
ion),426 Business Electronics (6-2),427 Cargill v. Monfort (6-2),42s Matsushita
(5-4) (wrote opinion),429 Southern Motor Carriers (7-2),430 and General
Dynamics (5-4).43' Finally, Justice White concurred in the judgment in
GTE Sylvania, but argued against overruling Schwinn.4 s2
Although there are exceptions,43 3 the pattern is clear. Unless Justice
Ginsburg develops an unusual-and not yet evidenced-preference for
the subjective approach to antitrust, her replacement of Justice White
is likely to maintain or even increase the importance of objective tests in
Supreme Court antitrust.
424 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991); see
Calkins, Toward Certainty, supra note 1, at 610-18.
42' 495 U.S. 328 (1990); see Calkins, October 1989 Term, supra note 405, at 363-66.
426 497 U.S. 199 (1990); see Calkins, October 1989 Term, supra note 405, at 358-63.
427 Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
428 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
429 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
130 Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
4-1 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
412 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 71 (1977) (WhiteJ., concur-
ring in the judgment). Justice White did not participate in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
Justice White also voted in part for the plaintiff in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 85 (1979) (White,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although
he joined the Court's discussion of the legal standard for buyer liability under the Robinson-
Patman Act, Justice White objected when the Court, on its own, determined that the
pricing at issue was justified by the meeting competition defense. Justice White would have
remanded the case back to the Federal Trade Commission for initial determination.
133 Most notable, Justice White wrote the 8-1 opinion, from which Justice Stevens dis-
sented, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979),
and he dissented from Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492
(1988), NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984),
and Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
Justice White also voted for the defendant, joining Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, in
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), a leading state action case.
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